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
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Head and Heart

BY

J. SPANGLER KIEFFER

Παθήματα μαθήματα. Herodotus 1, 207

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То

JOHN SPANGLER KIEFFER,

NOW FIVE YEARS OLD, AND, IN HIS GENERATION, THE HEAD
OF THE HOUSE, THIS BOOK IS AFFECTIONATELY
DEDICATED BY HIS GRANDFATHER,
THE AUTHOR.



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PREFACE.

The essays contained in this volume appeared first in the form of articles contributed to the Reformed Church Messenger, with which the author has been associated as a contributor for twenty-five years. None of them were originally intended for any other publicity than that which they thus received. In compliance, however, with the expressed desire of many of their readers, that some of them might be preserved in more permanent form, the present selection is published. In order to impart to the volume some sort of unity and order, such articles have been, for the most part, selected, as treat of a class of themes sufficiently indicated by its title. Along with them, it has been deemed not improper to include certain others, though not, strictly speaking, belonging to the same class.

J. S. K.

Hagerstown, Md., Aug. 6, 1909.



"THE IMPERIAL POWER IN HUMAN NATURE."

"IT is one of our limitiations to imagine that poetry is something less than truth instead of its only adequate expression, and that the heart is an impulsive child whose vagaries have to be checked, instead of the imperial power in human nature." We have quoted a characteristic sentence from "The Mind of the Master," by Dr. John Watson, a volume which has a large part of its significance and value in its distinct affirmation of certain deep, fundamental, spiritual truths, liable to be forgotten or disparaged. what the author says concerning poetry, though cordially assenting to it, and firmly believing that there is a sense in which, as Mrs. Browning says, the poets are "your only truth-tellers," or that, as Matthew Arnold declares we may some day learn to say, "poetry is the reality, philosophy the illusion," it is not our purpose at present directly to speak. We would, however, venture to say a few words concerning what is here very aptly called the imperial power of our being. are interested in this clear and striking affirmation of the supremacy (the word 'heart' being properly understood) of the heart.

Of the intellect and the things pertaining to the life intellectual, it is hardly possible to speak too highly, provided room is left to speak more highly still of another constituent element of our complex being. We shall quarrel with no one for paying great honor to the human understanding, if it be conceded that still greater honor is due to that power whose behests the understanding in some sense obeys. We shall willingly bow before this throne, if we may be permitted to bow with a still deeper reverence before the power behind the throne. The intellect may be kingly, but the heart is imperial. The affections are elemental, determining, sovereign. To love is more than to know. Knowledge follows in the wake of love; it cannot be said that love necessarily follows in the wake of knowledge.

At the root of all knowledge lies some form of affection. "The very basis and beginning of intellect, the first inducement to the exercise thereof, is," as a certain philosopher has said, "attraction towards, or affection for, some object." The law of the primacy of the affections in relation to the intellect would seem to be universal, holding good in regard to all kinds of knowledge. But most of all is the operation of it perceptible in the highest realms of truth, with reference to the knowledge of God and of all spiritual truth. Here knowledge without feeling is absolutely impossible; "it supposes," as Dr. Hodge says,

"the most essential characteristics of the object to be unperceived." This is St. Paul's declaration, that knowledge without love is nothing. This is his affirmation not only in the famous 13th chapter of I Corinthians, but also in the 8th chapter, where he says: "If any man think that he knoweth anything, he knoweth nothing vet as he ought to know. But if any man love God, the same is known of Him." This, also, is St. John's declaration: "Every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. that loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is love." And, in so declaring, these apostles were but reiterating a law which had previously been laid down by their own Master, when He said: "He that hath my words and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me; and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him." These words imply that, in regard to our Savior's person and all that pertains to Him, love, expressing itself by obedience (without which there can be no genuine love of Him), is the principle of manifestation or revelation. The same deep truth is indeed often elsewhere affirmed by our Savior, as for example, where he promises the highest knowledge (that, namely, which is involved in the vision of God) not to acuteness of intelligence, but to purity of heart: "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they hall see God."

This pre-eminence of the affectional elements of our nature, though often forgotten, is nevertheless found to be repeatedly and strongly affirmed, by a long succession, among human writers, of those who have thought most deeply upon the subject. We would merely call attention to the following distinct expression, by Prof. Tayler Lewis, of what we have been trying to say: "The emotional, in view of the true and the right, the evil and the false, is a higher thing than the intellectual perception of them, even could we suppose such separable cognition. We do not rightly see the true, or truly see the right, unless we love it; we do not truly see the evil or the false, unless we have the opposite affection."

The sovereignty of the affections is clearly evident from the fact that it is these, chiefly, that determine character. It is our affections, above all, that ultimately make us what we are; for it is actions that determine character, and affections (in the sense in which we are using the word) that determine actions. It is not the knowledge, but the love, of what is right, that will lead a man to the doing of it. Tell us what a man thinks, or knows, or even believes (in a certain not unusual sense of the word) and we have as yet no sufficient clue to his character. There are men who are, as Bacon says: "scientia tanquam angeli alati, cupiditatibus vero tanquam serpentes qui humi reptant,"—in knowledge like

winged angels, but in passions like creeping serpents. Bacon himself, indeed, was an instance of an almost flawless intellect combined with a moral character full of weaknesses and flaws Nor is there anything more common than this fatal discrepancy between intellect and character. this painful dualism between the things which a man knows, and the things which he does. the source of a great part of man's misery; it is the fountain of much of the sadness and pathos of human life. That one sees and approves what is right, but pursues what is wrong, is the mournful theme, not only of a portion of the 7th chapter of Romans, but of many a beautifully expressed lamentation by Latin or Greek poet. Knowledge has in itself no power to compel conduct and form character; it is dependent upon a force lying back of itself to give it the power which it ought to have; it is not possible to infer, simply from what a man thinks or knows what the man himself actually is.

But tell us what a man likes; what his affections are set upon; what he thinks most of and cares most for; what his ideal is; what he is bending his energies to attain,—and instantly we are on the trail of the man's character. For we invariably become like the thing that we like. It is the thing that we care most for that determines our conduct and assimilates our character. Affections set on earthly things produce an earthly

character, and affections set on heavenly things produce a heavenly character. We are insensibly drawn towards and assimilated to the objects on which our hearts are fixed. This is the law by which all character is formed. This, above all. is the principle on which Christian character is developed.—"We all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord." But let no one suppose that this transforming vision is one vouchsafed to intellectual perception; it is the same vision which our Lord promises to purity of heart; it is the vision which he alone beholds. which he alone is capable of beholding, in whose heart the love of the Lord resides and reigns.

Many minor indications there are of what may be called the primacy of the affections; one or two of which only we have space briefly to mention. It is characteristic of the affections, it is a mark of their superior rank, that they are incapable of serving for pay. Whatever they may do, must of necessity, by the very law of their nature, be "all for love, and nothing for reward." Intellect may be hired; there is nothing in its nature to prevent it. Intellectual ability comes into the market-place, and is not necessarily degraded by so doing; it will serve you, and serve you honorably and faithfully for suitable recompense. But all the wealth of the world cannot purchase

one particle of affection. The affections never come to market; they scorn the market-place; they take no pay; it is of their very nature to serve, but, whomsoever they may serve, they will serve no one for hire. They go their own way, following the higher law of their own being.

Finally, affection never becomes weary. There is a weariness of body, and a weariness of mind, but not properly speaking, a weariness of heart. In this sense, among others, "love never faileth." It knows no fatigue; it travels on in the greatness of its strength. When we love, we love on, unconscious of any lassitude, defiant of all fatigue. When the body breaks down, and the mind becomes weary with a great weariness, the affections are still unjaded and fresh. This is one mark of their being higher up in the scale of our being. There is in them something of the vitality and power of immortality.

II

PASSIONATE BELIEF.

Belief is never at its best until it becomes pas-To believe, in the proper sense of the word, is the highest act of which a man is capable. and the source of all admirable and beneficent It is this that makes men strong, to do, actions. to suffer, to conquer; he is thrice himself, it has been said, who has a Belief. "Belief, said one the other night," so writes Carlyle in his Journal, "has done immense evil: witness Knipperdolling and the Anabaptists, etc. 'True,' responded I, with vehemence, almost with fury, 'true, belief has done some evil in the world; but it has done all the good that was ever done in it; from the time when Moses saw the burning Bush and believed it to be God appointing him deliverer of His people, down to the last act of belief that vou and I executed. Good never comes from aught else." If one carefully considers the nature and the evident capabilities of belief, he will have some glimpse of the reason for the prodigious emphasis which the New Testament lays upon belief, and the prodigious achievements which it attributes to believers. He will have some vision of the deep, spiritual meaning of our

Savior's words when he says, "These signs shall follow them that believe: In my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover." And it will not seem to him an over-statement when the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews affirms of the believers of previous times that they "subdued kingdoms, wrought right-eousness, obtained promises, stopped the mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire, out of weakness were made strong, waxed valiant in fight, turned to flight the armies of the aliens."

But it is necessary to discriminate; for the word 'belief' is capable of being used in two very widely different senses. As actually used, it often stands for something almost as different as can be from the mighty meaning of the word as it stands in the New Testament and in the Apostles' Creed. The word 'belief' is often, and not improperly, made to signify acquiescence in and acceptance of some logically demonstrated truth. It is belief intellectual and philosophical; and it is good as far as it goes; we have nothing to say against it. We are simply affirming that this intellectual assent is not the belief of which we have been speaking; is not the mighty, changing. conquering, wonder-working force which the New Testament intends when it uses this great

word. Indeed, it is not, necessarily and in itself. a forceful thing at all. This is one of the principal characteristics of it,-its want of energy and compelling power. It is marked, as could be shown in many ways, by a singular insufficiency and incompetence. It is as if it ought to rule, yet could not; it has all the marks of sovereignty. with one fatal exception, namely, that of the ruling power. It stands there, to use a phrase of Burke's, "in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction." Such simply intellectual and philosophical belief is solitary, and, because solitary, is, as far as regards the transforming of character and the doing of mighty deeds, impotent and unproductive; whereas, the belief that is belief is the most powerful and productive energy that a human life can know.

It is as if all good things in the world were the result of combination and concurrence. Nothing, standing by itself alone, can be excellent; but only as it is blended with something else. It is not only of man, but of everything that has life, of every vital principle or force, that it holds true that it is "not good to be alone." It is only when belief in the sense we have indicated is combined with something else, to which we can give no better name than that of passion, that it is endued with power. When it becomes passionate, then its nakedness is clothed, its barrenness is changed into fertility, and its impotence into

energy. It is passionate belief that wields the sceptre; it is the passion of it that puts transforming and conquering power into any belief a man may hold. The intellect may give light, but it cannot supply warmth; it may show the way. but it cannot furnish motive power. The secret forces whereby our complex and mysterious nature is moved to action, lie not in the realm of the intellect (important and absolutely indispensable to all wise action as that part of our being is), but in the deeper realm of the affections. It is the belief which has its root in this deep region. and draws from thence a spirit of passionate devotion, that alone possesses power. Nay, it may well be questioned whether any other sort of belief is at all worthy of this high name; whether every other sort of belief is not, in fact. a shadowy and unreal thing. For a man's Belief, what is it other than his Ideal? And his Ideal, what is it other than the thing which is to him the highest and loveliest of all objects; the thing which he thinks most of and cares most for? And what would it be other than a contradiction in terms to say that the thing which a man cares most for is one which he is capable of regarding without feelings of passionate attachment and devotion? Belief, properly understood, is, in its very nature, passionate.

It is in accordance with this law that our

Christian belief is, primarily, not in any proposition, or set of propositions, but in a Person. is because, however we may believe in propositions, we cannot love them; we are so constituted that we are able, properly speaking, to love only persons. And so our religion consists, first and most of all, in belief in our personal Savior, Jesus Whatever truths we may need to believe concerning Him, whatever doctrines it may be necessary for us to receive by reason of Him, our first, fundamental, and all-comprehending act of belief is in Him. In Him alone we can believe with a belief that is passionate with all the passion of which our nature is capable. We cannot so believe in any doctrine, however fundamental and necessary: it does not make the same appeal to our affections. Still less can we so believe in those things which philosophy would present to us instead of our personal Savior; not in any "stream of tendency;" not in "the Power not ourselves that makes for righetousness," of which Matthew Arnold speaks; not in Herbert Spencer's "infinite and eternal Energy." We cannot worship a Tendency; nor pour out the wealth of our affection upon a Power; nor be so devoted to an Energy as to be willing to die for it. But God has given to us His Only Son, Jesus Christ; nay, in Him God has Himself drawn near unto us and manifested Himself unto us in personal human Him we can worship and love; Him form.

we can admire and adore, and He is the only one whom it is safe for us to admire all the admiration and adore, with adoration of which our souls are capable: to Him we can be devoted with that intense affection which is the ultimate source within us of all knowledge and all power. The belief in Jesus Christ, the man who died for men on Calvary, is of necessity a passionate belief; it could not exist apart from passionateness. To take away the passion, is to take away the power, of it. To make it a thing of the intellect, exclusively or mainly, is to rob it of its conquering energy, to despoil it of its sceptre and all its kingly character. To believe in Jesus Christ is the deepest, the most significant, the most influential thing a man can do: and it is this because it proceeds from the deepest part of him, the region in which the will and the affections dwell, and carries with it (as it belongs to that which is imperial to do) all the combined capabilities and powers of his mysterious being. "With the heart, man believeth unto righteousness." Nor could there well be a greater mistake than that of supposing that there may be a belief in Christ, in the New Testament sense of the word, other than the passionate belief of the heart; than that of substituting belief in propositions, or truths, or doctrines concerning Christ (important as all these are) for belief in Christ Himself.

III

WITH THE HEART.

There is a beautiful and striking French saying which tells us that "great thoughts come from the heart." It seems to imply a distinction according to which, while ordinarily and usually thoughts come from the mind, if there is any thought which is singled out from the rest as great and extraordinary, it is characteristic of it that it comes from the heart. It is a poetic, rather than a scientific, saving; the truth of which will be best pecreived by those who are of a poetic spirit. It is a saying, also, the scope of which might well be extended, so as to include other things besides thoughts. Not only great thoughts, but great actions also, may in a certain sense be said to proceed from that part of our mysterious nature which it is usual to describe as "heart." It is often said that nothing great is ever accomplished without enthusiasm. The German philosopher, Hegel, says that "nothing great is ever done without passion." Now, passion and enthusiasm are things, not of the head, but of the heart. Certain it is that the highest moral and spiritual act of which man is capable is performed with the heart. "With the heart," says

St, Paul. "man believeth unto righteousness." The verb which he uses is impersonal and passive; what he says is, literally, "with the heart it is believed;" that is, believing is characteristically a thing of the heart.

There are actions to the very idea of which it belongs that they cannot be performed otherwise than with the heart. There may indeed be the semblance of such performance: to all outward appearance, the thing may be done, and done otherwise than with the heart: but the act thus performed proves to have in it no virtue and no validity. It fails, so to speak, for want of heart. There are resolutions which are entirely unproductive of the beneficent results anticipated from them; it is because they were passed without, rather than with, the heart, that is, by a cold, negative, passive, simply acquiescent vote, having in them no warmth and fervor of genuine desire, conviction and resolution. There are laws enacted from which great consequences are expected, but which for some reason wholly fail to produce these consequences, proving ineffectual and futile, remaining, as men are accustomed to say, a "dead letter" on the statute-book; incapable of being, or at least failing to be, enforced and put into execution. It is because of the manner in which they were enacted; there was no heart in it; they are not the genuine expression of the "moral sentiment" of the community;

they do not come from the depths of the passionate beliefs, desires, convictions and determinations of the people. There would seem to be a general law, according to which, within the sphere of those things which relate to the lives, conduct and welfare of men, nothing can be accomplished without the action, or against the veto, of that imperial part of us which is often denominated "the heart." This is the region in which the great motive forces have their origin; this is the seat of attachment, affection, desire, passion; nay, in a certain deep sense, of thought and knowledge, too. However it may be with inferior thoughts and inferior actions, the great thoughts and the great actions "come from the heart." If this is true, it must be true most of all of the sovereign act of believing.

There is a belief, it is true, which is a purely intellectual act, being the acquiescence in and acceptance of truth by the mind. That is to say, certain propositions or statements are made, and are substantiated by sufficient proof, and we mentally accept them and believe them to be true. Upon a certain question argument is instituted, proceeding step by step to the conclusion, and we, following the process, finally accept the conclusion on the strength of the argument and the logic. The case is one of evidence and proof, and the act is one of which our minds are entirely capable. But, whatever

may be thought of this form of belief, it is evidently as different as can be from what the New Testament means by believing: this is a thing of which the mind by itself is not capable. In the New Testament "he that believeth" is not he that believes a certain statement, or proposition. or doctrine, but he that believes in Jesus Christ. To believe a statement is one thing; to believe in a person is another. To accept a conclusion arrived at by argument, or to believe in a fact substantiated by evidence, is one thing; to believe in the incarnate Son of God, and "that God hath raised Him from the dead" is another. The former is, the latter is not, an act capable of being performed by the intellect alone. "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ" is the constant command of the New Testament. "I believe in God the Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ, His only begotten Son, our Lord," is the constant affirmation of the Christian Church in her confes-This kind of believing, it is evident, sion of faith. is other and more than an intellectual act. Believing in Jesus Christ, in this sense, is not essentially different from loving and obeying Him; and these are acts which are not appropriate to the mind, nor capable of being performed otherwise than by the will and the affections. When a man believes he believes not with the cold and ineffective assent of the mind, but with the passionate and powerful desire, attachment and devotion of the heart

That belief is a thing of the heart results from the fact that believing is the supreme act of which man is capable, and can, therefore, effectively be performed only by that which is supreme within him. Now it would seem as if, in the Scriptures, "heart" were an expression for that which is sovereign and supreme in man's being. It would seem to signify, not so much any single, particular faculty, or power, or constituent element of his nature, as, rather, that in him which is deepest, most central, most comprehensive, most vitally related to all the rest. It is not so much a particular part of him, distinguished from all other parts, as that in him in which all the parts come together and coalesce into one. In every living organism there is something central, that is, to which all points of the circumference are equally related; something capital, that is, to which the rest of the organism is related as the body to the head; something radical, that is, from which all the rest grows, as from a root; something cardinal or pivotal, that is, on which all the rest turns, as on a hinge or pivot; something vital, that is, on which the life of the organism depends. Now, in man's being this central, capital, radical, cardinal, pivotal, vital thing the Scriptures call "the heart." It is that which is deepest, most determining, most dominant in man's soul; from which all his thoughts, desires, intentions, resolutions, actions proceed; which assenting, the whole man assents; which refusing, the whole man refuses. It is, as it were, an expression for the whole soul.

To say, therefore, that it is with the heart that man believes is equivalent to saying that he believes with his whole soul; that believing is performed, not by the separate action of any particular part of man's being as distinguished from the rest, but by the united action of the combined capabilities and powers of his entire being. No single part of him, no particular faculty or power, is sufficient for the accomplishment of this great work. It is an often quoted saving of Goethe's that "whatever a man does greatly, he does with his whole nature." Now, believing is the one thing of which, above all others, it may be said that it is done "greatly." It is a great action, and it is greatly performed. It is the supreme achievement of which a man is capable. He is at his highest and best, not when he is merely thinking, knowing, arguing, concluding, but when, by an act which includes all these activities and much more besides, he "believes." And, just for this reason, believing is a thing which can be done only by our whole nature, the intellect, the emotions, the will, all concurring in this supreme act. It can be done only by that which stands for, by that which in a certain sense is, our entire nature. But this is evidently just what the Scriptures mean by "the heart"

Inferior actions, it may be, are in some sense capable of being performed by this or that part of our being, acting separately and independently. There are times when the intellectual, or the emotional, or the volitional part of the soul may be active without special reference to the Now the man is thinking; now he is simply feeling; now he is acting. Especially may the intellect be said to be capable of such separate and independent action; when a scientific investigation is being conducted, it is not by the heart, but by the mind, that it is being conducted. What has been said, however, is true only with certain qualifications, and in regard to matters of inferior importance. When it comes to matters of supreme importance, when the act in question is the sovereign act of believing, such independent action is no longer either sufficient or possible. Believing must be done by the intellect, the emotions, the will, acting together. That is, it must be done with the whole soul; that is, it must be done "with the heart,"

The soul is like an army, which, though it is one, and under the authority of one commander-in-chief, is composed of different parts, or "branches of the service," capable, at times and according to circumstances, of acting separately. It may, at this or that particular time, be only a part of the army that is in action. Now it is a skirmish of infantry that is taking

place; and now it is a cavalry reconnoissance that is being made; and now it is an artillery duel that is being fought. But now there is a great change; evidently a critical hour has arrived, and a supreme act is about to be performed; the whole army, infantry, cavalry and artillery, is in motion and action. It is a "general engagement;" it is Gettysburg.

What a general engagement like that of Gettysburg is to an infantry skirmish, or a cavalry reconnoissance, or an artillery duel, that the supreme act of believing is to any act of which any particular part of our being is separately and independently capable. When it comes to believing, all the forces of the soul put themselves into motion and action. Intellect, emotions, will-all are there and all are active; all are active under the guidance and command of that moral and spiritual part of our being which is the supreme thing within us. For believing, in the New Testament sense of the word, is the highest act of which man is capable; and that which is highest can be performed only by that which is highest. It is with the whole soul: it is "with the heart," in the New Testament sense of that expression, that "man believeth unto righteousness."

IV

INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL.

Perhaps one of the best preservatives against certain dangers by which the process of seeking and obtaining intellectual culture is attended. consists in a clear recognition of the natural and constitutional limitations to which the human intellect is subject. Everything is good in its own place and within its own bounds; transgressing these, it is no longer entirely good, and may even become more or less injurious. It is a good part of wisdom to perceive and observe limitations. Probably the chief reason why "a little learning is a dangerous thing" is, that the very littleness of it tends to blind its possessor to the necessary limitations of all learning, whether little or much. The intellect has its place, within which it is inestimably serviceable and useful; but even it, great as it is, cannot, without detriment, depart from its place, nor transgress its natural limitations, without running the risk of causing error and mischief. The way of the transgressor (taking the word in its original and natural meaning, according to the etymology of it) is always hard. Of the intellect, it may be said, as is sometimes said of fire or water, that

it is "a good servant, but a bad master." And, perhaps, its characteristic fault is that of assuming to be a master, instead of a servant. The intellect is naturally forward, self-confident. assuming; whatever else it may be accused of, it cannot be accused of bashfulness. It has a genius for "claiming;" it manifests a tendency to lay claim, as men say, to "all in sight." It is not characteristic of it to "sit down in the lowest place;" it does not say to any other part of our nature, "After you;" it would be first. Being of the surface, it would claim to be of the foundation; being "a burning and shining light," or lamp, it would assume to be the sun; holding the office of prime minister, it would aspire to the place of monarch. And, so undeniably brilliant is it in its own nature, as compared with other and less conspicuous parts of our being, and so numerous and brilliant have been its achievements, that its claims are plausibly made and are often readily conceded.

Nevertheless, it is possible to show in many ways that, great as the intellect is, its place in our nature is a secondary and subordinate one; that there is a part of us more interesting and significant, more influential and powerful, however it may seem to be less so; and that it is when recognizing their subservience to the moral and spiritual part of our being that the intellect and intellectual culture are at their best. Upon this

subject of the priority of the moral, as related to the intellectual, we remember to have been much struck, a good many years ago, with a certain passage in the writings of an English author, who was himself a man of brilliant intellectual qualities, and whom no one would accuse of a disposition unjustly to disparage the intellect or the things pertaining to the intellectual life. This passage, which we have taken the pains to look up for partial quotation here, is as follows:

"Strength of Will is the quality most needing cultivation in mankind. Will is the central force which gives strength and greatness to character. We over-estimate the value of Talent, because it dazzles us; and we are apt to underrate the importance of Will, because its works are less shining. Talent gracefully adorns life; but it is Will which carries us victoriously through the struggle. Intellect is the torch which lights us on our way: Will is the strong arm which rough-hews the path for us. * * * No one, I suppose, will accuse me of deifying Obstinacy, or mere brute Will; nor of depreciating Intellect. But we have had too many dithyrambs in honor of mere Intelligence; and the older I grow the clearer I see that Intellect is not the highest faculty in man, although the most brilliant. Knowledge, after all, is not the greatest thing in life; it is not the 'be-all and the end-all here.' Life is not Science. The light of the Intellect is truly a precious light; but its end and aim is simply to shine. The moral nature of man is more sacred in my eyes than his intellectual nature. I know they cannot be divorced —that without intelligence we should be brutes—but it is the tendency of our gaping, wondering dispositions to give pre-eminence to those faculties which most astonish

us. Strength of character seldom, if ever, astonishes; goodness, lovingness and quiet self-sacrifice are worth all the talents in the world."

This, it seems to us, expresses in a just and striking manner one aspect of the relation and the difference between the intellectual and the moral nature of man. The two belong together; they may not be divorced; the cultivation of neither may be neglected. Nevertheless, brilliant as it is, admirable as its achievements are, and necessary as is that intellectual culture, without which we should be barbarians, the intellect bears this unmistakable mark of secondary rank, that it is for illumination, and not for action: for guidance, and not for motive power. If it be so, as has often been said, that "conduct is three-fourths of life;" and that this world is a world "in which there is little to be known and much to be done," then it cannot be that the faculty which enables us to see while we act is greater than the faculty which enables us to act. Of great significance and importance is the torch which lights our path; but of still greater significance and importance is the power which propels us in our course. Now, the intellect is not for propulsion; it is simply for illumination and guidance; the propelling power comes from another quarter of our being. It is one thing to know, and another and greater thing to do: "the doing power" is what we most need; and

this intellectual culture is not in itself capable of begetting. Nav, even when carried far, it may leave the possessor of it weak and incapable in this respect; it is an old complaint that men may "know the right, and yet the wrong pursue." There is ground for believing in the general union of intellectual and moral excellence; but yet it is well known that intellectual ability and moral depravity may exist in the same person. Dr. Arnold, of Rugby, had so strong a belief in this general union that, where intellectual ability seemed to be found in combination with moral depravity, he was often inclined to deny its existence altogether. Yet he was often obliged to recognize the possibility, and did not fail to remark upon the weakness and unworthiness of intellectual cleverness unaccompnaied by moral integrity and capability of right action. His biographer remarks of him that he used to say: "Mere intellectual acuteness, divested as it is, in too many cases, of all that is comprehensive and great and good, is to me more revolting than the most helpless imbecility, seeming to be almost like the spirit of Mephistopheles."

The intellect, we say, is not for propulsion; it has no ability to impel men forward in the path which it serves to point out and illumine. Intellectual culture, important as it is, is in itself incapable of bestowing that power of right action which is our greatest need for the proper man-

agement of the affairs of our lives. This, however, is only one of its limitations. When we come to what might be considered its own peculiar and exclusive province, namely, the ascertainment of truth, we find that it is by no means wholly exempt from limitations even there. It becomes apparent that the light of the intellect is that of a torch, and not of a sun; the world of truth is too vast and mysterious to be sufficiently illumined by its rays. There are, it is true, certain portions of the kingdom of truth in which its light cannot be said to be insufficient; there its jurisdiction is complete, and its conclusions incapable of being disputed. In the field of mathematical and physical science the intellect reigns supreme. It is because here it is left alone, within its own bounds, coming into contact and collision with no superior force. Here it sees with that "dry light" which is essential to perfect intellectual vision, encountering none of that refracting moisture which proceeds from the mists of human interest and prejudice. Here it is at liberty to go directly to its object, unswerved from its course by any deflecting tides of human passion. Here, accordingly, there is nothing to obscure the clearness of its judgments, or to impair the certainty and finality of its conclusions. It is entirely different, however, when it leaves this field and comes to deal with those truths which relate to human conduct and welfare, and have to do with the agitations of human life. Here the "dry light" is gone, and the deflecting tides are present. Here the intellect seems to lose its sovereignty, and gives token of obeying a power more sovereign than itself. Something blurs its vision; swerves it from its course; robs its conclusions of that mathematical certainty and finality which was once their glory. It is because it has passed beyond certain bounds, has entered into a different realm of truth, and has come into contact and conflict with a power more imperial than itself, and which shows itself capable of contravening and vetoing its proceedings and its conclusions.

"From the principal parts of Nature, Reason and Passion," says Hobbes, "have proceeded two kinds of learning, mathematical and dogmatical. The former is free from controversy, because it consisteth in comparing figure and motion only, in which things truth and the interest of men oppose not each other. But in the other there is nothing indisputable, because it compares men, and meddles with their interest and profit." Unfortunately for the intellect, this latter kind of truth is the higher and more important; the questions which meddle with human interest and profit are just the principal questions. And it is just in regard to these that the intellect shows itself incapable of putting an end to the controversy.

It is significant that the great social and moral questions which agitate the world of human affairs are not generally settled by exclusively intellectual methods. It would seem as if the intellect ought to be able to settle them; is not that what it is for? Yet, in point of fact, this is seldom done. The intellect seems to have no power to decide such questions, as a problem in geometry is solved, by a mathematical demonstration, compelling the acquiescence and acceptance of all concerned. Here, on the contrary, the logic of the intellect seems incapable of bringing us to a similar certainty. Here "nothing is indisputable;" there are always reasons for and against; there seems to be no good reason why the argument should not go on forever. It is characteristic of such questions, for the most part, that they are decided finally in a practical manner. The agitation, when it has reached its most critical juncture, takes on a practical form, and comes to its settlement by other than theoretical methods. It was thus that, in our own country, the question of slavery was finally decided. It was not decided by the logic of argument; as far as theory and disputation are concerned, the arguments for and against slavery might be going on at this hour. When the agitation had reached its crisis, the question was taken up and settled by what men learned to call the "logic of events," bringing certain things

to pass which none had the power, and eventually none the willingness, to gainsay. It is probable that the question by which the minds of the citizens of the United States are at present being so greatly agitated, the question of socalled "imperialism," will likewise come to its final solution in a practical manner. It is evident that it will not be settled by argument; one is struck with the inconclusiveness of the disputation, with the really strong reasons which may be adduced both for and against the proposed policy. It is not probable that either side will, by mere force of argument, gain general acceptance for its views and beliefs. This question, too, will find its settlement by means of experiment and action, not by the logic of argument, but by the more conclusive logic of events.

The higher we ascend in the realms of truth, the more we become aware of a certain relative disability of the intellect, and a certain insufficiency, as a means of ascertaining truth, of exclusively intellectual methods. The ability and competency of the understanding and the power of logic are at their highest in the field of mathematical and natural science; they are at their lowest when dealing with moral and spiritual truth. Truth is of many kinds; and the world of truth is a vast, complex and mysterious world. That which is highest without us makes its appeal to that which is deepest within us. The

knowledge of that truth which is highest in its own nature, and which is most vitally related to human welfare and destiny, comes not by the intellect alone; comes not without the exercise of those other and higher powers of our being, the will and the affections. The things that are greatest can be known only through love and obedience. One can know God only by loving and obeying Him; one can know the truth only by loving it and giving oneself to it. It is not the knowing of the doctrine that leads to the doing of the will, but the doing of the will that leads to the knowing of the doctrine. With the reception of the most far-reaching, vital and affecting truths the heart has more to do than the brain.

No one will accuse us, we trust, of depreciating intellect, or disparaging intellectual culture, or putting a slight value upon the things pertaining to the intellectual life. The case is one of loving "not Cæsar less, but Rome more." What we have been saying consists simply of a few of those fundamental truths, the remembrance of which may serve as a preservative and safeguard against those dangers from which the process of intellectual culture is confessedly not exempt. Great is the mind of man; but this is not the greatest part of his mysterious nature; the greatest part of him lies in his will and his affections. Let homage be paid to the intellect; let still

greater reverence be rendered to the heart, which is a more imperial power. It is a great thing to know, but a greater thing to love. And, however important intellectual culture may be, he has paid too high a price for it who has sought it alone, and sought it exclusively for its own sake, "who has aspired to know, instead of to love, and finds himself at last amid a world of barren facts and lifeless theories, loving none and adoring nothing."

"The night has a thousand eyes,
And the day but one;
Yet the light of a whole world dies
With the setting sun.

"The mind has a thousand eyes,
And the heart but one;
Yet the light of a whole life dies,
When love is done."

INTELLECT AND WILL.

In reading that interesting work, the Life and Letters of Phillips Brooks, the writer found nothing more interesting than the account therein contained of the gradual process of development and change which that extraordinary man underwent in regard to the question of the relation between the intellect and the will. This change was not a mere circumstance or incident in the life of the man; it was, rather, coincident and co-extensive with the life itself: it was, indeed, as one of the most pervasive, so also one of the most significant and characteristic things in the man's career. The question of the relation between intellect and will, the intellectual and the moral, doctrine and duty, dogma and life, was with Phillips Brooks one of the first things and one of the last. And the clear recognition of the truth in regard to this matter, which he was from the beginning traveling towards, and at which he eventually arrived, must be regarded as in a large measure the secret source of his extraordinary influence and power as a preacher.

The natural temperament of Phillips Brooks

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was, as his biogragher says, "predominantly intellectual;" and the intellectual atmosphere in which he was brought up, his education at Harvard University, and the circumstance of his living in an age which ascribed the supremacy to the intellect, all conspired to confirm and strengthen this natural and original bent. was one of those who loved to know; "a voracious devourer of ideas:" "to know for himself, to understand that he might believe, had been his ambition." In the first stages of his development. it is said, he "assigned the lead to the reason;" and this predominantly intellectual view was conspicuous in the preaching of his early days in the ministry. Yet it had always been one of his ruling ideas "that one did not reach the truth solely by the intellectual process." And by degrees he came to perceive that, as the knowledge of the truth is not arrived at solely, so it is not arrived at chiefly, by intellectual means and methods; that the action of the intellect in regard to this matter is not primary, but altogether secondary; that the knowledge of religious truth comes, not by the activity of any particular faculty of man's being, but by that of the unified totality of his powers; and that this activity takes place under the dominance and direction, not of the intellectual, but of the moral part of him. Thus, by an inward revolution, he was led to reverse his original position. From believing

in the primacy of the intellect, he came to believe in the primacy of the will. Having begun by holding an intellectual view of ethics, he ended by holding an ethical view of intelligence. Having at first, as regards the approach to religion, ascribed the initiative to the intellect, he eventually came to perceive that that initiative belonged to the will, as the central, sovereign and all-comprehending element of man's being.

It may be instructive to observe two or three of the successive steps by which this transition was accomplished. Early intimation was not wanting, as it never is wanting in any genuine development, of what the final issue was to be. Already during the years when he was a student in the Theological Seminary at Alexandria, Va... we find evidences of the existence in him of another attitude or mood, struggling with his intellectualism and threatening to gain the supremacy over it. In his own person he exhibited a rare combination; his biographer speaks of "his capacity of being quickly roused into a glowing enthusiasm, of blazing up into a consuming fire. under the contact of ideas or truths presented to his mind. For truth to him did not rest with an appeal to the intellect but stirred his whole being, his emotional nature, and ended in the will, where it buried itself deeply, calling for action." His abundant note-books of this period show that he was constantly brooding

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over the problem of the relation between intellect and will; how to take the things of the intellect, ideas, truths, theories, doctrines, philosophies, and make them effective in the region of the will; how to turn them into action, to translate them into conduct. "For abstract ideas as such, for purely speculative conclusions in themselves, he felt no attraction, nor had he use for them unless he saw in them some practical relation to real life in the world." Yet all this was without any clear perception of the truth which he came finally to hold; he still seemed to believe in a certain priority of ideas, theories, doctrines; the question was, how to take these, the chiefly important things in the case, and make them what they ought to be, using the will as a means for this purpose. He was as yet far from recognizing the essential priority of the will, as related to the intellect, and that, in a deep sense, ideas, theories, doctrines are the outgrowth and product of the will, instead of being things independently originated by the intellect, and to be dealt with afterwards by the will, as a subordinate and subservient instrument. Nevertheless it is deeply significant to find Phillips Brooks. even as a student, groping after the great truth which was to become a sort of guiding-star to his life, and coming thus early upon the trail of that important principle which was to be in so great a degree the secret source of his power,

as it has been of the power of so many others who have deeply influenced their fellow-men.

The next step which we notice in the process of development and transition, is found in a sermon preached in the earlier days of his ministry. in Philadelphia, in 1865, immediately after the assassination of President Lincoln. The theme of the discourse was the life and character of Lincoln; and from what is said of it in the biography, we quote the following:

"The sermon also indicates a change, a forward step in the development of Phillips Brooks. He was now beginning to pass out of the youthful worship of the intellect as the highest quality in man. That worship had attended his way through college, through seminary, through the earlier days of his ministry. It would still require many years before it would cease to control his character. Yet even when he was making his preparatory studies at Alexandria, he had been confronted with the question of the hidden relationship between the intellect and the will, or how ideas could be made effective in the development of moral character. When Lincoln died, the question was on the lips of many, who were forecasting the estimate to be made of him by posterity, whether or not he were an intellectual man, or whether his greatness was not exclusively in the moral sphere. There was a certain tone of resentment in Phillips Brooks' soul that such an issue should be raised. Already he had begun the solution of his own life-problem."

From the sermon itself we quote the following passage:

"As to the moral and mental powers which distinguish him, * * * the most remarkable thing is the way in which

they blend with one another, so that it is next to impossible to examine them in separation. A great many people have discussed very crudely whether Abraham Lincoln was an intellectual man or not, as if intellect were a thing always of the same sort, which you could precipitate from the other constituents of a man's nature. The fact is that in all the simplest characters the line between the mental and moral natures is always vague and indistinct. They run together, and in their best combination you are unable to discriminate, in the wisdom which is their result, how much is moral and how much is intellectual. You are unable to tell whether in the wise acts and words which issue from such a life, there is more of the righteousness which comes of a clear conscience or of the sagacity that comes of a clear brain."

As late as 1878, in two lectures on the "Teaching of Religion," delivered before the students of Yale Divinity School, we find him still ascribing a certain superiority or initiative to the intellectual powers. In these he "assumed that truth came first to the reason, then from the reason to the feelings, and finally from the feelings to the will." Yet, even here, there are abundant evidences of change and progress. For, while still holding the usual division of the human powers into intellect, feeling and will, he protests against breaking up the unity of man; affirms that there are other methods of knowing than through the intellect alone; and maintains that "the full perception of the truth must come through the quickened feeling, and above all. through the obedient will." Still more do we

find evidences of progress in the Bohlen Lectures, on "The Influence of Jesus," delivered in 1879. Speaking of the last of these lectures, which treats of the influence of Jesus on the intellectual life of man, the biographer says:

"In the first place he refuses to give the intellect in man the supremacy when taken by itself. He has said this before, but now repeats it with deeper conviction. In speaking of the person of Christ, he asks the questions, How does Christ compare in intellectual power with other men? How did He estimate the intellect? Was His intellect sufficient to account for the unique position He holds in the world's history as the mightiest force that has controlled the development of humanity? He finds the answer by turning to the fourth gospel, which gives us the most that we know about the mind of Jesus. It is the intellectual gospel, because there is in it one constantly recurring word. That word is 'truth,' which is distinctly a word of the intellect. * * *

"He takes up the word 'truth' as it is used in the fourth gospel, finding that in every instance it is employed in a sense different from that of the schools. In its scholastic sense it is detached from life and made synonymous with knowledge. But knowledge is no word for Jesus. With information for the head alone, detached from its relations to the whole nature, Jesus has no concern. Truth was something which set the whole man free. It is a moral thing, for he who does not receive it is not merely a doubter but a liar. Truth was something which a man could be, not merely which a man could study and measure by walking around it on the outside."

The biographer, speaking of the Bohlen Lectures as indicating a change and an advance;

as being "the result of his experience in the first ten years of his ministry in Boston, which gives to his preaching in Boston a different tone from the Philadelphia life," says: "There are hints in this book that another change was awaiting him, when he would pass into an ampler and diviner sphere. At times he seems to be tempted to give the primacy to the will."

This final change seems to connect itself with the year 1882, which he spent in Europe, chiefly for the purposes of study. There, to his instruction and delight, he came in contact with the philosophy of Lotze. Of the effect produced upon him by this contact, it is said:

"The influence of Lotze was to raise the question whether the intellectual formula at any moment was adequate for the full and final expression of the human soul, of human faith and belief. That one did not come to the truth solely by the intellectual process, had always been one of the ruling ideas of Phillips Brooks. But in the first stages of his developement he had assigned the lead to the reason. But as he passed through the struggles of the seventies. he found more and more that men must believe through the cognitive power of the feeling—those deeper instincts of the human constitution which do not originate so much in the mind as in the heart. With this growing tendency in himself he found Lotze in harmony, as also in another direction which he was forecasting, that the reason had been given a predominance in modern philosophy which obscures or subordinates the mighty function of the human will."

And, again, further on in the biography, the author, comparing the earlier and the later

preaching of Phillips Brooks, speaks of "a change which it was not easy to define," and connects the change with the increasing importance which he came to attach to the will, as distinguished from the intellect. He says:

"We have seen from his correspondence how Phillips Brooks, when in Germany, had been reading Lotze, with a feeling of grateful surprise. What 'Ecce Homo' had been to him in earlier years, Lotze was in his later years. To both he came prepared by his own previous work. In his philosophy of life and religion he had been anticipating what Lotze would teach him. He had felt deep dissatisfaction with the abstract theories of prevailing systems of philosophy, a certain scorn for the one-sided intellectualism of his age, whether in philosophy or theology. The speculative reason had seemed to him inadequate for the expression of the rich fulness of the contents of the soul, or for the deductions from human history. In these convictions his study of Lotze confirmed him. giving him the strength and confidence which a man standing alone must eagerly welcome. There was no break in his experience, only the continuation in bolder fashion of the principles which had hitherto given him freedom and power of utterance."

From this time there seems to have been a different and deeper tone in the preaching of Phillips Brooks; a change, but only in the way of development and progress; only the continuation and completion, as it were, of that which had been characteristic of his preaching from the beginning. It was as if he had at last arrived at clear and full vision of the great principle which, though more or less hidden, had from the first

been dominating all his thinking and all his preaching. Of his later preaching it is said:

"But there is another tendency to be noted in his later representative utterances. He inclines to identify the total man in his unity with the will. He places the stress upon the will, as if in itself it carried the harmony of all the powers. He had always magnified obedience as the highest virtue, but he speaks of it at last as though the will were the essence of life whether in God or man. It begins to be more evident that he had himself been going through an inward revolution, and must therefore be ranked with those who have uttered their protest in history against the tendency to give too exalted prominence to the intellect."

It is said of him that, in a sermon on the "Knowledge of God," preached in 1884, he "went so far as almost to identify knowledge with will, till all life seems to resolve itself into will." And as regards this characteristic of his later preaching, his biographer remarks: "This importance attached to the will, as if it held the intellect in solution, explains some characteristics of Phillips Brooks otherwise unintelligible to an age which gave the supremacy to the intellect." This expression concerning the will, "as if it held the intellect in solution," seems to us very striking and deeply significant, and to approach very near to the root of the matter, as regards this vital question of the relation between intellect and will. It is understood, of course, that the word "will" is used, in this

connection, not in a small and narrow, but in a very large and comprehensive sense. Phillips Brooks himself warns against an undue restriction of the signification of the word, saying: "We must not understand will too narrowly. It includes the whole creative force in which there is an element of affection and desire."

We make one more quotation, for the purpose of showing, what might otherwise abundantly be shown, that this change was not accompanied by any unjust disparagement of, or any indifference towards, the intellect and the things pertaining to the intellect. Dwelling upon the change perceptible in Phillips Brooks after the critical year to which we have referred, his biographer says:

"He had by no means grown indifferent to the intellectual problems in theological reconstruction. He followed them with interest, and took his part in their discussion. He retained his allegiance to the old formulas of belief, and yet with a difference, for at last he had learned that they had not the quality of finality. The full truth was something larger always than the intellect could adequately formulate."

Such were the principal successive stages in that great process of change and evolution which seems to us to have been the most significant and characteristic thing in the life of Phillips Brooks, and also one of the chief things explanatory of his great influence and power as a preacher.

THE INCLUSIVENESS OF THE TRUTH.

The writer sometimes finds a jewel—an intellectual jewel—which he thereupon instantly and eagerly seizes and thrusts into the treasury of his memory. The jewel he discovers is mostly a sentence or a phrase, or it may be even a single word; it is like a nugget of gold, heavy with condensed meaning, or like a sparkling diamond, sending forth its light in many directions. It is a consolation to the student that he need not go to California or Montana in order to find nuggets of gold, nor travel to the diamond-fields of South Africa in order to obtain precious stones.

The precious stone, in this instance, is a saying of the philosopher Leibnitz. We do not claim to have discovered it for ourselves, for we have been no student of the writings of Leibnitz—we have not worked in that mine. We humbly admit that we have received it at second-hand; it has just been brought to our attention through an address on the "Similarities and Contrasts of Christianity and Buddhism," by Professor George H. Palmer, of Harvard University. The

Outlook, publishing this address in its issue of June 19th, refers to it editorily as "a noble example of what all theological discussion should be; namely, never controversial, but always truth-seeking; never an attack on supposed falsehood, but always an exposition of the truth." This high praise, it seems to us, is fully deserved. The same editorial points to the quotation from Leibnitz as the keynote to this "remarkable address." The address, it should be mentioned, was delivered before the Outlook Club, and formed part of a friendly discussion of the relations between Christianity and Buddhism, with the well-known Oriental scholar, Dharmapala.

The quotation in question occurs, near the beginning of the address, in the following passage. Discussing and allowing the claims of Buddhism and Mohammedanism to universality, Professor Palmer says:

"I say, therefore, that, so far as I am competent to contrast these faiths with Christianity, I can hardly give them the title of universal in the same sense as I give it to Christianity; for, as it seems to me, each of these faiths takes into account but a single section of a man's being. They show us the nobility of that side of ourselves, but they leave out other sides. Therefore I think both of these may be called universal simply in the sense that they do not confine themselves to a single nation. They are not universal in the sense of appealing to man as man. Of course, if I found this to be the case with Buddhism,

I should confess myself a Buddhist; for, as I understand it, the test of religious truth is inclusiveness. That was a noble saying of Leibnitz: 'Every denial is false; every affirmation true.' And something of this sort we must assert in the matter of religion. We must declare all exclusions evil.'

We quote the passage simply in order to give, in its proper setting, the quotation from Leibnitz, which is all that we are here concerned with. It bears that paradoxical form in which great truths often love to clothe themselves. It is a statement which might easily and plausibly be pronounced false. Taken according to the letter, it is indeed false; but, taken according to the spirit, it enshrines and expresses a great, incontrovertible, far-reaching truth.

The truth is, in its very nature, affirmative and inclusive. Denying and excluding are not, properly speaking, characteristics of it; these are, rather, the characteristics of error. It is with deep insight that Goethe puts into the mouth of Mephistopheles the words, "Ich bin der Geist, der stets verneint." Not every one who denies, indeed, is of the spirit of Mephistopheles, but the Mephistopheles spirit is essentially the spirit of denial. Denial is almost always evil; at best it is only a secondary and a very inferior sort of good. The wise man will not often make an unqualified denial; he will not be found in the number of those who are forever "denying the

assertion" and "controverting the position." "Now I." writes one of the most thoughtful and acute of English critics, "who believe all errors to arise in some narrow, partial, or angular view of truth, am seldom disposed to meet any sincere affirmation by a blank, unmodified denial." a rule, the man who sees narrowly and superficially will be always denving; the man of broad and deep vision will be always affirming. The one will be found building walls to exclude, the other, throwing open gates to let in. It is because of the nature of the truth itself. For it is positive and not negative; and it is large, comprehensive, catholic, universal. The truth loves to affirm; it has a passion for including. Whatever denial may be necessary, it simply allows to follow of itself, as a corollary to its affirmation. It is vexed by no trembling anxiety lest its claims should be disallowed or its cause overthrown. It is serene and tranquil; fears no foes; is best defended when most defenseless; sits enthroned; "securus judicat orbis terrarum."

Its inclusiveness is one of the chief glories of Christianity. Whatsoever of truth there may be in Buddhism or Mohammedanism, or any other faith claiming or seeming to be universal, is comprehended in the one religion which is really such. He who is the Truth embraces all in Himself. The sun, the source of all the light there is, knows well the congenial and friendly

relation sustained to it by all inferior lights; it does not consider even the most faintly flickering candle-light alien to its own splendor. Gospel of Jesus Christ is affirmative of all truth and inclusive of all goodness. This has not always been clearly perceived by those who have stood forth as defenders of the faith and maintainers of the truth. These have often acted in a spirit different from that of Leibnitz's maxim; they have seemed to delight in denial and exclusion. It is, in large measure, the result of the human fondness for the construction of systems. The difficulty lies not in the tendency to form systems, which is inevitable, but in the dogmatism which insists upon the finality of these. instead of regarding them as in their very nature more or less temporary, provisional and tentative. For the sake of his system, the maker of it is sometimes obliged to reject and exclude no small amount of truth. He prematurely draws his circle, with the result that, after it is drawn, much is found left out which ought to have been included. Naturally and necessarily sothe Truth is so large and the circle is so small. "The most glorious and widely operative of all truths," says the author of "Enigmas of the Spiritual Life," "are often rejected by philosophers for the sake of consistency." And, again, the same writer says: "It seems as if the Infinite abhorred systems, as if it even loved to lurk in

the mazes of apparent inconsistencies, as if God had 'chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise.'" The worship of system, the passion for consistency, the bondage to logic, have often narrowed and impoverished the minds and hearts of men. Systems are good, useful, necessary; but we very much need to know how inadequate our small and exclusive systems are for the statement of the vast, comprehensive and inclusive Truth.

Let all truth be included. There is truth that is simply other. Make room for the other truth: it, too, whatsoever it may be, belongs to the one great household. This is an evil, that men are sometimes led to disparage, if not to deny and exclude, truth other than that to the pursuit of which they themselves are devoted. The mathematician is in danger of making light of all truth that is incapable of mathematical demonstration, and, unfortunately for him, the very highest truths are subject to this very incapacity. The man of natural science is prone to regard with suspicion all truths not arrived at by what he, in his narrowness, calls scientific methods. The theologian has sometimes been afflicted by a perfectly needless fear of the discoveries of science, seeming to threaten his view of the Bible or his theological system. As if any actually discovered truth could be at variance with any other truth. All truth is sacred, and

all truths are consistent with one another. And the genuine love of the truth is characterized by a largeness and inclusiveness born of the largeness and inclusiveness of the truth itself. It has a catholic regard for all kinds of truth, whether natural and physical, or mathematical, or moral and spiritual, giving to each its proper place and assigning to each its due degree of importance. It remembers our Saviour's words: "In My Father's house are many mansions."

There is truth that is not only other, but opposite. Let this also, nay, let this especially be included. Make room for the truth that is opposite, and seemingly inconsistent with something already held, though undoubtedly consistent with that, with a consistency that lies too deep for our shallow logic to discover. This is the nature and glory of the truth, that it is large enough to afford entertainment to a great number of apparent inconsistencies. This is the distinction of the Christian religion, in this respect, that, while "seemingly the home of paradoxes," it is "really the reconciler of contending and partial truths." One of the greatest preachers of the present century, whose special characteristic was his depth of spiritual insight. in enumerating the principles on which he had taught, included this one: "That truth is made up of two opposite propositions, and not found in a via media between the two." Of these two

opposites, always found in the highest regions of truth, let neither be rejected; let both be included.

There is truth that is imperfectly and inadequately expressed; let it not be excluded because of its imperfect form. It is well to remember the "soul of goodness in things evil," and to recognize truth even when it stumbles into falsehood in the attempt at expression. We cannot but feel that at one point in the beautiful and noble address which has given rise to this communication, Professor Palmer seems to fall short, in this respect, of the spirit of the saying which he quotes from Leibnitz. He is contrasting the disparagement and denial of personality by Buddhism with Christianity's affirmation of the supreme worth of it, and takes occasion to illustrate his meaning by quoting from a popular hymn:

"Our popular hymn says:

'O to be nothing, nothing!
Only to lie at His feet,
A broken and empty vessel,
For the Master's service meet!'

"What blasphemy! An empty vessel suited to the service of the Master? No, never! The most perfect vessel, the fullest vessel, this shall be ours. And that is the Christian doctrine. It is not to starve and abolish ourselves; it is to fill ourselves full and render ourselves potent individuals, that we may be forever God's efficient servants."

We entirely agree with Prof. Palmer in what he affirms in opposition to the sentiment of this hymn as apprehended by him. Without doubt there is something in it jarring to sound Christian feeling. But, would it not be better, would it not be more in accordance with the motto adopted from Leibnitz, to perceive and recognize the truth, whatever it may be, imperfectly expressed by these lines, and affirm that also? And, after all, is it not a truth which the hymn is trying to utter? To be nothing before God. is not that, in one sense, what Christianity teaches us we must become? To be empty, is not that, according to the Gospel, the condition of being filled? Is there not a good sense in which we may desire to be as empty and broken vessels? Is there not in this hymn (awkwardly expressed. we are willing to admit) something akin to what our Saviour says of poverty in spirit, of hungering and thirsting after righteousness, of losing one's life in order to find it? Is not the sentiment very much like that of St. Paul, when he says: "When I am weak, then am I strong." and when he exclaims, "Most gladly, therefore, will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me?"

We are not arguing in behalf of this hymn, which we have never sung, and know only by report. We are simply using it as an instance and illustration, to show that, along with the

truth that is other, and the truth that is opposite, that truth is also to be included which has the misfortune to be awkwardly or erroneously expressed. This would seem to be in accordance with the spirit of Christ, who condemned only sin, who excluded none but those who excluded themselves, who was always mindful of the "other sheep," declaring that He must bring and include "them also."

VII.

THE OTHER SIDE.

The partisan will care for his own side; the seeker after truth, supposing him to have a "side," will be almost equally interested in that which is opposite his own. He will care for the other side, also; for various reasons, chief among which will be his consciousness of the largeness and inclusiveness of the truth, and the probability that a portion of it lies in the opposite direction. The truth is characterized, in a remarkable manner, by a certain duplicity, using this word, not in its secondary and derived, but in its primary and original sense. It is double, in the natural and good sense of the word. "All things are double one against another;" and this duplicity is characteristic especially of the great kingdom of the truth. We do not pretend to be acquainted with the philosophy of Hegel, but we have seen him quoted as holding "that every truth is the unification of the contrary elements of two partial aspects of the idea; that every truth holds its contradiction, and that it is from antagonism in the opposing forces that the development into final unity must come; that the vitality of the

truth depends upon this antogonism that is necessary for its perfect evolution." So strange a thing is the truth; so large and comprehensive; so characterized by duplicity or doubleness; so much the home of paradoxes; such room does it make for the other side.

Something of this largeness and comprehensiveness there will be in every one who is sincerely a lover of the truth and a seeker after it. He will not be swift to fix upon a single side, and obstinately maintain that there is no other. He will have a fear of narrowing that which God made "very broad." He will not be among the pretenders to universal and absolute knowledge. but will lay stress upon the fact that all our knowledge is "in part," and that all our systems are in a certain sense tentative and provisional. He will be afraid, not indeed of metaphysics and the making of systems, which are good, but of the spirit of dogmatism, which is bad. There are those who say, "This or that is true," and those who say, "This and that is true:" the genuine seeker after truth will be more likely to be found amoung the latter; he will always be considering the other side. One cannot help feeling that there is deep truth in Emerson's words, when, having spoken in his usual gracious manner of the system-makers, he nevertheless adds: "Tis the gnat grasping the world. We have not got on far enough for this. We have just begun,

and are always just beginning to know." The same writer elsewhere says in regard to this same matter: "If one can say so without arrogance. I might suggest that he who contents himself with dotting only a fragmentary curve, recording only what facts he has observed, without attempting to arrange them within one outline, follows a system, also, a system as grand as any other, though he does not interfere with ts vast curves by prematurely forcing them into a circle or ellipse, but only draws that are which he clearly sees, and waits for new opportunity, assured that these observed arcs consist with each other." It is Emerson, again, who says of Plato, what might well indeed have been said of himself: "The acutest German, the lovingest disciple, could never tell what Platonism was; indeed, admirable texts can be quoted on both sides of every great question from him."

We mention these things, especially this judgment in regard to Plato, for the purpose of calling attention to the fact that the largeness and comprehensiveness of the truth, taking the form of duplicity in the natural and good sense of the of the word, is apt to be found in every great representative and teacher of it. This peculiarity, being misapprehended, may be complained of as being unsatisfactory, as giving an elusive and tantalizing character to a man's teaching. It is easier to deal with one side than with two

sides: one-sidedness is far more congenial to our littleness and narrowness. We like to have things clearly defined, definitely fixed, finally settled; we love the dogmatic and absolute tone; we would rather know in whole than "in part." It is provoking to follow a teacher whose teaching often seems to border on indefiniteness and indecision, and leaves many questions open. on the other hand, it may be asked whether this complaint ought not to be made against the truth itself, rather than against the representative and teacher of it. Is one-sidedness necessarily good, or two-sidedness necessarily evil; is not the latter, properly understood, one of the essential elements in all just representation? And the provoking and tantalizing character of the teaching of a teacher who refuses to communicate finalities, but leaves many questions undecided, and has habitual regard for the other side, -may there not be something wholesome and beneficent in this? To provoke, to tantalize, to stimulate and inspire for the search after truth,—is not this one of the chief characteristics of a great teacher? Does not the greatness of a great teacher chiefly consist, not so much in the definite "views" he communicates or the fixed "system" he lays down, as in the circumstance of his being an awakening, stimulating and inspiring force to those who follow him?

Regard for the other side is produced by the consciousness of the largeness of the truth; it

is the result, also, of considerations of prudence and policy. It is a practical as well as a theoretical matter, a thing needed by the advocate, the rhetorician, the statesman, no less than by the philosopher. While every question has two sides, yet, when it comes to practice and action, it becomes wise and necessary to choose one side as distinguished from the other, and endeavor to secure acceptance and adoption for one view instead of its opposite. In all argument by which men seek to convince their fellow-men and persuade them to the adoption of a certain course of action, it is the part of wisdom and the indication of strength to give the fullest and fairest possible statement and consideration of all the reasons capable of being adduced on the other side. And to do this is one of the characteristic peculiarities of the servant of the truth as distinguished from the partisan and special pleader; of the statesman as distinguished from the politician; of him who is really the holder of the truth for which he argues as distinguished from him who is simply the "advocate "of it, and nothing more. The partisan, thinking only of his own view, and having in mind the victory of his own side, will seek to conceal or make light of the things that make for his adversary's cause; but the servant of the truth, instinctively feeling that weakness and defeat lie along that line, and strong with the strength of his own belief and conviction, will be scarcely less careful

of his adversary's side than of his own. Hence it is a rule in all sound rhetoric, to make the clearest, fullest and fairest possible statement of all the reasons that may be brought against the view in behalf of which one is arguing. It is this, largely, that wins attention and tends to produce conviction. For it at once sweeps away the suspicion that the speaker holds his belief through ignorance or want of attention or consideration, and shows that he has arrived at it only after having weighed and found wanting all that could be said against it.

A distinguished Queen's Counsel was accustomed to say that he won his cases by admissions. Much of his power lay in the wisdom and skill with which he made concessions. It is said to have been characteristic of John Stuart Mill that, at the outset of every argument, he aimed to make, and often succeeded in making, a clearer and more forcible statement of his adversarv's case than the adversary was able to make himself. What is more impressive than such a manifestation of the spirit of fairness and justice? What course could be better adapted to win a hearing, to remove prejudice, to overcome opposition, to enable one to carry one's point? Every lover and seeker of the truth, and every one who aims by means of legitimate argument, to win over, "those that oppose themselves," will find it necessary to give large attention and consideration to the other side.

VIII.

MATHEMATICAL AND MORAL CERTAINTY

"What a pity," says George Eliot in one of her earlier letters, "that, while mathematics are indubitable, and no one doubts the properties of a triangle or a circle, doctrines infinitely important to man are buried in a charnel heap of bones over which nothing is heard but the barks and growls of contention!"

The complaint is an old one, and a favorite one with those whose chief passion is for knowing: who demand that knowledge shall be exact, perfect, "indubitable;" who deem it necessary, or at least desirable, that the truth of the "doctrines infinitely important to man" should be demonstrated and known and held with the same unquestionable certainty as the truths of mathematical science. Against this complaint the counter-complaint might justly be urged that it exercises no discrimination, but commits the fallacy of transferring to one species of truth requirements which are applicable only to another. Certainty, of such kind and in such degree as is possible and necessary, will not be wanting to the holding of any kind of truth.

But everything after its kind; for each species of truth, that sort of certainty, and no other, of which it is naturally and constitutionally capable. For mathematical truth, mathematical certainty; for moral truth, moral certainty. And moral certainty, though different from that which is mathematical, is, nevertheless, genuine certainty still.

It is not our purpose at present, however, to dwell further upon this point, important as it is, but rather to point out the fact that the true state of the case is exactly the reverse of that which is implied in the sentence we have quoted. As regards the "pity" there spoken of, it is just the other way. Instead of being a pity that moral and spiritual truth is not capable of being rendered "indubitable" by mathematical demonstration, it would be a pity if it should be. Such demonstration is, as we have said, from the nature of the case impossible. What we are saving now is that if it were possible it would not be desirable. That is to say, if it were possible to prove the truth of the "infinitely important" doctrines in question with the same sort of certainty and finality with which it is proved that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, we should not be the gainers; we should, in fact, be impoverished instead of enriched thereby. For the accomplishment of this one object, however desirable it may be considered, would have ren-

dered impossible the accomplishment of other objects vastly more important. If, indeed, it were the object of man's existence simply to know, and the satisfaction of his curiosity were the one chiefly desirable thing, then the prompt, final and indubitable settlement of all questions by means of mathematical demonstration would be the supremely important thing which George Eliot conceives it to be. It needs no argument. however, to show that the attainment of clear. exact and certain knowledge is not the chief end of man's existence on earth, and that the satisfaction of all his curiosity would be a comparatively poor, insignificant and ineffective thing. The end of life is, as we are frequently reminded, not a thought, but an action. It has become a sort of proverb that "conduct is three-fourths of life." There are things of higher rank and deeper meaning than knowledge; lying at the root of it, giving rise to it, determining and controlling it; in comparison with which knowledge may justly be disparaged. "Knowledge puffeth up, but love buildeth up." We are here, not for the satisfaction of curiosity, but for the development of character. We are in this life as pupils are in a school, for the purpose of being educated. disciplined, trained. And it would be easy to show that the fulfilment of this purpose is directly and powerfully aided by the very lack of mathematical indubitability, by the very circumstance that all our knowledge as regards the great questions pertaining to human welfare, conduct and destiny, is necessarily of a partial and imperfect character.

It is no disparagement of the truth to say that there is something more desirable than the possession of it; that is to say, considered simply as knowledge capable of being acquired and held by the human understanding. In a certain sense, indeed, there is nothing greater than the truth; we may even say with Plutarch, that it is "the greatest blessing God can give or man receive." But, taking the word in the sense that we have just indicated, the passion for the truth is evidently something of greater importance and value than the possession of it. To be, as our Saviour said. "of the truth," is more than to have the truth; for being is always more than having. It is one thing to possess the truth (supposing that to be possible), considered merely as so much knowledge; it is another thing to possess the passionate desire for the truth, or, rather, that kinship and sympathy with the truth out of which the passionate desire for it grows. This is the basis of the truth which is generally felt to be expressed in Lessing's famous saying, however it may be criticized, that, if God should hold in His right hand eternal truth, and in His left the one indestructible impulse and quest after the truth, and should say to him, "Choose".

he would humbly incline to His left hand, and say, "Give me that, O Father. Eternal Truth is for Thee alone!" In this saying of Lessing's there would at least seem to be more of insight and wisdom than in the often-quoted saving of Huxley's, similar in form, but contradictory in substance: "I protest that if some great Power would agree to make me always think what is true and do what is right, on condition of being turned into a sort of clock and wound up every morning before I got out of bed, I should instantly close with the offer." The greater wisdom of Lssing's utterance is found in the fact that he perceived, what Huxley failed to perceive, the immense significance, as regards the attainment of the knowledge of the truth, of the passionate desire for it. Where this passion exists it is certain to lead eventually to the finding of the truth; on the principle that "he that seeketh. findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened;" on the principle that he that is "of the truth," "heareth the voice" of Him who is "the truth." But, on the other hand, without this passionate desire, the knowledge of the truth is an utterly impossible thing. The love of the truth, the desire for it-above all, the doing of it so far as known—is an absolutely essential part of the knowing and holding of it. Moral and spiritual truth is of such a nature as to be incapable of being known and held by the understanding alone, independently of the action of the affections and the will.

Such is the supreme importance of the passion for the truth. And, doubtless, the principal reason why moral and spiritual truth is incapable of the certainty and finality of mathematical demonstration, is, that such demonstration, far from producing or fostering this passionate desire, has nothing to do with passion at all. In a certain sense it is uncertainty, rather than certainty, that tends to breed the passion for the truth, and is the secret source of all the progress we make toward the knowledge of it. It is because we know only "in part," that we are forever led onward in the quest after higher and fuller knowledge. At all events, that passionate desire is chiefly nurtured, not by the mathematical certainty of one who would see the truth of the "infinitely important doctrines" demonstrated after the manner of a problem in geometry, but by the moral certainty of him who believes and trusts, and, acting on belief and trust, having always sufficient warrant for so doing, presses ardently onward toward the object of his love. The substitution of mathematical for moral certainty would be an infinite loss. It would kill desire; it would put an end to progress; it would cause the largest and most opulent portions of our being to perish from atrophy. Destroying love, it would, in fact, at the same time destroy

knowledge, which has its root and origin in love. No more effectual means could be found of defeating the very purposes for which moral and spiritual truth is to be sought and found by us, than the establishment of it with mathematical indubitability, by means of mathematical demon-The immediate and final answer of all stration questions; the being made by "some great Power." always to think what is true: the being forced to assent to the truth of the great doctrines of religion, with the compulsory acceptance with which we accept the conclusion of a demonstration in mathematics—this, if it were possible. would render impossible the very end for which moral and spiritual truth exists as an object of our search.

In all processes of education there is something more important than knowledge; it is the passion for learning. The possession of knowledge is one thing, and may be a very poor and ineffective thing; but the passion for learning is always something high and noble, influential and productive of results. He would be a poor teacher who should conceive that his duty to his pupils consisted in answering all questions for them, and solving all problems. The wise teacher places in the hands of his pupil the means of finding the answer to the question and the solution of the problem, and compels him to find them for himself. It is by so doing that he is

educated. The value of the answer for him lies. not in the possession of it, but in the process by which he finds it. The problem, unsolved by him, is, in the proper sense of the word, not solved at all. In matters of education, it can hardly be said, strictly speaking, that there is such a thing as one person's solving a problem for another; he must solve it for himself; therein, chiefly, is the value of the solution found. Hence the wise teacher is far from being addicted to the indiscriminate communication of information: it will probably be as characteristic of him to withhold as to impart. Dean Stanley, in his "Life of Dr. Thomas Arnold," says of the teaching of his master: "His whole method was founded on the principle of awakening the intellect of every individual boy. Hence it was his practice to teach by questioning. As a general rule, he never gave information, except as a kind of reward for an answer, and often withheld it altogether or checked himself in the act of uttering it, from a sense that those whom he was addressing had not sufficient interest or sympathy to entitle them to receive it." Elsewhere, the same biographer says: "The very scantiness with which he occasionally dealt out his knowledge, when not satisfied that the boys could enter into it, whilst it often provoked a halfangry feeling of disappointment in those who eagerly treasured up all that he said, left an impression that the source from which they drew was unexhausted and unfathomed, and to all that he did say gave a double value." the method of one great teacher who recognized the fact that sympathy with the truth, and not possession of the knowledge of it, is the thing to be first and chiefly desired, and whose aim was. not to communicate information, but to awaken souls and to develop character. It was the method of a still greater Master; of Him of whom it is said that He taught the truth to His disciples in parables as they were able to bear it: and who, almost at the very close of His intercourse with them, said: "I have vet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now."

As it is with the education received in scholastic institutions, so it is likewise with the education received in the greater school of human life. It is often and truly said that probability is the guide of conduct. In matters pertaining to the conduct and course of life, the evidence upon the strength of which we act is not of a mathematical, but of a probable or moral nature. There is no mathematical certainty to determine our actions; moral certainty is all that is afforded us. The questions which arise are mostly of such a nature as to be incapable of mathematical demonstration. There are generally sound arguments on both sides of them,

which we are obliged to consider and weigh; and, when we act, we act on the strength of a preponderance of reasons. It is easy to see why this should be so. For it is thus that we get our education. It is by the practice of discrimination and judgment; by coming to conclusions in the face of much that may be said on the opposite side; by making ventures; by the exercise of choice, for which the compulsoriness of a mathematical demonstration would leave no room whatever—it is by these things that the deepest and most characteristic powers of our being are called into activity, and receive their discipline and training.

It would seem entirely reasonable and natural that God should deal with us on this same principle in the great school in which He is preparing us for eternity, and as regards the questions relating to our eternal welfare and destiny. It is not without deep reason that the proof of moral and spiritual truth should be destitute of mathematical certitude. And it is not a pity, but, on the contrary, something to be profoundly thankful for, that this is so; that all our knowledge here is of a partial and imperfect character; that, as regards doctrines of infinite importance, moral certainty is all that we may expect to attain. There are greater things than the possession of the truth considered simply as so much knowledge; there are things more to be desired than the satisfaction of our curiosity. It is better to love and to do the truth than to know it. God cares more for the development of man's character than for the increase of his knowledge; and the fulfillment of this object, while moral certainty guards and guarantees, mathematical certainty would destroy.

Perhaps, in justice to the distinguished author whose words we have been using as a text, we ought to add that evidence is not wanting that George Eliot, in the course of time. underwent a change of thought and feeling in regard to the matter in question. The quotation given by us is, as we have said, from one of her earlier letters. There are passages in the later letters which seem to show that she had come to question the supremacy of the things pertaining to the intellect; to perceive that struggling to attain is in a certain sense a greater thing than attaining, and the passion for the truth a greater thing than its possession; and to feel that there are things more to be desired than the mathematical and indubitable proof of the truth of infinitely important doctrines. One such passage, which we happen just to have read, and which is significant because of the importance which it seems to attach to the feelings and affections as distinguished from intellectual opinions and beliefs, we may be permitted to quote in conclusion: "I have had heartcutting experience that opinions are a poor cement between human souls; and the only effect I ardently long to produce by my writings is, that those who read them should be better able to imagine and to feel the pains and the joys of those who differ from themselves in everything but the broad fact of being struggling, erring, human creatures."

IX.

ARGUMENT AND ANNOUNCEMENT.

The writer had known, almost from boyhood, of Daniel Webster's speech on the "Dartmouth College Case." He was acquainted with the occasion of it from an early reading of the biography of the great statesman and orator; had often seen it referred to or heard it spoken of; had a general but not a very clear idea of its purpose and contents: knew that it was considered to be Webster's masterpiece as a constitutional lawyer. Yet it happened, somewhat singularly, that the speech itself had never been actually read by him until the other day, when he took up a volume, the object of which, as stated in the preface, was, "to give, not only Mr. Webster's masterpieces, but his masterpiece in each department of the great field of intellectual action which he occupied in life." The first of the speeches contained in the volume was that on the Dartmouth College Case; and it was given as Webster's acknowledged masterpiece in that department of the field of intellectual action in which he appeared as a constitutional lawyer. The writer now understands, as he did not be-

fore, the exact nature of the question at issue in this celebrated case, and has such a perception as would not otherwise have been possible, of what it is that constitutes the strength and greatness of Webster's oration. One here sees the great American lawyer doing some of his noblest work in "the great field of intellectual action." The oration is calm and dignified; it is characterized by what seems to have been characteristic of all the speeches of Webster, the naturalness, moderation and reserve of great power. One is impressed with that "evidence of ease" which Ruskin declares to be on the very front of all the greatest works in existence; one feels, not that there is great effort here, but that there is great power here. The phrase "intellectual action," which has just been used, is one by which the oration itself may appropriately be described; it is an intellectual performance, and the feeling with which we witness it is for the most part that of a pure intellectual delight. One here sees what the intellect is capable of when at its best, and when employing its powers in the cause of truth and justice. One perceives and admires the logical nature and character of the orator's method; making clear statements and just discriminations; discerning prinand deducing logical inferences from ciples them; citing authorities; constructing and connecting arguments; neither forgetting nor omitting anything essential to the case; proceeding step by step, one thing following necessarily from another, to the inevitable and irresistible conclusion. Everyone who reads this oration must perceive it to be a noble instance of argument.

It is solely on this account that we make mention of it here. We are adducing it as an instance and illustration, than which perhaps no better could be found, of the nature of argument. It serves to give us a high idea of the power of logic, to impress us with the dignity and nobility of the argumentative process. Argument is, within its own proper sphere, one of the principal methods by which truth is ascertained and imparted, one of the chief means by which conviction is produced and conclusions arrived at. It is the special function of the discursive intellect, of the Understanding as distinguished from the Reason, to use these terms in the sense in which they are used, and distinguished one from the other, by Coleridge. The adjective "discursive," applied to the intellect, is a very significant and suggestive one. The intellect is so called a discurrendo, from running about. The term is not a very dignified one. and yet it very aptly describes the nature of the intellect, and the nature of its activity, when engaged in the process of reasoning. The intellect is naturally nimble, alert, active; very

capable of "running about," and, indeed, very much needing to "run about" when engaged in its habitual and usual activities. When engaged in reasoning and arguing, it passes rapidly hither and thither, from right to left, from left to right; perceives an objection that will be made and goes to meet it; observes a weak point in its own defences, and hastens to strengthen it; goes after authorities, bringing them in; seeks and finds and gathers together and arranges in order ideas, analogies, illustrations, from all quarters. It is characteristic of the argumentative process that it proceeds step by step, from point to point. First one position is established; from this another necessarily follows; and from this another. and so to the end. It is like the construction of a chain, link being fastened to link. It is after the order of a syllogism; first the major premise, then the minor, then the conclusion. It is like a journey, a thing of steps; first one step, then another, and so on until the intended conclusion is arrived at. Argument is, so to speak, a pedestrian method of ascertaining and communicating truth.

This is not said in disparagement of argument, the dignity and nobility of which, within its own sphere, we have already sufficiently recognized. While freely admitting its greatness and importance, it is the object of this communication simply to point out the fact that, as regards the

matter of perceiving and imparting truth, there is a method different from and higher than that of the process of argument. There are truths, and those of the very highest order, which argument can do comparatively little either for or against; they are neither perceived, nor imparted, nor rejected, in that manner. It is characteristic of the greatest truths that they are not so much reasoned out as felt out. In regard to these, the action of the soul is not discursive, but direct; not mediate, but immediate; not pedestrian, but winged. Moral and spiritual truth is of such a nature that the recognition of it is a thing, not so much of argument, as of vision. It is, in a certain sense, beyond the region of the discursive intellect. In this region, and by the methods peculiar to the discursive intellect, great and good results may be accomplished in the way of demonstrating truth and producing the conviction of it. But beyond this region (for it has its boundaries) things are different. The highest truth is not arrived at for oneself or demonstrated to others by means argument: it is directly perceived. greatest teachers and uplifters of the human race have been, not its reasoners and arguers, but its seers, its priests, its prophets, its men of vision and inspiration. These arrive at the truth, not by the slow process of syllogistic reasoning, but by the swift process of spiritual

vision. As it is with their own perception of truth, so it is with that of those who receive it from them. It is communicated to them otherwise than by argument and demonstration; they receive it by means of perception, recognition, vision, intuition—whatever name may be given to the soul's mysterious capacity for receiving the highest truth. This truth is known, so to speak, as a coin is known, by the ring of it. Just because it is the highest truth, it makes its appeal, not to a part of us, but to the whole of us. Its recognition is a function, not of the discursive intellect merely, but of the whole vital soul; of what the Scriptures call the seeing eye, the hearing ear, the understanding heart.

The world's greatest teachers, those to whom men have most readily listened, and by whom they have been most stimulated, inspired and uplifted, have been, as we have said, its seers. They have been the men of vision; they saw, and told what they had seen. Their method has been, for the most part, not that of Argument, but that of Announcement. The greatest teacher probably argues comparatively little. He tells his vision; he makes known the truth which he perceives; you can take it, you can leave it; there it is; it is an announcement. We think we could show, by giving instances, that this comparative disregard of argument has been characteristic of some of the most influential

teachers of modern times. Take, for example, Emerson, who, whatever opinion may be held of his system of thought and belief, will hardly be denied to have been one of the most influential teachers of modern times, his utterances. whether by word of mouth or by pen, acting as a powerful intellectual, moral and spiritual stimulation and inspiration, upon a very wide circle of hearers and readers. It was characteristic of Emerson that he almost never argued. in the usual sense of the word; he stated, he affirmed, he announced. We remember to have read, in Cabot's biography of Emerson, of the curious surprise and disappointment of a certain man, who came to a public address or lecture given by the Concord philosopher, with the intention and expectation of "holding an argument" with him afterwards. He found that the philosopher could not "argue;" he had to be informed by others that "Mr. Emerson never argues." This inability to argue may seem to have been a defect and a weakness; it may well be questioned whether it was not rather a part of the sage's excellence and strength. "To complain that Emerson is no systematic reasoner," says Mr. John Morley, "is to miss the secret of most of those who have given powerful impulse to the spiritual ethics of our age. It is not a syllogism that turns the heart towards purification of life and aim; it is not the logical enchained propositions of a sorites, but the flash of illumination, the indefinable accent, that attracts masses of men to a new teacher and a high doctrine. The teasing ergoteur is always right, but he never leads, nor improves, nor inspires." The great teacher may be deficient in, or at least in the practice of, argumentative power; but "the flash of illumination, the indefinable accent"—these will certainly be characteristic of him, and it will be chiefly by means of these that he will attract, and lead, and improve, and inspire men.

But why should we speak of human teachers? Why should we not rather at once cite the example of the greatest Teacher the world has ever had? It was characteristic of the teachings of our Lord Jesus Christ that there was in it little or no argument in the accepted sense of the word. He seems almost never to condescend to enter into argument. He affirms, He announces, He commands. In His discourses, He uses none of those means by which ordinary public speakers seek to silence objection and to produce conviction. Instead of hastening to meet. He seems to ignore and defy the objection and opposition raised by the human reason to His teaching. He declares that except a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God, and when Nicodemus finds objection and wants to know how such a thing is possible,

He simply reiterates His assertion. He affirms, but enters into no argument to demonstrate the truth of His affirmation; He commands, but institutes no process of reasoning to justify His authority to command. He cites no authorities: the principal formula with which He introduces His utterances, used by Him more than seventy times, is that of "Verily, verily I say unto you." "I am the way, the truth and the life." "I and My Father are one." "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." "Believe in Me." "Keep My commandments." "Come unto Me, all ye that labor and are heavy-laden, and I will give you rest." Such are His affirmations, His commands, His promises. It is not as if He despised argument, but as if He felt Himself to be in a region far beyond it; as if He had perfect confidence in the power of the truth, and in the soul's constitutional kinship with it and capacity of immediately recognizing it; as if He took it for granted that the truth is meant for the soul, and the soul for the truth, and that, when the truth is announced with authority, the soul will know it, as the eye knows the light, or the lungs know the air. trusted to the seeing eye and the hearing ear. He that was "of the truth" would hear His voice. He said, "Everyone that is of the truth heareth My voice."

Such was the peculiarity of our Saviour's

teaching, a peculiarity worthy of reverent and long-continued consideration. And it was because it was His, and of such character, that it wielded, and it is because of this that it still wields, such vast power over the minds, and hearts, and lives of great masses of men. this teaching it is said: "And it came to pass, when He had ended these sayings, the people were astonished at His doctrine; for He taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes." Of argument there was in it little or nothing, but there was in it something far higher and better; it had the "flash of illumination." the "indefinable accent" of sincerity and truth. Its method was the method, not of Argument, but of Announcement.

THE PRINCIPLE OF AGNOSTICISM.

Certainly no one can be considered to be more justly entitled or better qualified to define Agnosticism than Professor Huxley, by whom the term itself was invented. We remember to have given, several years ago, in a communication in this paper, his own interesting account of the circumstances under which and the purpose for which he invented and introduced this word. which has since attained so extensive a circulation. A definition of the meaning of the word is found in the volume on "Science and Christian Tradition." There it is said that Agnosticism "is not properly described as a 'negative' creed, nor indeed as a creed of any kind, except in so far as it expresses absolute faith in the validity of a principle which is as much ethical as intellectual. This principle may be stated in various ways, but they all amount to this: that it is wrong for a man to say that he is certain of the objective truth of any proposition unless he can produce evidence which logically justifies that certainty."

Such is Professor Huxley's admirably lucid statement of the principle of Agnosticism. It is

to him a principle of great and vital importance, for it is ethical no less than intellectual in its character. It is not merely an intellectual mistake, it is a moral wrong, to believe anything true, to regard anything as certain, except upon the strength of logical demonstration, and by reason of adequate evidence adduced. It is his sense of the ethical quality of this principle that leads Mr. Huxley to speak, as he elsewhere does, of "the sin of faith." To believe anything, the certainty of which has not been "logically justified" by the "evidence" adduced in its behalf, is, according to him, contrary to sound morality; is, from his point of view, a "sin." Probably he would himself agree that it is a sin of different character, and of a lesser degree of enormity, than some others that might be named.

However this may be, the principle itself is one which may well be questioned and challenged. It itself, to begin with, is evidently one of those propositions (and that there are such we are far from denying) which require to be sustained by sufficient evidence and established by logical demonstration. The fallacy of it lies in its assumption that evidence and logical demonstration are the only means by which a knowledge of the truth is capable of being arrived at. It bases itself upon the supremacy of logic—a very questionable position. Important as logic is in its place, its field is limited; it by no means

comprehends within its domain all the things that may be believed and known. It is safe to say that "there are more things betwixt heaven and earth" than are dreamed of by logic. There are not wanting thinkers of profound and farreaching insight who use very strong language in affirming the inadequateness and insufficiency of logic and argument as the means of ascertaining truth in general. They discriminate; within certain bounds they admit, beyond these bounds they deny, the supremacy or sufficiency of logic. "Looking at the whole circle of things summoned before logic," says one of these, "I do not find more than one single object taken in by logic entirely, and that is 'Euclid's Elements.'" mathematics the supremacy of logic is certainly to be admitted; but just as certainly there are other truths besides those found in the world of mathematical science. Not all truth presents itself in the form of a proposition to be maintained and demonstrated by argument. The world of truth is very large; the methods by which it is communicated and received are various; and it is only in a relatively small portion of it that argument has the precedence over other means of arriving at certainty. The temple of truth, some one has said, has as many entrances as it has mansions. Some truths are arrived at in one way, and some in another. Some are reasoned out, and some are felt out:

some come by the head, and some by the heart; some are slowly and laboriously proved, and some are instantly perceived; some are arrived at by argument, and some by action. There are truths or doctrines, and those of the highest order, to the very idea of which it belongs that certainty in regard to them is attained not by debating, but by doing; not by logical processes, but by action, by experience, by endurance, by obedience. The law is that he that doeth the will shall know of the doctrine. Without being able to discuss here at greater length the question of the supremacy of logic as the sole means of arriving at a knowledge of the truth, we would simply remark that it is somewhat singular that the principle of a system whose avowed object it is to guard against doubt and guarantee certainty, should itself be of a character so doubtful and uncertain.

In this principle of Agnosticism, thus authoritatively stated, we recognize that narrowing, curtailing, abridging quality which would seem to be one of the principal characteristics of Agnosticism itself. It lessens, it contracts, it attenuates, it dwarfs. It abridges the scope of man's powers; it makes him to consist of intellect alone; at least, in connection with the work of ascertaining the truth, it seems to know nothing of those moral and spiritual capabilities and forces which lie above and beyond, or

rather underneath, the intellect, in the constitution of man's vast, complex and mysterious nature. It seems to leave out the will and the affections, as having nothing whatever to do in a process which might well be presumed to call for the activity of all man's powers. It has no glimpse of the profound truth contained in Pascal's saying, that "the heart has its own reasons, which the intellect knows nothing of." It narrows the realm of truth. It recognizes no other kind of truth than that which is capable of being expressed in "propositions" and logically justified by "evidence." It contracts the domain of certainty; it admits no other kind of certainty than that which is the result of logical demonstration. It leaves no room for moral. as distinguished from mathematical, certainty: though that is just as genuine a species of certainty as the other, and one the importance of which is enhanced in an extraordinary degree by the circumstance that it is the only kind of certainty we have to base our actions on. If "conduct is three-fourths of life," then the kind of certainty on which our conduct is grounded would seem to be a thing of great significance and consequence, and one entitled to a large place among the things pertaining to human life; yet to this kind of certainty the principle of Agnosticism seems to assign no place whatever.

How contracted, to an Agnostic, the realm of certainty is, is evident from these words of Mr. Huxley himself: "No induction, however broad its basis, can confer certainty—in the strict sense of the word. The experience of the whole human race through innumerable years has shown that stones unsupported fall to the ground, but that does not make it certain that any day next week unsupported stones will not move the other way. All that it does justify is the very strong expectation, which hitherto has been invariably verified, that they will do just the contrary. Only one absolute certainty is possible to man, namely, that at any given moment the feeling which he has exists. All other so-called certainties are beliefs of greater or less intensity." This is taken from a passage quoted in Huxley's Biography; there is much to the same effect in the volume from which we have quoted his definition of Agnosticism.

One can hardly read these words without feeling that it is inconsistent on Huxley's part to magnify belief, as he here does, by reducing the domain of certainty to almost nothing, and yet to disparage and disown the religion which exalts belief. How can he speak as he does, driving certainty almost out of the field and leaving almost the whole of it to belief, and yet minimize the importance of belief, and speak of

"the sin of faith?" How, in view of these affirmations and admissions of the great agnostic, could John Cotter Morrison characterize as immoral the saying of Christ, "Blessed are they who have not seen, and yet have believed?" What would Huxley himself have to say in reply to one who should urge that an act of faith lies at the beginning of all our reasoning and underlies the greater part of our actions?

Substantially these questions were suggesting themselves to us, when, in the volume to which we are referring, we came upon what seemed to be an answer to them. In the essay on "Agnosticism," Mr. Huxley says: "It is quite true that the ground of every one of our actions, and the validity of all our reasonings, rest upon the great act of faith, which leads us to take the experience of the past as a safe guide in our dealings with the present and the future. From the nature of ratiocination it is obvious that the axioms on which it is based cannot be demonstrated by ratiocination. It is also a trite observation that, in the business of life, we constantly take the most serious action upon evidence of an utterly insufficient character. But it is surely plain that faith is not necessarily entitled to dispense with ratiocination, because ratiocination cannot dispense with faith as a starting point; and that we are often obliged, by the pressure of events, to act on very bad

evidence, it does not follow that it is proper to act on such evidence when the pressure is absent."

This answer to our questions, while, in speaking of "the great act of faith," it seems to admit, does in fact, like Agnosticism in general, disparage and minimize, the importance of the part played by belief in the thinking, knowing and conduct of men. From the admitted facts Mr. Huxley does not draw what would seem to be the natural and logical inference, but an inference which seems perverted and forced. If it is true that "the ground of every one of our actions and the validity of all our reasonings" rest upon an act of faith, the natural inference which an unsophisticated mind would be led to draw from this would certainly seem to be, "then, how great a thing is faith!" This is not the inference drawn by Mr. Huxley; rather, he seems to avoid and evade it. He calls attention to the fact that faith is indispensable only "as a starting point." As if the "starting point" were not everything. It is as if one should disparage and belittle the foundation of a structure, saving, "it is only the foundation," and not recognizing the fact that, in its relation to the superstructure, the foundation is in a certain sense all-related and all-determining. He points out, as regards action, that faith is a thing to which we are sometimes driven by the "pressure

of events." As if this, too, were not a sign of its greatness, instead of its insignificance; as if it were not magnified and exalted by the circumstance that it is all that we have to depend upon in times of stress and trial. He claims that faith is not in place "when the pressure is absent:" it may be dispensed with then. But when, as regards action, is the pressure ever absent; and how can conduct ever be dissociated from faith which is "the ground of every one of our actions?" He concedes that "we constantly take the most serious action upon evidence of an utterly insufficient character," that "we are often obliged, by the pressure of events, to act on very bad evidence." But why is it necessary to call the evidence in question "very bad" or "utterly insufficient?" If it justifies the action, it is good and sufficient. "Good and sufficient reason" for a course pursued is by no means identical with logical demonstraton. From the fact that ratiocination cannot dispense with faith "as a starting point," he denies that it may be inferred that faith may dispense with ratiocination when the starting point has been left behind. But who would wish to claim for faith such a severance from reasoning? Faith is reasonable; it can always give a reason; it is of the will, but it is of the intellect, too; there is no capacity or power of the human soul that is foreign to it. It does not dispense with

reasoning; as it antedates, so it likewise includes it.

It is curious how Agnosticism, unwillingly, and even while endeavoring to minimize its place and power, is led to magnify belief. It goes far in denying the possibility of any certainty. It goes far also in affirming the necessity of belief as a principle of action. The principle of Agnosticism stands or falls with that doctrine of the supremacy of logic with which it identifies itself. This doctrine is one in the validity of which one may well hesitate to place "absolute faith." There is something more in man than mere intellect: and there are other things besides logic; and the world of truth is larger than the world of "propositions." We are not at the mercy of the intellect; we have a higher certainty than any that it could give us. The certainty we have is the child, not of induction, but of obedience

"PRIOR TO PROOF."

The text for our last communication was furnished by Professor Huxlev's definition of Agnosticism. This occurs on page 310 of the volume entitled "Science and Christian Tradition." On page 312 of the same volume, the author, having spoken of "ecclesiasticism, the championship of a foregone conclusion," gives, in a foot-note, the following, from Dr. J. H. Newman, in "Tracts for the Times:" "Let us maintain before we have proved. This seeming paradox is the secret of happiness." This quotation reminded us of a similar expression of Newman's, used concerning Keble, his friend and associate in the days of the Oxford Movement. It is cited by Principal J. C. Shairp, in his essay on Keble, and it is to be found on page 232 of "Studies in Poetry and Philosophy." As there quoted, Newman, having spoken of Keble as one "who guided himself and formed his judgments, not by processes of reason, by inquiry or argument, but, to use the word in a broad sense, by authority" (meaning, by authority in its broad sense, as Principal Shairp explains, "conscience, the Bible, the Church, antiquity, words of the wise, hereditary lessons, ethical truths, historical memories"), goes on to say: "It seemed to me as if he felt ever happier when he could speak and act under some such primary and external sanction; and could use argument mainly as a means of recommending or explaining what had claims on his reception prior to proof." This phrase, "prior to proof," is a deeply significant one, and expresses an idea well worthy of consideration. Its meaning is identical with that of the quotation given in Huxley's foot-note, above referred to, concerning maintaining before proving.

Nothing could be more entirely contrary to the principles of Agnosticism, as laid down by Professor Huxley, than the language which he quotes from Dr. Newman. According to the one, it is improper and impossible to receive and hold anything whatever as true that has not first been "logically justified" by sufficient evidence; according to the other, there are kinds of truth which it is possible and proper for us to receive and maintain and act upon before they have been logically proved. According to the one there can be no certainty that is not the result of argument and demonstration; according to the other, there may be a certainty which goes before demonstration, and is followed, rather than preceded, by argument. "Posterior to proof" is the motto of the one: "prior to proof"

might be regarded, if not as the watchword of the other, at least as one of its characteristic expressions. Newman's language is quoted by Huxley without a word of direct comment; it is as if he repeated it in silent contempt and scorn, as if he felt the idea to be one which, in order to be repudiated, needed only to be expressed in words. To him, Newman was simply the apostle of "ecclesiasticism," the typical representative of "the championship of a foregone conclusion." And yet it may well be inquired whether this saying is in fact one to be scornfully rejected without comment; whether, under this "seeming paradox," of maintaining before proving. there does not lie hidden away a great and profound truth.

Being anxious to know the connection in which the saying quoted by Huxley occurs, we took the pains to look up his reference to the "Tracts for the Times." The saying in question is a part of the conclusion of the sixth one of that series of eight lectures on "The Scripture Proof of the Doctrines of the Church," which make up Tract No. 85. From this conclusion we quote as follows:

"It surely cannot be meant that we should be undecided all our days. We were made for action, and for right action—for thought, and for right thought. Let us live while we live; let us be alive and doing; let us act on what we have, since we have not what we wish. Let us believe

what we do not see and know. Let us forestall knowledge by faith. Let us maintain before we have proved. This seeming paradox is the secret of happiness. Why should we be unwilling to go by faith? We do all things in this world by faith in the word of others. By faith only we know our position in the world, our circumstances. our rights and privileges, our fortunes, our parents, our brothers and sisters, our age, our mortality. Why should religion be an exception? Why should we be unwilling to use for heavenly objects what we daily use for earthly? Why will we not discern, what it is so much our interest to discern, that trust, in the first instance, in what Providence sets pefore us in religious matters, is His will and our duty: that thus it is He leads us into all truth, not by doubting, but by believing; that thus He speaks to us. by the instrumentality of what seems accidental; that He sanctifies what He sets before us, shallow or weak as it may be in itself, for His high purposes; that almost all systems have enough of truth, as, when we have no choice besides, and cannot discriminate, to make it better to take all than to reject all: that He will not deceive us if we trust in Him "

Read thus, in their connection, these words do not seem to be absurd; rather, they seem to be words of soberness and truth. However contrary the sentiment in question may be to the principle of Agnosticism, it certainly is not contrary to, but in accordance with, those principles by which for the most part human thought and action are governed. To "maintain before we have proved," to accept certain truths, and hold them as certain, and act upon them, "prior to proof"—this is not a thing unknown, alien

and abhorrent to our human life; rather, it is a necessity from which, by the very constitution of our being, it is impossible for us to escape. It is a principle upon which, as Newman says, we are constantly acting in regard to earthly matters. The whole fabric of our ratiocination rests, as we have seen Professor Huxley himself acknowledging (though with a strange unwillingness to accept what seems to be the natural inference from the fact) upon certain truths accepted "prior to proof." The great majority of our actions are performed upon the same principle. In our conduct we are guided by probability, by a preponderance of reasons, by moral as distinguished from mathematical certainty. If, as regards any proposed course of action, we were obliged to wait, before acting, for a logical and irrefragable demonstration of the correctness of it, we should almost never act. As things are accepted, so likewise they are done, "prior to proof." Intellectual certainty is a thing to end, rather than to begin with. We act on belief and trust; we are rewarded by certainty. The thing is done by a motive power other than that of logical demonstration; the argument and proof by which the doing of it is intellectually justified come afterward rather than before.

This essential posteriority of the things pertaining to argument and demonstration would probably be found to hold good both of all the greatest truths perceived and held, and of all the greatest actions planned and performed. As regards the reception of the highest truth, there would probably be found to exist a law by which, as Newman says was the case with Keble, this truth is first accepted as having claims on one other than those furnished by argument, while argument comes in afterwards to recommend and explain what was previously accepted on different grounds. Certain it is that no great thing is ever done as a result of logical explanation beforehand of the principles underlying it or the method by which it may be done. The great thing, when it appears, comes to pass in an altogether different manner. It is done first, and reasoned about afterwards. It is wrought, not according to a theory logically evolved beforehand, but, as it were, spontaneously and by the instinct of genius; and afterwards, from the accomplished work of genius, by means of analysis, argument and proof, the principles of the particular department of art to which it belongs are derived and established. It is thus for the most part, that principles and rules come to be known; they are the result of the posterior activity of analysis, argument and demonstration, dealing with some extant and independently-produced work of genius.

"I said just now," says Ruskin, "that there was no exception to this law, that the great men

never knew how or why they did things." good composition," he goes on to say, "cannot be contrary to the rules. It may be contrary to certain principles supposed in ignorance to be general; but every great composition is in perfect harmony with all true rules, and involves thousands too delicate for ear, or eye, or thought to trace. Still, it is possible to reason, with infinite pleasure and profit, about these principles, when the thing is once done; only, all our reasoning will not enable us to do another thing like it, because all reason falls infinitely short of the divine instinct." Cicero, in speaking of the rules pertaining to the art of eloquence, makes their significance to consist in this: not that, by following them, orators had attained to the praise and fame of eloquence, but that "what eloquent men had done, that certain ones had observed and had acted according to, and that thus eloquence was not born of rules, but rules were born of eloquence." No great work of art is ever wrought by following a theory reasoned out beforehand for the doing of it; it is wrought by some inspired genius, spontaneously, and, as it were, unconsciously; and the theory is discovered afterwards by the reverent contemplation and study of his production. This is the order: first "the divine instinct," and then analysis and argument; first the thing done, the work of genius brought into being, and then

(very important, too, in their place) investigation into and demonstration of the principles and reasons which make it great.

In view of these and other similar analogies which might be adduced, it can hardly be regarded as irrational and absurd to say that there are truths which have claims upon our reception "prior to proof," and that, at least in regard to certain portions of the vast domain of truth, we may "maintain before we have proved." On the other hand, the rationality might well be questioned of the contention that no truth whatsoever is to be accepted unless after proof in the form of logical demonstration. This contention, involving the supremacy of logic as the sole and exclusive means of ascertaining the truth, constitutes, as we have seen, the very principle of Agnosticism, being with it the article of a standing or falling philosophy. It is a contention which does not at once recommend itself as sound and worthy of acceptance: on the contrary, it has been questioned and criticised even by those who may be considered to belong in some respects to the school of Mr. Huxley himself. In support of what we have just said, we beg leave to quote the following language of a distinguished man of science, Professor George John Romanes, the intimate friend and co-laborer of Darwin, and the founder of the Romanes Lectures, from whose remarkable "Thoughts on Religion" we remember to have quoted on previous occasions.

"For the reason," says Romanes, "is not the only attribute of man, nor is it the only faculty which he habitually employs for the ascertainment of truth. Moral and spiritual faculties are of no less importance in their respective spheres even of every day life; faith, trust, taste, etc., are as needful in ascertaining the truth as to character, beauty, etc., as is reason. Indeed, we may take it that reason is concerned in ascertaining truth only where causation is concerned; the appropriate organs for its ascertainment where anything else is concerned belong to the moral and spiritual region."

Further on the same writer says, in similar manner:

"As regards the part that is played by will in the determining of belief, one can show how unconsciously large this is even in matters of secular interest. Reason is very far indeed from being the sole guide of judgment that it is usually taken to be—so far, indeed, that, save in matters approaching downright demonstration, where of course there is no room for any other ingredient, it is usually hampered by custom, prejudice, dislike, etc., to a degree which would astonish the most sober philosopher could he lay bare to himself all the mental processes whereby the complex act of assent or dissent is eventually determined."

To the same purport, again, is the following:

"The influence of will on belief, even in matters secular, is the more pronounced the further removed these matters may be from demonstration (as already remarked); but this is most of all the case where our personal interests are

affected, whether these be material or intellectual, such as credit for consistency, etc. See, for example, how closely, in the respects we are considering, political beliefs resemble religion. * * * Now this may be all deplorable enough in politics, and in all other beliefs secular; but who shall say that it is not exactly as it ought to be in the matter of beliefs religious? For, unless we beg the question of a future life in the negative, we must entertain at least the possibility of our being in a state of probation in respect of an honest use not only of our reason, but probably still more of those other ingredients of human nature which go to determine our beliefs touching this most important of all matters."

These words are worthy of being pondered; they are the words of one who had not only patiently and profoundly studied the facts and phenomena of physical nature, but who had also looked deeply into the human soul and into the nature of that soul's "complex act of assent or dissent." They are words, moreover, which, if they be true (and they seem to wear the aspect and to have the ring of truth), must have the effect of overturning the very principle of Agnosticism. For that principle, as laid down by him who invented the term, consists in, and stands or falls with, the affirmation, as regards all truth, of that priority, sufficiency and supremacv of logical demonstration, which in these words is so emphatically denied and so clearly disproved.

XII.

TWO MEMORABLE UTTERANCES.

We have recently been writing of Agnosticism, and we are not yet ready to dismiss the subject. In the present communication, however, we desire not so much to express at length our own views and opinions, as rather to call attention to two significant and memorable speeches, each of which, though the thing is mentioned by name in neither of them, contains an interesting and suggestive reference to this peculiar system of thought and belief. Both of them were delivered in England, and they are very far apart in point of time; the one preceded the other by twelve hundred and fifty years.

The first belongs to the time when the Anglo-Saxon people were coming under the influence of Christianity. It was not many years after Abbot Augustine and his companions had come to Britain, in 597, it was in the early years of the seventh century, that Christianity, in the person of Bishop Paulinus, sought an entrance into the powerful kingdom of Northumbria. The king, Edwin, had married Ethelberga, a sister of King Eadbald, of Kent, under the express agreement that she should be permitted to take her clergy with her and practice without hindrance the

Christian worship of God; the king and his people, however, were still pagans. The king was prevailed upon by Paulinus to call together an assembly of his priests and nobles for the purpose of considering and determining what should be their attitude in regard to the new religion. It was in this assembly that one of the king's chiefs rose and spoke as follows: "In winter, O king, when thou art sitting in thy hall at supper, with a great fire, and thy nobles and commanders around thee, sometimes a little bird flies through the hall, in at one window and out at another. The moment of his passage is sweet to him, for he feels neither cold nor tempest: but it is short, and from the dark winter he vanishes into the dark winter again. Such, O king, seems to be the short life of man: for we know not whence we came or whither we go. If, therefore, this new doctrine can teach us anything certain, let us embrace it."

This has always seemed to us, not only a very remarkable, but a very noble and pathetic speech. It expresses, in a very striking manner, the natural longing of the human heart for certainty in the things of religion, for some distinct answer to the great questions, what we are, whence we came, and whither we are going. Though the name had not then been invented, and was not to be invented for twelve hundred years, it was Agnosticism to which this man was objecting,

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and from which he was seeking a refuge. This man was not satisfied with the agnostic's answer. "I do not know;" he had a hope that the "new doctrine" might throw some light upon the darkness by which on either side the brief space of our earthly life is bounded. That was a happy and memorable hour when the assembly listened to these words of wisdom, when the king and his councillors resolved to renounce their pagan gods, and Paulinus, "riding to the spot which formed the principal seat of the idol worship, set the example of destroying the old objects of veneration." It was in this spirit that the Christian religion was accepted by the prince and people of Northumbria, and by the Anglo-Saxon race in general; an element in the acceptance of it was that dissatisfaction with and repudiation of Agnosticism, which found expression in the speech which we have cited. Christianity claimed to give distinct answers to those questions to which Agnosticism claims that no answer may or can be given; to communicate knowledge in regard to matters concerning which it affirms knowledge to be unattainable. And, judged by its consequences and effects, the truth and justice of its claim would seem to be amply justified. For Christianity has been, indeed, to England, a source of light and truth, of law and liberty; the friend of education, civilization, and all forms of emancipation and enlargement; the parent of progress and prosperity, both material and moral. It is not Agnosticism, it is Christianity, with its denial and repudiation of Agnosticism, that has made England the great and powerful nation which it has been and is.

The other speech was delivered, as we have said, twelve hundred and fifty years later. too, was delivered before an Anglo-Saxon assembly: not, however, before an assembly representing one of the petty and warring kingdoms of a divided and distracted country, but before the Imperial Parliament of the British Empire. composed of the representatives of a Christian people. It, too, formed part of a discussion of matters pertaining to religion; in it is found, likewise, a reference to Agnosticism, not now in its ignorant and pagan, but in its educated, cultured, scientific form-the Agnosticism of the nineteenth, as distinguished from that of the seventh century. It is only indirectly and incidentally, however, that the subject of Agnosticism is mentioned (and then not by name) in the great speech to which we refer.

The speech in question was that delivered by Mr. Gladstone on the Affirmation Bill of 1883. In 1881, soon after the beginning of Mr. Gladstone's second ministry, occurred the Bradlaugh controversy and scandal, of the agitation produced by which at the time many of us have a

vivid recollection. The question at issue in that controversy related to the right, under the existing law, of "a free-thinker of a daring and defiant type," like Mr. Bradlaugh, of one who was unwilling to affirm his belief in the existence of God, to a seat in the British Parliament. controversy was violent and protracted. 1883, when the question was two years old, the government, in order to prevent the recurrence of similar scandals in the future, made a serious, but for the time being ineffectual, attempt to change the law by the Affirmation Bill of that year. This bill is significant, as Mr. Morley says, as showing "how far Mr. Gladstone's mind -perhaps not, as I have said before, by nature or by instinct peculiarly tolerant—had traveled along one of the great highroads of human progress." His speech on this bill "was a noble It was delivered under circumstances of unsurpassed difficulty, for there was revolt in the party, the client was repugnant, the opinions brought into issue were to Mr. Gladstone hate-Yet the speech proved to be one of his greatest. Imposing, lofty, persuasive, sage it would have been from whatever lips it might have fallen; it was signal, indeed, coming from one so fervid, so definite, so unfaltering in a faith of his own, and who had started from the opposite pole to that great civil principle of which he now displayed a grasp invincible. * * *

These high themes of Faith, on the one hand, and Freedom on the other, exactly fitted the range of the thoughts in which Mr. Gladstone habitually lived. 'I have no fear of atheism in this House,' he said. 'Truth is the expression of the divine mind, and, however little our feeble vision may be able to discern the means by which God may provide for its preservation, we may leave the matter in His own hands, and we may be sure that a firm and courageous application of every principle of equity and of justice is the best method we can adopt for the preservation and influence of Truth.' This was Mr. Gladstone at his sincerest and his highest."

In the course of his speech, addressing himself to the opposition, the great statesman and orator said:

"You draw your line at the point where the abstract denial of God is severed from the abstract admission of the Deity. My proposition is that the line thus drawn is worthless, and that much on your side of the line is as objectionable as the atheism on the other. If you call upon us to make distinctions, let them at least be rational; I do not say, let them be Christian distinctions, but let them be rational. I can understand one rational distinction, that you should frame the oath in such a way as to recognize not only the existence of the Deity, but the providence of the Deity, and man's responsibility to the Deity; and in such a way as to indicate the knowledge in a man's own mind that he must answer to the Deity for what he does, and is able to do. But is that your present rule? No, sir; you know very well that from

ancient times there have been sects and schools that have admitted in the abstract as freely as Christians the existence of a Deity, but have held that of practical relations between Him and man there can be none."

Then, in illustration of what he had just said, he quoted from Lucretius certain Latin hexameter lines, the purport of which is that the gods "dwell in supreme repose through endless time; far withdrawn from all concerns of ours; free from all our pains, free from all our perils, strong in resources of their own, needing naught from us, incapable of being won by our favors or moved by our resentment." After which, commenting upon the sentiment expressed in these lines, he proceeds to say (and this, thus led up to, is the passage concerning "modern" Agnosticism, to which we have desired to call special attention):

"'Divinity exists,' according to these, I must say, magnificent lines, 'in remote and inaccessible recesses; but with us it has no dealing, of us it has no need, with us it has no relation.' I do not hesitate to say that the specific evil, the specific form of irreligion, with which in the educated society of this country you have to contend, is not blank atheism. That is a rare opinion very seldom met with; but what is frequently met with is that form of opinion that would teach us that, whatever may be beyond the visible things of this world, whatever there may be beyond this short span of life, you know and you can know nothing of it, and that it is a bootless undertaking to attempt to establish relations with it. That

is the mischief of the age, and that mischief you do not attempt to touch."

It is thus that the great English statesman, even while he was fighting against odds the battle of freedom of thought and toleration of opinion, spoke of the modern educated and scientific Agnosticism. To him it is "the mischief of the age," the "specific form of irreligion that is characteristic of the present day." To him it is more to be dreaded than blank atheism, not because it is in itself a worse doctrine, but because it is more common and prevalent, more subtly pervasive in educated society, and so more extensively destructive. It is indeed a form of opinion which may well be feared; as a system of thought and belief it may well be called "a mockery, a delusion and a snare." Professing to be progressive, it is in fact retrogressive; it would carry us back to the condition of darkness and ignorance from which the Northumbrian thane desired to escape. Claiming to enrich and empower, it impoverishes and disables. Pretending to expand and enlarge, it is characteristic of it, as we have seen, to contract, to abridge, to curtail, to dwarf. It is a withering and blighting influence, destroying belief and depriving men of that power with which belief always goes hand in hand. And it is this because it rests upon a principle which, as we have shown, is incapable of rational justification, and cannot be reconciled with the constitution of man's being and the principles and laws by which human action is governed.

Who we are, whence we came, and whither we are going; whether there is anything beyond and above this present material and visible world, or anything to be expected after this brief earthly life is over; whether there is a God, who cares for us, with whom we may come into relations, and to whom we are responsible for our actions—these always have been, and always will be, the most vital and concerning questions to the human race. To these questions the agnostic answer, "we do not know," "we cannot tell," is no more likely to be permanently satisfactory in the twentieth century than it was in the seventh. These are the questions which Jesus Christ has answered. And, as it has been in the past, so it is safe to predict it will be in the future; in all the great crises of life. when the souls of men are importunately demanding an answer to these questions, and refusing to be put off, they will turn away from the ignorance and impotence of Agnosticism to Him and His everlasting gospel of light and life and power.

XIII.

AN AGNOSTIC'S EXPERIMENT.

There appeared in the daily newspapers, not long since, a somewhat extended account of "a unique test of agnosticism," to be made in Cincinnati, O., by "a well-known local attorney and an ardent follower of Ingersoll." experiment which this man proposes to make is to be made upon his own child, "a baby girl, only a few months old." This child, it is stated, will be brought up "in the faith of agnosticism." She will be taught no prayers and will not be permitted to attend Sunday-school or Church. She will be instructed to believe "that God is a myth, that the Bible is not inspired, and that the Christian religion is false, gloomy, and an enemy of humanity. She will be taught to reason, and every effort will be made to raise her in the paths of virtue, charity, and kindness."

In a statement of considerable length this father announces his own views and beliefs in regard to religious matters; that the Bible contains many contradictions and absurdities; that the Church has ever been the chief obstacle to progress, and "the greatest enemy of the human race;" that there is no "hereafter;"

that "when we die we are just as dead as any other animal." He then proceeds to speak as follows concerning the proposed bringing up of his little daughter:

"Therefore, our child shall not be taught to believe in that which there is absolutely no evidence to substantiate, but shall be reared in the light of reason. She shall not be taught the 'Lord's Prayer'; it is suggestive of death, and therefore has a tendency to produce melancholy. It proclaims temptations, and reminds one of evil and kingly power, and is altogether useless and harmful to the innocent mind. Trials, troubles and responsibilities will come soon enough: therefore we have determined not to burden our child with them so long as they may be avoided. She shall not learn to sing songs of 'Him on high,' except in ridicule, nor associate with children who do. Her mind shall ever be a receptacle for the truth. and not a waste-basket for superstition. She will be taught honor, virtue and self-esteem; to do all the good she may; to pity those who bend the knee to an imaginary being beyond the clouds; that intelligent persons and priests are 'out for the money,' and do not believe that which they preach, and are imposing upon the blind and ignorant; that they are the stumbling blocks in the way of intellectual progress; to be ever mindful of the feelings and sentiments of others.—to be charitable and tender of disposition: to recognize the brotherhood of mankind."

It is interesting to consider this proposed experiment of bringing up a child, not "in the nurture and admonition of the Lord," but in the "light of reason." It is one thing to propose and another to carry out; and one cannot help thinking of the difficulties which this father will

probably encounter in the effort to execute his plan. It will not be sufficient for him to keep his child from Sunday-school and Church. It is not here alone that the principles of religion are taught; the very air is saturated with Christian ideas and beliefs. How, except by absolute seclusion, will it be possible to protect his child from being inoculated with the poison of the Christian religion? Certainly, if she is to be forbidden to associate with children who sing hymns of praise to God, her companionship will be extremely restricted; rather, she will have no companions at all, unless they should be sought for her in quarters where her parents would probably be very unwilling to look for them.

Further, it is unavoidable to consider what success will probably attend the attempt to teach such things as honor, virtue, charity, etc., in an entirely abstract way. Where such things are concerned, it is futility to deal in abstractions. The greatest force in teaching is that of example; we learn by this, rather than by precept. One of the chief distinctions of the Christian religion is, that, in its teaching and training, it relies chiefly, not upon theoretical and abstract communications, but upon the perfect example of the life and character of Jesus Christ. Whatever may be the alleged contradictions and absurdities of the Bible, there, in the New Testament, is the perfect life and character

of Christ, unmistakably, undeniably, inevitably, The strength of the Crhistian religion lies, not in any doctrine or system of doctrines, but in the Person of Christ; and the power of its teaching, as regards the things pertaining to character, is found chiefly in Him and His example. the case of this unfortunate child, however, we understand that the element of teaching by example is to be eliminated; she is to be taught honor, virtue, gentleness, kindness, charity, as . so many abstractions. Whether these things can be so taught and so learned may well be questioned. Whether "virtue" can be "taught," is a question which has been discussed from very early times. It was the opinion of so wise a man as Plato that virtue cannot be taught; that honor, generosity, courage, hope, all the higher things pertaining to character, may not be communicated in the same manner as things pertaining to science, but are differently imparted. These higher things follow a higher law. They go by contagion; they are to be had only by contact with those who possess them. It is only life that can kindle life. Nobility, honor, virtue, whatever pertains to the higher life of the soul—these things are not capable of being "taught" in any simply theoretical and abstract manner.

Especially may we question the qualification of any one to teach "charity" who begins the

exercise of his office of teacher with so sweepingly uncharitable a judgment upon the ministers of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, as is made by this "well-kmown local attorney." With something that savors of omniscience, he does not hesitate to declare that the body of Christian ministers is made up of two classes: they are either fools or knaves; the unintelligent ones among them are fools; the intelligent are hypocrites and knaves. These latter do not believe what they preach; they impose upon the blind and ignorant; they are "out for money." We hope we may not ourselves be guilty of a want of charity in calling attention to the fact that the judgment thus pronounced upon the great body of Christian ministers can hardly be regarded as an instance and illustration of that charity which "thinketh no evil," and that the pronouncing of it may well raise the question whether the man by whom such a belief is entertained and expressed is well qualified to be an instructor in charity to the child for whose proper training he mnaifests so great a concern. Apparently, whatever else this father may be prepared to teach his daughter, he can hardly be considered well prepared to teach her "to be charitable." Let some one else teach her charity, supposing that it may be taught. Of the things in one place specially mentioned by the father, "honor, virtue, selfesteem." it would probably be best for him to confine himself to the last-named branch.

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Perhaps what strikes one most in this pronunciamento, is the extreme confidence, not to say dogmatism, of its assertions. It has the "absolute tone;" its language is the language of one who is absolutely certain of the things which he affirms. Notwithstanding he appears as a representative and expounder of "the faith of agnosticism," this man is not an agnostic, but a gnostic —using the two words in the natural and primary sense imparted to them by their etymology. That is to say, he is not one who does not know, but one who knows. He is perfectly certain of things in regard to which thousands of wise men have been in perplexity and doubt. He knows that God is a myth; that the Bible is an uninspired book; that there is no "hereafter;" that man, when he dies, is "just as dead as any other animal"; that the Christian religion is "the greatest enemy of the human race;" that Christian ministers are all of them either fools or knaves. He does not suspect these things; he knows them. He is so perfectly certain of them that he is giong to have them taught to his child as among the great and vital doctrines that make up "the faith of agnosticism." There is something curious, and almost droll, in the contrast between the modesty and humility expressed by the name "agnosticism," and the confidence, the dogmatism, the arrogance of the utterances of some of those who profess to hold the beliefs for which that name stands.

Because of its modesty and humility, one sometimes feels a liking for the name agnosticism, and an attraction towards agnostics. We are impelled to go over to them in a friendly spirit, and, to a certain extent, to associate and identify ourselves with them. We are moved to say to them: "We like your name; in regard to many things, we are of one mind with you; we do not know. We are very ignorant; we are of yesterday; we know nothing. Encompassed by mystery, let us sit down in reverent silence; perchance some voice may speak to us out of the mystery and the darkness. It is, after all, a world 'in which there is very little to be known, and very much to be done.' Let us do with our might the things we know and herhaps we shall thereby learn some of the things we desire to know." Thus we speak; but, in some cases at least, we find ourselves entirely mistaken. Our friends, the agnostics, are not of this mind at all. They are not for silence but for speech; they are not for modest and reverent consideration, but for affirmation of the most positive and dogmatic kind. They prove to be altogether other than their name implies; they are not agnostics, but gnostics; they know, they are certain; the mystery has been dissolved for them; and often they have no patience with any differing belief or opinion. We are not speaking of all agnostics, but we think we are correct in saving that there is a certain

class of them in regard to whom it is true that one is attracted by the seeming modesty and humility of their agnosticism, only to be presently repelled by its real dogmatism, arrogance and intolerance.

After all, it is probable that, for genuine tolerance and charity, we shall be obliged to go, not to Agnosticism, but elsewhere. Somehow, the agnostic sentiments we have been considering have caused us to recall to mind a certain passage. read by us a great many years ago, in the biography of one who may himself be regarded as in some respects a representative agnostic. It is an utterance of Carlyle's, and is one of the many instances which show how, for the power to produce the best and noblest results as regards character, he found himself compelled to revert to the old religious faith, from which he had in a measure departed. The passage, which we have taken the pains to look up, occurs in one of his letters to his brother John, and is as follows: "On the whole, I take up with my old love for the Saints. No class of persons can be found in this country with so much humility in them, with as much tolerance as the best of them have. tolerance of others is but doubt and indifference. Touch the thing they do believe and value, their own self-conceit,—they are rattlesnakes then." Commenting in a foot-note upon the passage as given above, the biographer of the philosopher says: "The italics are mine, for the words —true as any Carlyle ever spoke—deserve them."

XIV.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

Contrary to the assumption of the agnostic, the sacred Scriptures continually assume the possibility of knowing God. They do not, it is true, in any particular place or places, directly and distinctly affirm it, but the question as to this possibility they nevertheless answer in the affirmative, and in a manner much stronger than that of such direct affirmation. There is something much stronger than the direct affirmation of a fact at any particular point. It is when, indirectly and at all points, the fact is silently taken for granted, as a thing with respect to which no question can possibly exist. Now it is in this way that we find in the Scriptures the possibility of knowing God. They do not argue the question of its being possible to know God; they do not even raise the question or betray a consciousness of the possible existence of any such question. They everywhere imply and take for granted the possibility of knowing God. This possibility is for the Scriptures a pervasive. everywhere present, unquestionable fact. There is no point at which they do not rest upon it as an admitted and certain reality. For they are, from beginning to end, the record of a process by which God has made Himself known to men. Nay, they are themselves such a revalation of Himself by God to mankind.

Though nowhere directly affirming the possibility of knowing God, there is much directly said by the Scriptures on the subject of this knowledge. St. Paul prays, in behalf of the Colossians, that they may be found "increasing in the knowledge of God." He desires, in behalf of the Ephesians, that "the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory," may give unto them "the spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Him." Sometimes this knowledge is spoken of as a thing the lack of which is to be censured and condemned, as where the apostle says, "For some have not the knowledge of God; I speak this to your shame." St. Peter begins his second epistle with the salutation "Grace and peace be multiplied unto you through the knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ our Lord." Above all, there is a remarkable instance in which our blessed Lord Himself speaks of this matter of knowing God. It is the beginning of His intercessory prayer, where He says: "And this is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent."

This serves to show that, according to the Scriptures, the knowledge of God is possible.

God is a God whom it is possible to know. The relation between God and man is not such as to involve the necessity of man's forever remaining separate from and ignorant of God. On the contrary, it belongs to the idea of God that He should make Himself known to man; and, on the other hand, it belongs to the idea of man that he should be formed for, and capable of, the knowledge of God. There is that in God which impels Him to make Himself known to man, whom He made in His own image; and there is that in man which is capable of recognizing and knowing the God in whose image he was made.

According to the Scriptures, the knowledge of God is not only possible, but also necessary. It is uniformly spoken of, not merely as something which may be in us, but as something which must be in us, in order that we may become what it is our destiny to be, as the children of God. It is always spoken of as a fundamental element of Christian character. It would perhaps be more correct to say that it is spoken of as that one thing which is absolutely necessary and indispensable that we may attain to the realization of the idea of our being. Our Savior identifies it with eternal life. For the meaning of His words, already quoted, "This is life eternal, that they might know Thee," etc., may not be perverted and superficialized by interpreting them to mean that the knowledge of God is one of the means by which we attain unto eternal life, as something in itself different. The words evidently mean that this knowledge is eternal life—that eternal life, whatever it may be found eventually to comprehend, has its essence, its principle, its living, potential, and all-including germ, in the knowledge of God. So broad, and strong, and comprehensive an expression is this expression, as used in the Scriptures, of knowing God. And so absolutely necessary to us is this knowledge of God; lying not so much upon the surface of things, as at their foundation; being not so much one among other things as the one thing which above all others we need, for our everlasting salvation,

Such being, according to the Scriptures, the possibility and necessity of knowing God, God, on His part, according to the same Scriptures, has left nothing undone that men may know Him. He has made Himself known, as we say, in the person of Jesus Christ His Son. It is upon this one act of God's that all our knowledge of Him Apart from this, our capacity for depends. receiving this knowledge would remain a mere negative capacity, and God would still remain unknown. He has manifested Himself to us in the person and life of Jesus Christ His Son, making it possible for us to attain to the actual possession of that of which otherwise we should have had the mere susceptibility. This is the meaning of the Incarnation; it is God's making Himself known. And all our knowledge of God is in consequence of His having revealed Himself in Jesus Christ. There is no knowing of God apart from Christ. "No man," saith our Savior, "cometh unto the Father but by Me." To know Christ is to know God.

To speak further and more particularly, now, of this knowledge of God, it is evident that, when the Scriptures speak of knowing God, they are very far from meaning simply the possession of certain information, no matter how extensive and correct, about God. The knowledge of God is not merely to know certain things about God's nature, and attributes, and character, and dealings. It is perfectly apparent that, in speaking of knowing God, the Scriptures use the word "know" in a peculiar, pregnant, profound and practical, rather than theoretical, sense. When our Savior says. "This is life eternal, that they might know Thee;" when St. Paul says, "That I may know Him and the power of His resurrection," it is evident that they are not using this word in any narrow or superficial sense, as having reference merely to the understanding, as denoting something consisting mainly of thoughts, notions, conceptions, information. Words are used in different senses. The same word is sometimes used in a sense so entirely different that it seems to be an altogether different word. It is thus with the word "know." The word.

as it is generally used, has reference to the mind, the intellect, the understanding. It is by this that we know; and by knowledge we understand, for the most part, that which we gain by the activity of the mind. But it is plain that this is not the sense in which the word is used in those passages of the New Testament which we have cited. And it is evident that by the knowledge of God the New Testament does not mean simply and exclusively, or even chiefly, or at all, such knowledge as may be gained by the inquiring and investigating activity of the mind. The knowledge of God of which it speaks is not that of information, but rather that of identification. It consists in a deep interior oneness with God and assimilation to Him, resting upon a real impartation of Himself, through faith, love, and obedience, to believers. To know God is, in a certain sense, to possess God. It is a thing of life rather than of logic. When St. Paul expressed his supreme desire to know Christ, and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of His sufferings, he wanted something vastly greater and deeper than information; he wanted to possess Christ, and to be identified with Him in respect of the things mentioned: He wanted to suffer, and to be crucified, and to be risen, with his Savior.

So pregnant and profound a word is this word "know," as it is used in the New Testament, with reference to God, to our Lord Jesus Christ,

and to all spiritual things. The meaning of the word rises with the nature of the objects of the knowledge. According to the New Testament. the realities of the spiritual world may and must be known, but can be known only with a knowledge compatible and consonant with their own character. The things of the Spirit of God, according to St. Paul, cannot be received by the natural man: "They are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." The New Testament clearly distinguishes between different kinds or ways of knowing. "If any man think that he knoweth anything, he knoweth nothing yet, as he ought to know." Everything depends upon the kind or manner of knowing, whether it is accordant with the nature of the object to be known. As regards that manner of knowing which the agnostic has in mind when he declares the impossibility of knowing God, it is not upon this point that he is in conflict with the New Testament. When he affirms this impossibility. he affirms only what St. Paul taught before him. If there were no other kind of knowing than that upon which the agnostic insists, then certainly there could be no knowledge of God. If it were necessary to gain and hold our knowledge of God by the understanding, just as we gain and hold any ordinary piece of knowledge; if, in order to know God, it were necessary precisely and accurately to explain and define Him, as we do in the case of our ordinary conceptions; if the knowledge of God were a matter simply of logical investigation, argument and demonstration, to be arrived at by strictly scientific methods, as we arrive at the knowledge of mathematical truth, solving a problem in geometry, or proving the existence of the law of gravitation; if this were so, the agnostic would be right, and no knowledge of God would be possible. agnostic's mistake lies, not in his contention that God cannot be known with his kind of knowing, but in his assumption that this is the only kind of knowing there is. There is a realm of truth far higher than that with which the understanding is of itself competent to deal; and, corresponding to this, there is in man, far deeper than his understanding, a power of recognizing and knowing the things pertaining to this realm.

Perhaps many of the illusions of agnosticism would disappear if the nature of the act of knowing were itself more carefully considered. How we came to know at all is a very profound question, which the agnostic has a way of dismissing, without consideration, by taking it for granted that it is a thing exclusively of the mind. It is quite possible that the act may be a more complex one than he imagines, involving the activity of other powers besides those of the mind. Even as regards ordinary and natural knowledge

it is probable that feeling has more to do with it than is generally admitted or perceived. we attentively consider the matter we seem to discover that it is in large measure by sympathy that we come to know. "It is only like that can know like," said an ancient Greek philosopher. "To know is virtually to love, and to love is virtually to know," is the conclusion arrived at by one, in modern times, who had pondered long and deeply upon the question. "Love furthers knowledge," says Goethe; perhaps it would not be contrary to the truth to go further and say that love begets knowledge. At all events, as regards knowledge in general and the attainment of it, there would seem to be deep, fundamental, constitutional alliance and co-operation between that in us which is of the intellect and that which is of the feelings.

It seems natural and rational that, as we rise higher in the realm of truth, and the horizon widens, those deepest forces within us, which as regards ordinary knowledge operate only in the background, should come more prominently into activity. The feelings and the will, never at any time really dissociated from the act of knowing, have everything to do with it when it is the highest that is to be known. God is known, not primarily by an act of the logical understanding (though in this knowledge there be abundant and superabundant room for the exercise of that),

but by a deeper and more fundamental faculty. It is fit that the highest without us should make itself known only to the highest within us. is by the heart, in that profound and all-comprehending sense in which the word is used in the Bible, that God is known. He is known by love; there is profound truth in St. Bernard's saying: "Tantum Deus cognoscitur quantum diligitur." Especially is He known by love in the form of obedience. Here the law is: obey, and thou shalt know; he that will do His will shall know of His doctrine. That secret knowledge which refuses to disclose itself to the acutest and most searching mental investigation willingly makes itself known to a loving heart and an obedient will. "The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him; and He will shew them His covenant."

XV.

FAITH AND THE WILL.

There is something very remarkable and worthy of consideration in our Savior's words to Thomas, "Be not faithless, but believing." It is significant that the words are a command. They seem to imply, they certainly do imply, that the act of believing on Thomas's part, that the act of believing on the part of those generally who believe, is not one independent of the will, but one of which it is characteristic that in it the will is interested and active. If belief were the necessary result, in which the will has no power to refuse to acquiesce, of evidence offered, it is not conceivable that our Savior should have used these words of command in speaking to Thomas. While there is always sufficient evidence for faith to rest on, and while the believer is always able to give a reason for the faith that is in him, the evidence is never of such a nature as to produce mathematical certainty, and the act of believing is never compulsory in such sense as to be incapable of being vetoed and nullified by the will; but, in a certain deep sense, men believe when they will to do so, there being sufficient evidence to justify the act, and, when they are unwilling to believe, they refuse to do so in spite of all the evidence adduced.

The apostle who refused to believe in the resurrection of Christ unless he should himself see in His hands the prints of the nails, and put his finger into the print of the nails, and thrust his hand into His side, has sometimes been censured with a censure which he does not deserve, and sometimes has been praised with a praise to which he is not entitled. Without doubt the incredulity of Thomas was, in a measure, constitutional and temperamental. He was different from the rest: he was naturally slower to believe: he had more difficulties to contend with than they. It is probably no fortuitous circumstance, but one in which the hand of God's wisdom and goodness is specially to be discerned, that he was not with them when Jesus first showed Himself to His assembled disciples, but was with them on a similar and later occasion. He was exceptionally dealt with, because he was an exception; he had more preparation than the rest for the appearance of the Lord, because he needed more preparation than they. In a certain sense, Thomas is to be pitied, rather than blamed; certainly his Lord and Master, who knew the peculiar individuality of each one of His disciples, had the tenderest sympathy with him. He said, "I will not believe:" probably in a certain sense, his difficulty was, that he could not. It has been

said, "Many say plainly, 'I will not believe,' whose words are estimated by the Lord's grace as meaning in many instances that they cannot. Thousands of others, alas, lyingly say that they cannot, but the Searcher of hearts knows that they will not." It is the first of these two classes, rather than the second, to which Thomas must be regarded as belonging.

Nevertheless, that cannot be accepted as the true view of the case of Thomas, which regards and applauds him as an illustration of what a man's attitude ought to be in respect to the highest truth and the acceptance of it. Here, it is said, is an intelligent and right-minded man, who has resolved not to be deceived; he wisely rejected all second-hand information; he justly refused to believe except upon the testimony of his senses. His demand was in every way rational and justifiable, and very much in accordance with the modern spirit of scientific inquiry. This unqualified praise of the spirit and conduct of Thomas is just as much mistaken as the unqualified censure of the same. It cannot be said that the course pursued by him was praiseworthy and exemplary. It is true, it was overruled by God for the greater confirmation of the truth of the Gospel, but this does not alter the essential character of it. It is impossible not to perceive something blameworthy in his positive declaration, "I will not believe;" not to recognize an

element of willfulness in his refusal to believe what he had good and abundant reason to believe, in the strength of the unanimous testimony of his fellow apostles, whom he had every reason for trusting. Certain it is that our Savior, in His words to Thomas and in His manner of dealing with him, by no means implies that his attitude as regards the matter of belief was a laudable example for others to follow. The apostle who was unwilling to believe except upon his own most wilful terms, deserved reproof, and reproof is unmistakably present in the words addressed to him by our Savior. When Jesus says to Thomas, "Be not faithless, but believing," and when He says, further, "Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed; blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed;" the reproof which the words contain, however gentle. is nevertheless entirely unmistakable.

That Thomas was commanded to be "not faithless, but believing," clearly implies that his believing was in some sense dependent upon his will, that it was an act which he could perform if he would. The words are deeply instructive. They teach us that faith is not, exclusively, or chiefly, or primarily, an act of man's intellectual, but of his moral nature. It is an act of the inintellect indeed, but only because it is an act of the entire being, in which the intellect, without being violated or in any sense contravened, is

controlled and carried along by a power possessing natural, legitimate and constitutional sovereignty over it. In the kingdom of man's mysterious being there is a "power behind the throne." In the highest place within his soul sits, supreme, the will; without whose acquiescence no other part of him is capable of separate and independent, conclusive and final action. Without its consent, or against its veto, nothing whatever can take place; least of all, the ultimate and supreme act of believing. It exercises the prerogative of endorsing or vetoing the acts of the understanding. It has the power to interfere, to dictate, to thwart. It is possible to discern this peculiar and characteristic action of the will in its effect upon the beliefs and opinions of men generally, even in regard to matters secular, temporal, political. It is perceptible in all cases in which the will is interested; it is most perceptible of all in reference to the believing acceptance of the truth of Christianity, for here the will is interested most of all. Of this constitutional and inalienable primacy and sovereignty of the will, as related to the understanding, which the writer considers to be one of the most central. vital, and far-reaching of truths, and to which he has often given utterance, he has just come upon a very striking illustration in one of the sermons of Canon Liddon. Because we do not remember to have seen anywhere a better statement of the

relation of the will to the matter of belief, we beg leave to quote the passage here:

"The real difficulties of belief lie, generally speaking, with the will; and nothing is more certain, and nothing is more alarming—than the power of the will to shape, to check, to promote, to control conviction. For the will. too, has a reasoning power, so to call it, of its own. The will is, in a sense, a second reason within us. It looks ahead, does the will. It watches the proceedings of the understanding with jealous scrutiny. It watches, and, if need be, interferes. It sees the understanding on the brink of embracing a conviction, which means, it knows. very much more than speculative assent; which means action, or suffering, that is to say, something entirely within its own province, the province of the will. It sees the conviction all but accepted. It sees the understanding stretching out its arms as it were, to welcome the advancing truth, and it mutters to itself. 'This must not be, or I shall be compromised. I shall have to do or to endure what I do not like.' And such is the power of the will, the sovereign faculty of the human soul, that it can give effect to this decision. It can balk and thwart the straightforward action of the intellect. It can give it a perverse twist. It can even set it thinking actively how best to discredit and refute the truth which but now it was on the point of accepting."

Such is the power of the will, as regards belief. No one can believe, except by an act of his will, or moral nature. The evidence in behalf of Christianity is of such a character that, after it is all presented, there always remains room for disbelief, if there be the will to disbelieve. It is possible to believe it, if the will assents; it is

possible to disbelieve it, if the will refuses. It may be questioned why this should be so; why the act of belief should be dependent upon the will; why, in regard to the most vital truths, room should be left for the denial of them; why the evidence in behalf of Christianity should not be conclusive and compulsory, leaving no room whatever for disbelief, or denial, or doubt. Men crave certainty. There are certain truths in regard to which absolute certainty is possible. No shadow of uncertainty rests upon the truth arrived at by means of mathematical demonstration; there is no wavering of doubt in the belief with which the conclusion of the demonstration is accepted. Why should not the truth of Christianity be demonstrated in a similar manner; why should the acceptance of it be compulsory, leaving no room for choice?

To this question, the answer is, in the first place, that such demonstration and such acceptance are, in the case of Christianity, impossible. There are truths and truths. Some truths there are which appeal to, and are capable of being accepted by, the intellect alone. The will is not interested in them; is not affected by them; cares neither one way not the other; and so does not interfere. Such is mathematical and physical truth. But it is entirely different with the truth which Christianity stands for and consists in. This is not for a part of us, but for the whole

of us, for our will and our affections, no less than for our intellect. It is not fit that that which is for the whole of our being, should be dealt with and accepted by a single part of us. Nav. such separate and independent acceptance is not only unfit; it is entirely impossible. When we come to truth in its highest form, to moral and spiritual. as distinguished from mathematical and physical truth, we find that it is characteristic of it that it can be recognized and accepted only by the action of the will and affections, concurring with that of the intellect. It is not capable even of being truly perceived by the intellect separately. It is of such nature that it cannot be known unless it be loved. No man can really know the truth without loving it. The truth is a thing which, in order to be known, must be chosen, must be loved, must, above all, be done. For these reasons, it is not possible that belief in the truth of Christianity should be the result of mathematical demonstration, compelling and enforcing acceptance, and leaving no room for choice.

Secondly, such compulsory belief in the truth of Christianity, if it were possible, would not be desirable. If the proof of the truth of Christianity were of the same nature as the demonstration of a mathematical problem, we should have no choice as regards the matter of accepting it; we should believe in it (supposing such a belief to be possible) with the same necessitated and

passionless belief with which we hold the truths of mathematical science. Our faith would be an act of the intellect alone, compelled by scientific demonstration; and would involve no activity of the powers of that vast realm of our being which is represented by the will and the affections. But faith is what it is, and accomplishes what it accomplishes, in large measure just because it does bring into activity the capabilities and powers of this higher realm of our being. belongs to the very idea of faith to choose, to love, to trust. A faith that included no action of the will and the affections, that had in it no choice, no love, no trust, would be no faith; for this is the characteristic and essential thing in it. If faith were independent of the will, if there were no room in it for choice, then the momentous consequences which have always followed from it would no longer follow; then it would no longer work the mighty works which it is capable of accomplishing and always has accomplished. Of such a faith (if it might still be called by that name) no such things could ever be said as are said in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews. The element of acting on trust, which is supposed to be its weakness, is its strength and its glory. Great is the power of trust. George Eliot says that "they who trust us educate us;" perhaps it is a deeper truth that they who themselves trust are thereby educated. We are educated by being trusted; still more are we educated by trusting. The element of choice, which it is proposed to eliminate from faith, is one of the principal and most powerful means of developing that character which is the supreme aim of Christianity. Great is the power of choice. It is the same writer who somewhere defines character as "the result of reiterated choices." The mighty power of faith to develop character is largely because of the element of choice there is in it; of this it would be deprived if the evidence for the truth with which it deals were of such a nature as to leave no room for choice.

Faith is, chiefly, an act of the chief part of our being. It is of man's moral, far more than of his intellectual nature. It is of the intellect, indeed, but it is of the will and the affections still more. It is an everlasting truth that "with the heart man believeth unto righteousness."

XVI.

AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT.

Mr. John Morley, in his "Life of Edmund Burke," writing of the mutual esteem and strong friendship which, notwithstanding no small difference of opinion, especially in regard to political matters, existed between Burke and Dr. Samuel Johnson, says that "they always parted, in the deep and pregnant phrase of a sage of our own day, except in opinion not disagreeing."

"Except in opinion not disagreeing,"-it is indeed a deep and pregnant phrase. It implies the great truth, so liable to be forgotten, that real agreement or oneness may exist in spite of difference and disagreement. In particular, it assigns to opinion that relatively unimportant position which is all that it is rightfully entitled to. "Except in opinion,"-how finely this qualifying and parenthetical clause ascribes to disagreement in opinion its proper place of inferiority and insignificance, as compared with disagreement in respects more vital. The phrase is just,—it recognizes the existence of difference of opinion; but places it in the background, not in the foreground; it locates it in the parenthesis, not in the main sentence. There are differences and differences, disagreements and disagreements. Some are of the surface, others of the depths; some are of the frontiers, others of the interior; in other words, some are of the mind alone, others of the heart and will. And it is only these latter that can be said to be disagreements in the full and proper sence of the word. Of all who are truly united together in one, it will be capable of being said, in some sense, that they are, "except in opinion, not disagreeing."

Room must always be made, and in any true agreement room will be left, for differences of opinion. That union is strongest which combines (as it is perfectly possible to combine, as Burke and Johnson combined) sameness at the center with variety at the circumference; oneness in heart and will with difference in mind, thought, view. Differences of opinion there must always be: they are natural, unavoidable, not in themselves injurious. Experience has shown that it is not possible, and if it were possible would not be desirable, to make all men think alike. If it were possible to adopt one man's view or opinion of the truth, and exact and enforce subscription to it and acceptance of it, as the basis of union among the followers of the truth, what would that be but to "make a desert and call it peace"? Nor is it enough to say that differences of thought, view, opinion are unavoidable; nor even that they are in themselves uninjurious. It may, not with-

out reason, be contended that they are, under proper conditions, salutary and beneficent, enlarging and enriching. They are wholesome, if they stand, as they may, for the mind's natural and wholesome activity; if they are the natural result of innocent individual thinking. They are enlarging and enriching if, as they may, they serve to give us larger and fuller views of the truth. In a very true sense, differences of thought, or view, or opinion, are the result of the vastness and opulence of the truth itself. So vast and opuulent is the truth that no one mind is capable of adequately comprehending and expressing it. Each one, after his own manner and according to his own capacity, perceives some particular aspect of it; and it is by means of these various aspects (the multitudinousness of them being begotten by the multitudinou ness of the truth) that we attain to some approximation to a comprehension of the truth itself.

In what we are saying of the legitimacy and necessity of disagreement, we are by no means losing sight of the still greater legitimacy and necessity of agreement. The place of disagreement is, as we have said, in the parenthesis; the place of agreement is in the main sentence. If, even in the Church of Christ, it is unavoidable that men should be "of many minds," it is nevertheless necessary that they should all be "of one mind." The subject of agreement is

an oft-recurring one in the New Testament: the state of being united together in one is a condition frequently insisted upon by our Savior and His apostles. This is the condition which Christ in His intercessory prayer, prayed that His disciples might be in: "That they all may be one; as Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us." It is the condition of which St. Paul speaks in many an affirmation and many an exhortation. How frequently the word "one" occurs in his epistles! "For we, being many, are one bread and one body." "For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office, so we, being many, are every one members one of another." "That there should be no schism in the body, but that all the members should have the same care one for another." "Endeavoring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." "That ye be like-minded, having the same love, being of one accord, of one mind," "Be of the same mind one toward another." "Now I beseech you, brethren, that there be no divisions among you, but that ve be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment." "Finally, be ye all of one mind." "Being knit together in love."

Consider these expressions; they all of them have the same tone. "One," "one body," "unity of the Spirit," "of one accord," "of one mind,"

"perfectly joined together," "knit together in love."-these all speak of and magnify agreement. It is to be observed, however, that none of them denies or disavows what we have just been saving as regards difference and disagreement. The agreement here spoken of is that which we have already mentioned; it is of the depths, and not of the surface; of the interior, instead of the frontiers; of the will and heart, rather than the mind. It is not to be of one view, but to be "of one accord;" it is not a being knit together in opinion but a being "knit together in love." The agreement upon which the New Testament continually insists, is not a mental and theoretical, but a moral and practical, thing. True, St. Paul uses the word "mind;" he says, "of one mind;" "of the same mind;" "perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment." But, far from being used exclusively, or even predominantly, with reference to the intellect or understanding, nothing could be more intensely moral and practical than this word "mind," as thus used by St. Paul. To be "of one mind" is not to be of the same opinion, but to care for, to have the heart set upon, the same thing. practical import of the term is evident from the following expressions: "mind not high things;" "who mind earthly things;" "let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same things;" "let this mind be in you which was also in Christ

Jesus." These expressions, all of them, relate, not to intellectual conceptions, but to disposition, feeling, desire, aim, purpose, conduct.

It is not anything mental, but something moral and practical, which constitutes that agreement upon which it is characteristic of the New Testament to insist. And it is not anything mental, but something moral and practical, which constitutes the disagreement condemned by it as heresy. Of heresy, in the modern sense of mere intellectual error, the New Testament would seem to know nothing. Of the three passages in which the word occurs, one mentions "heresies" in connection with "divisions." In another they are enumerated among the "works of the flesh;" "hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies." It is in such company that heresy is found. In the third, St. Peter speaks of false teachers, bringing in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them;" whose "pernicious ways" many shall follow. The practical import of the word, in all these passages, is sufficiently apparent. It is significant that, when any one undertakes to inquire into the nature of the New Testament heresy, he is obliged to acknowledge this moral character of it. Phillips Brooks writes in one of his note-books ("Life and Letters of Phillips Brooks," vol. ii, p. 86):

"I have been writing to-day an essay on 'Heresy,'and

have got quite interested in the subject. I have been rather surprised to find how clearly in the New Testament and all the way down in the healthiest periods of theology, as in Augustine and in the English Reformation at its best, Heresy has meant obstinacy, a fault of the Will, not a mistake of the Intellect. The worst persecutors seem to me to have had some dim feeling of this when they reconciled themselves to the burning of heretics. They must have had some feeling of the moral character of heresy, however woefully their prejudices may have blinded them in imputing it in special cases."

At an earlier day, another eminent man, Dr. Thomas Arnold, of Rugby, had expressed the same belief as regards the moral and practical character of the New Testament heresy. In one of his letters ("Stanley's Life of Arnold," vol. i., p. 319) he writes:

"Meantime, I wish to remind you that one of St. Paul's favorite notions of heresy is 'a doting about strifes of words.' One side may be right in such a strife, and the other wrong, but both are heretical as to Christianity because they lead men's minds away from the love of God and of Christ to questions essentially tempting to the intellect, and which tend to no profit towards godliness. And again, I think you will find that all the 'false doctrines' spoken of by the apostles are doctrines of sheer wickedenss; that their counterpart in modern times is to be found in the Anabaptists of Munster, or the Fifth Monarchy Men, or in mere secular High Churchmen, or hypocritical Evangelicals,-in those who make Christianity minister to lust, ot to selfishness, or to ambition; not in those who interpret the scriptures to the best of their conscience and ability, be their interpretation ever so erroneous."

Such, as regards the New Testament heresy, are the expressed beliefs of men whose insight and judgment will be acknowledged to be worthy of confidence. And they are worthy of consideration at a time in which a disposition is very prevalent to regard heresy as an intellectual error.

Such, according to the New Testament, would seem to be the nature of agreement and disagreement. Both of them are of a moral and practical character. To agree is not to be of the same opinion, but to be "of one accord," to be one in feeling and desire, in will, purpose, intention, Of many who love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity, it may be said that they are, "except in opinion, not disagreeing". On the other hand, to disagree is not merely to hold a different opinion or view, but to hold that opinion or view, whatever it may be, in an arbitrary, arrogant, defiant, obstinate spirit, in the spirit of separation and division, of variance and strife. It is not to be denied that heresy may be, that it generally is, associated with the holding of erroneous views, opinions, beliefs; what is to be denied is that the heretical quality consists in these, in themselves considered. It consists, rather, in the manner in which these are held. In a deep sense, it is true that it is the manner or spirit in which a view is held, rather than the view itself, that matters. That a man holds a different opinion on this or that point may signify little. But when a man detaches and isolates himself from the general body to which he belongs; when he makes light of the belief of the generality, as compared with his own, slighting, disparaging and contemning the "quod semper, ubique, et ab omnibus"; when he selfishly and arbitrarily chooses for himself (which is the very meaning of the word "heresy") a doctrine differing from that of the rest, and especially when he holds this doctrine in an arrogant, defiant, obstinate manner, in the spirit of separation and division, contention and strife—that is the proper spirit of disagreement; that is of the nature of the New Testament heresy; and it is this, not because it is an intellectual, but because it is a moral and practical, thing. It would be easy to point out how, as regards certain views and beliefs, which have within recent times been regarded as heretical, and which, in some cases, alas! have given rise to the melancholy "heresy-trial," the heresy (if there was one) consisted more in the spirit in which the doctrine was held, than in the doctrine itself.

A clergyman, who has spent all the years of his long ministry in the service of the Episcopal Church, recently said, in a letter to the writer, in which mention was made of questions agitating the Church at the present time: "If every one were kind, there would be no heresy trials. I have lost all desire to induce people to think as I do. Controversy whets the intellect, but hardens the

heart,—at least, is apt to. . . . The evils of liberty are great, but those of slavery are greater. for people to think wrong than not to think. That seems to be the trouble in all our Churches, that we have encased Christianity in rigid forms of creed and ritual, and thus shut out so many who love Christ and their fellow-men, but must think for themselves." These sentiments, in the spirit of which there are many who will unite. caused the writer to reflect upon the strange way in which the intellect divides, and the heart unites. When Christian persons differ, it is in their views and opinions that they differ; when they are one, it is in will, in heart, in spirit, that they are one.

XVII.

THE KNOWN AND THE UNKNOWN.

The writer laid down the book he was reading. because the passage upon which he had come was so suggestive and at the same time so expressive of his own views and feelings in regard to the subject under discussion, that he wished to give to the author's utterances a few moments of The volume was "From a College reflection. Window," by Arthor Christopher Benson, an author of whose writings, after having read his biography of his father, Archbishop Benson, the writer had desired to obtain some further knowledge. The particular essay in which the passage in question occurs is that on "Books," in which the author distinguishes three motives for reading, "the first, purely pleasurable; the second, intellectual; the third, what may be called ethical." The passage itself, which occurs in the discussion of the third of these three motives, is as follows:

"I do not know why so much that is hard and painful and sad is interwoven with our life here; but I see, or seem to see, that it is meant to be so interwoven. All the best and most beautiful flowers of character and thought seem to me to spring up in the track of suffering; and what is the most sorrowful of all mysteries, the mystery of death, the ceasing to be, the relinquishing of our hopes

and dreams, the breaking of our dearest ties, becomes more solemn and awe-inspiring the nearer we advance to it.

"I do not mean that we are to go and search for unhappiness; but, on the other hand, the only happiness worth seeking for is a happiness which takes all these dark things into account, looks them in the face, reads the secret of their dim eyes and set lips, dwells with them, and learns to be tranquil in their presence.

"In this mood—and it is a mood which no thoughtful man can hope or ought to wish to escape—reading becomes less and less a search for instructive and impressive facts, and more and more a quest after wisdom and truth and emotion. More and more I feel the impenetrability of the mystery that surrounds us; the phenomena of nature, the discoveries of science, instead of raising the veil, seem only to make the problem more complex, more bizarre, more insoluble; the investigation of the laws of light, of electricity, of chemical action, of the causes of disease, the influence of heredity—all these things may minister to our convenience and our wealth, but they make the mind of God, the nature of the First Cause, an infinitely more mysterious and inconceivable problem."

What is here said, especially what is incidentally affirmed of the relation between suffering and "all the best and most beautiful flowers of character and thought," affords much food for reflection. We are at present, however, quoting the passage chiefly because of what it says as regards the seemingly ever-increasing impenetrability of the mystery that surrounds us, an impenetrability which seems to increase, not only in spite of, but, as it were, in consequence of, and in proportion to, the additions which the discoveries of science are continually making to the world's stock of knowledge. The more the realm of the known is expanded, the more likewise the realm of the unknown is expanded; the two keep pace with each other. Our knowledge seems but to reveal and increase our ignorance. Seemingly, logically, it ought to be the other way. Every enlargement of the domain of the known ought to be accompanied, it would seem, by a corresponding diminution of the domain of the unknown. It is not unnatural to take it for granted, as is sometimes done, that this is actually the case. The increase of human knowledge, the investigation into and the exploration of the laws of the universe and of the human mind, the multitudinous and marvelous discoveries of science within modern times,—these things are sometimes spoken of as if they involved a real diminution of the territory of the unknown; and it is sometimes hinted or implied that this spirit of investigation and discovery is destined to go on "conquering and to conquer," until, if it shall have not revealed all secrets and solved all problems, it will at least have reduced the realm of the unknown to inconsiderable dimensions.

Now, it is possible sincerely to rejoice over every new discovery of science, over every ascertained fact, over every addition to the stock of human knowledge; and it is possible to admit that within certain strictly-defined bounds, every increase of that which is known is a diminution of that which remains unknown,-a diminution of it, that is, within those bounds; while yet one perceives the deeply significant and impressive truth, affirmed in the passage we have quoted, that every expansion of the boundaries of the known is at the same time an expansion of the boundaries of the unknown. Not, indeed, absolutely; not, that is, that the unknown becomes actually larger than it was before; but it becomes larger to our perception and apprehension; it is seen and known and felt to be increased by every increase of our knowldge. Perhaps it is mostly those who look on and observe the discoveries of science from the outside that are apt to regard them as so many actual encroachments upon the domain of the unknown. Those, on the other hand, by whom these discoveries are made are more likely to be impressed with a sense of the mystery ever baffling them, and retreating before their advances, with a consciousness of the world of the unknown and the undiscoverable, whose magnitude increases, instead of diminishing, with every new discovery that is made. It is significant that it was Professor Huxley who invented the term "agnostic," so expressive of helpless ignorance of all that lies beyond a certain inexorable line which science is incapable of crossing. And Herbert Spencer, in his famous sentence,

"Amid the mysteries which become more mysterious the more they are thought about, there will remain the absolute certainty that we are ever in the presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed," makes the same confession; the mysteries become more, and not less, mysterious; with every increase of the territory of the known, the territory of the unknown is correspondingly increased; every pushing forward of the boundaries of knowledge is at the same time a lengthening of the line along which light comes in contact with darkness. Some years ago the writer heard what seemed to him a very striking illustration of this truth. It occurred in conversation with a friend, an educated gentleman, a member of the Society of Friends. Perhaps the circumstance that he was the son of a distinguished mathematician, and was himself not uninterested in mathematical science. may account for the mathematical character of the illustration. Our friend was speaking of this very matter, of the spread of knowledge, of the marvelous discoveries of science, and especially of human knowledge in relation to human ignorance. "Suppose," said he, "for the sake of illustration, we represent our knowledge, whatever it may be, by a circle of light in the midst of surrounding darkness; a circle, say, one foot in diameter; then we shall have, at the circumference of it, approximately, three feet of cont t with darkness. Let knowledge increase; let the circle needed to represent it be enlarged to one three feet in diameter: instantly the line of contact with darkness is increased to nine feet. Let the circle be expanded to nine feet in diameter, and the line of darkness surrounding it will at once be expanded to twenty-seven feet. And so on, in geometrical progression; the greater the light, the greater is the darkness confronting it, or, at least, the more extended the line along which they confront each other." The illustration may not be new; it may not have been original with him who used it,—there is nothing new under the sun; but it was the first and only time the writer heard it used, and it impressed him as illustrating, in a very striking manner, the paradoxical truth that the realm of the unknown is not diminished, but is rather increased, by every increase in the realm of the known, and that the things which are mysteries to us are made only the more mysterious by the ever increasing and multiplying discoveries of science.

It is not our object at present to point out any inferences to be drawn, or any lessons to be learned, from this peculiar relation between the known and the unknown, but simply to affirm the existence of it. It may well be questioned, however, whether the ever-increasing mystery which surrounds us does not bestow more blessings than it withholds, whether a world in which the

realm of the unknown is ever increasing is not a fairer, more interesting, more opulent world to live in than one in which it should be ever diminishing, and which should hold out to us the expectation of an approaching time when all secrets should be revealed, and all problems solved. an age which is consumed with the passion for knowing, it is perhaps well to remember that there are things better than knowing. In a deep sense, the desire to know is more and better than to know; and what, more than the unknown, kindles and keeps alive the desire to know? "Admiratio semen scientiae," says the Latin proverb; and a Greek proverb, to the same effect, reminds is that wonder is the beginning of all knowledge; and it is always the unknown and the mysterious that breeds wonder. The wondering soul is more than the knowing intellect. It is said that the absence of the desire for positive and accurate knowledge betokens a fatally diseased intellect. This may be accepted as true in the realm of the intellect and the things pertaining to it; the desire for knowledge, exact and comprehensive, is one of the signs of a natural and healthy understanding. But it may be questioned whether it is strictly and universally true, whether, under certain conditions, and in regard to certain subjects, the absence of such desire may not be due, rather, to the soul's poetic and imaginative temperament. Readers

of George Eliot's "Middlemarch" may remember a remark made by Mr. Casaubon of young Ladislaw: "So far is he from having any desire for a more accurate knowledge of the earth's surface that he said that he should prefer not to know the sources of the Nile, and that there should be some unknown regions preserved as huntinggrounds for the poetic imagination." No one is to be blamed for desiring an accurate knowledge of the earth's surface; nor, on the other hand, is any one to be blamed for desiring that some unknown regions might be left for the imagination to wander in. And, indeed, even as regards this poor, small earth of ours (to say nothing of the myriads of worlds beyond our ken), there is little reason to fear that, even after the North Pole shall have been discovered, there will not still be left, in its depths, if not upon its surface, regions utterly unexplored and unknown. human soul, in the region of the intellect, desires and demands the known; but, in the realm beyond and above the intellect, it likewise desires and demands the unknown; or, at least, when on the borders of the unknown and the mysterious, it is not inconsistent with its nature to relinquish the insistent desire to know. It has been said "that before an insoluble mystery, clearly seen to be insoluble, the soul bows down and is at rest, as before an ascertained truth."

And so let us come back to our author and to

the passage with which we started. The author has been speaking of reading, not for amusement, nor for the acquisition of information, but of such reading as consists in "a patient tracing out of human emotion, human feeling, when confronted with the sorrows, the hopes, the motives, the sufferings which beckon and threaten us on every side," and is dominated by the desire "to know what pure and wise and highhearted natures have made of the problem." Of this species of reading he speaks in words so beautiful, and so consonant with what we have been saying, that we beg to be permitted to conclude this communication with the quotation of them:

"The reading that is done in such a mood has little of precise acquisition or definite attainment about it; it is a desire rather to feed and console the spirit—to enter the region in which it seems better to wonder than to know, to aspire rather than to define, to hope rather than to be satisfied. A spirit which walks expectantly along this path grows to learn that the secret of such happiness as we can attain lies in simplicity and courage, in sincerity and loving kindness: it grows more and more averse to material ambitions and mean aims; it more and more desires silence and recollection and contemplation. In this mood, the words of the wise fall like the tolling of sweet, grave bells upon the soul, the dreams of poets come like music heard at evening from the depths of some enchanted forest, wafted over a wide water; we know not what instrument it is whence the music wells, by what fingers swept, by what lips blown; but we know that there is some presence there that is sorrowful or glad, who has power to translate his dream into the concord of sweet sounds. Such a mood need not withdraw us from life, from toil, from kindly relationships, from deep affections; but it will rather send us back to life with a renewed and joyful zest, with a desire to discern the true quality of beautiful things, of fair thoughts, of courageous hopes, of wise designs. It will make us tolerant and forgiving, patient with stubbornness and prejudice, simple in conduct, sincere in word, gentle in deed; with pity for weakness, with affection for the lonely and desolate, with admiration for all that is noble and serene and strong."

XVIII.

THE INDESTRUCTIBLE RESIDUUM.

Whatever contributions the scientific movement of the past half century may have added to the world's store of knowledge, it cannot be said to have increased the world's stock of hope and joy. On the contrary, it would seem to have been characteristic of it to diminish the supply of these, to produce, in those who have chiefly come under its influence, a comparatively joyless and hopeless condition of soul. If it has been on the one hand an enriching, it has been on the other an impoverishing, process. If it has blessed, it has also blighted; if it has given one sort of certainty, it has taken away another and a higher; if it has increased knowledge, it has destroyed belief, with which health and hope and joy go hand in hand. It has bred agnosticism and skepticism, to the depressing and disabling effects of which many earnest, truth-seeking agnostics and skeptics have borne mournful testimony. From Darwin down many of the chief representatives of the scientific spirit and movement have lamented the decline within them of once cherished capabilities and powers, the departure from them of old and precious beliefs, enthusiasms and hopes. Here and there, indeed, one may be found who professes to regard this loss as being in fact a gain; but in general it is not so. The most of them speak of it in a tone of great sadness; they unite, in one form or another, in saying, with Professor C. K. Clifford, "We have seen the sun shine out of an empty heaven, to light a soulless earth; we have felt with utter loneliness that the Great Companion is dead."

In reading the biographies of eminent and representative Englishmen, whose lives have fallen within the period of which we are speaking. one is impressed with the characteristic dejection and melancholy of many of them. This is a condition for which it is easy to account. is more productive of melancholy than the longing for what is in its very nature unattainable; and the agnostic is one who, in consequence of the very principle which makes him an agnostic, is tormented by this longing. He is one who accepts the principle laid down by Professor Huxley, "that it is wrong for a man to say that he is certain of the objective truth of any proposition unless he can produce evidence which logically justifies that certainty," He is one who has committed himself to the supremacy of logic, and who demands for all forms of truth, the highest as well as the lowest, "irrefragable demonstration." But it is just the highest forms of truth, those truths which above all it behooves a man to know and to be certain concerning, that

are, by their very nature, incapable of "irrefragable demonstration," in the sense in which that phrase is used by logic. If the principle of agnosticism is sound; if there are no other capabilities and powers in the soul of man than those which are comprehended in his intellect; if logic is supreme over all, and there can be no certainty save that which it is capable of giving us; if, as regards the whole realm of spiritual truth, no knowledge is possible except that which is the result of "irrefragable demonstration" before the bar of the human understanding,—then our lot must be to be forever longing and seeking for what is forever unattainable: then we may well give up our beliefs and hopes, and surrender ourselves to the power of melancholy and despair.

"If we were all, indeed," writes an earnest agnostic, "without a God, without a future, let us die, I murmured; cry not peace where there is no peace; end the miserable farce of human life, and go down with the saurians and mastodons—more perishable than they, because of frailer bones-to corruption. But in the very act of thus murmuring, the centuries arose before me; I saw the procession of the races over the whole globe. I saw their temples and great works; I heard their poems and prayers; I felt within myself immortal thoughts; and the miracle of what we call the mind became pre-eminent. I know we are not in the scale of the saurians and mastodons. We cannot perish like them. This world of ours, this wonderful microcosm of our bodies and brains, cannot have come together by chance. The soul of man, be it what it may, demands more-it requires a God. Then with my cries I beat against the blue heavens. On the top of mountains, among the Alps, feeling myself alone and near to God, I have sent the passion of my spirit upward. But not an echo answers me."

The passage which we have quoted is from the biography, which we have recently been reading, of John Addington Symonds, the brilliant and highly-cultivated English man of letters, a characteristic and typical product of the dominant forces of the latter part of the nineteenth century. It is a biography from which much instruction and inspiration may be derived; it is the story of one who lived a toiling and endeavoring, an accomplishing and achieving life, struggling, all the way through, with a fatal physical malady. It is a life, also, which illustrates well what we have been saying of the inevitable melancholy produced by an indestructible and irrepressible longing, which demands satisfaction, and yet is incapable of being satisfied in the peculiar way in which satisfaction is sought. The passage quoted is from an account, given by Symonds himself, of the supreme crisis in his intellectual and spiritual history. In a letter written June 16th, 1867, he speaks of the "disquietude," of his soul: of his destitution of "the sentiment of belief; that original, strong, unreasoned sentiment, by virtue of which Jowett cannot help it." says: "I do not acknowledge any principles, teleological, or otherwise, from which a God, in the

old, true, personal, creative, royal sense, can at present be proved."

He rehearses the steps by which he arrived at this state. The process, he says, began at school, by a refusal to accept certain seemingly unreasonable dogmas. "It advanced steadily with the growth of my mind; for I carried out to its logical conclusion the principle that I might test opinions or creeds, and pronounce whether they were of human origin or not. One after another fell the constituent beliefs of Christianity, and at last, when I considered the history of all religions, and applied the canons of cold analysis to the central creed of all. I was forced to acknowledge that the personal Deity might, after all, be nothing but a mirage—a magnificent mirage of humanity-or, as I expressed it, a Brocken spectre, projected by the human consciousness upon the mists of the unknown." But, having reached this point, he found himself "face to face with death and weakness. I had destroyed the hypothesis of the paternal God, and had found nothing to substitute for it. The burden of proof was now thrown upon me. I had to seek some formula which should satisfy me about myself, the universe, the future." Alas, a "formula" is a poor device with which to satisfy the longings of the soul. And, "cold analysis" is a very inadequate instrument for the ascertaining and apprehending of that truth which is in its very nature a flaming and burning thing. Then Symonds returned to Chsritianity, for a reconsideration of its claims; only, however, to find that, in the light of science, its miracles were impossible and its dogmas untenable. Still, science had nothing to give in the place of what it took away; it had no power to calm the disquietude of the soul. The seat of this disquietude he discloses when he says that the sentiment of God had disappeared from him "without the need of God being destroyed." He writes, passionately, of "the note of anxious, yearning, impatient, God-desiring, hungry and thirsty, exiled, footsore, feverish, blind, passionate, unhappy, skepticism in the present day. Give a man possessed by this fiend one creed, throw him a mustard seed of faith, and he will move mountains." He perceives dwells upon the connection between his own unrest and that of the times:

"This is not a merely personal history; it is the history of the age in which we live, of the age of the disintegration of old beliefs. A man like myself can only lose his religious sentiment because the religious sentiment is weak in the men around him. We are undergoing the greatest cataclysm of thought that the world has ever suffered and in the midst of it some must perish.... The cataclysm began with the Reformation. That was the first and most powerful introduction of a skepticism which since has never ceased to work, successively undermining in the world at large, as I described its operation in my own mind,

all creeds from the most insignificant to the most vital. Science has helped; physical science, by showing that the old miracles are untenable; the science of histories and languages by comparing religions and putting them upon one footing. The most powerful acids of every sort have simultaneously been applied to the fabric of catholic belief, which is honeycombed through and through; the only portion which resists all chemistry being the noble life and helpful morality of Christ."

It is these last significant words that have given this communication its title; it is for their sake that it is being written. We have been a long time coming to them; we could not give them except in their connection. We call attention to the testimony borne by this man of genius, at the time of the greatest crisis in his intellectual and spiritual history, when the tide of skepticism was overwhelming and desolating his soul, to the fact that there is in Christianity something which "resists all chemistry," something upon which "the most powerful acids" of a destructive criticism have no effect whatever. In the midst of the destruction, or seeming destruction, there is found an undestroyed and indestructible residuum. Such a residuum is characteristic of every parenthetic wasting and desolation that occurs in the course of any vital process of development. There is always a remnant. What a great part the "remnant" plays in the Bible! When the flood has passed; when the destruction is at an end; when the wasting has ceased; there is always a remnant left. And it is characteristic of this remnant that it carries the whole in itself; that, it being left, nothing has been lost; that it becomes the basis of reconstruction, restoration, renovation. From the beginning the people of God have had reason to rejoice over the "remnant"; never has there been more reason for their rejoicing than there is to-day.

The terms are very lowly which our author applies to the residuum of Christianity, when he speaks of "the noble life and helpful morality of Christ." Be it so; we quarrel not with the language. Apply to that life whatever descriptive adjective you will; call it the noble life, the beautiful life, the perfect life, the ideal life, there it is, undeniably and unalterably, the life, the character, the Person of Christ. Time cannot change it: fire cannot burn it: moth and rust cannot corrupt it; the "most powerful acids" have no effect upon it; it "resists all chemistry." And, Christ being left, all is left, Christ being left, nothing of Christianity is lost; for He and Christianity are indissolubly one. It is not a "formula," nor a proposition, nor a doctrine, but a Person, that calms the disquietude of the human soul, that puts an end to its dejection, that delivers it from its despair. Let the skeptic, even while he is a skeptic, accept that "noble life" as the model of the life to be lived by himself; let him follow as his guide Him by whom it was lived; and he will learn more than logic could ever teach him; and he will eventually, doubtless after many experiences, find a way out of the gloom and hopelessness of his skepticism into the brightness and gladness of faith. He will discover the truth of certain words spoken by Christ Himself: "He that followeth Me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life."

So, likewise, as regards the "helpful morality" of Christ. This, too, is a part of the indestructible residuum. It is speaking very moderately to use this descriptive phrase of the marvelous teaching of our Lord, of those words which, some of the greatest skeptics themselves being the judges, are the most wonderful words ever spoken on this earth. But, call them by whatever name you will, there they are and remain, permanent, unchangeable, everlasting. When our author affirms that they "resist all chemistry," what is he doing but bearing testimony to the truth of our Savior's words when He said: "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away." The words of Christ are indestructible and eternal; they relate exclusively to eternal things; they are addressed to the eternal part of man; they have the eternal tone. Well, indeed, may they be called "helpful morality." To no one are they more helpful than to the poor skeptic, oppressed with the melancholy of a melancholy age. "exiled, footsore, feverish," striving and struggling in vain, by intellectual and philosophical methods, to find out God. Let him give earnest heed to this "helpful morality." Let him try the moral, as distinguished from the intellectual, path. Let him make experiment to ascertain whether doing does not lead to knowing, far more surely than knowing to doing. Let him act upon the words of Christ, "if any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine." And, doing so, he will probably experience the power of this "helpful morality." By its help he will probably learn lessons which philosophy and logic could not teach him. By its help he will probably make discoveries which science, with all its powers, is unable to accomplish. By its help he will probably find a away out of the gloom and melancholy of his skepticism into the brightness and joyousness of faith.

A skeptical soul is a melancholy soul; and a skeptical age is a melancholy age. For the soul, and for the age, the hope of deliverance lies in the undeniable and indestructible residuum of Christianity, which is acknowledged to remain after all the so-called "disintegration of old beliefs:" and, which remaining, all remains.

XIX.

THE QUESTION OF IMMORTALITY.

The age in which we live has not improperly been called "the age of the disintegration of old beliefs." All of those beliefs, from the least to the greatest, have successively been subjected to the dissolving chemistry of an intellectual and scientific skepticism. Acting upon the principle that nothing is to be accepted as true, that it is wrong to accept anything as true, except upon logically sufficient evidence, scientific proof is demanded in behalf of those truths, or alleged truths, which have heretofore, in a certain sense unquestioningly, been held by the generality of men. Naturally prominent among these beliefs is that in the immortality of the soul. Whether there be an immaterial soul in man, and whether, if so, it survives the dissolution of the body,—it is desired and demanded that there be "irrefragable demonstration" of these things. and then it is declared that we may presently expect, now and then it is announced that the world is on the eve of, such demonstration. Sometimes this effort at demonstration assumes a curious and grotesque form, as when the newspapers announce a new and wonderful discovery (so obvious a device that one wonders it was

never thought of before), namely, that of proving the existence of the soul by weighing it. The bright idea which occurred to this discoverer was, to place a dying man on a weighing scale and to ascertain the weight of his soul by observing the "drop" in the scale at the moment of expiration. How often has one to exclaim, "Non tali auxilio!" There is something pathetic in this quest after irrefragable demonstration of things in regard to which irrefragable demonstration of the kind demanded, is, in the nature of the case, impossible. Nor is this impossibility a thing to be complained of, or regretted, or regarded as strange. There are different kinds of truth; there are different ways of perceiving, recognizing, knowing and holding truth. complain that spiritual truth is incapable of so-called "scientific demonstration," is much the same as complaining that the beauty of an oratorio is incapable of being perceived by the sense of sight, or the beauty of the mountains or the sea by the sense of hearing. The principle holds true, that spiritual things are "spiritually discerned." Our Savior once said to the Jews, "Whither I go, ve cannot come." In like manner, spiritual truth, retreating into a world in which logic loses its supremacy, and the borders of which scientific demonstration cannot cross. says to the man with the scales, "Whither I go, ve cannot come."

It is impossible to read the history of any sincere and earnest soul that has come under the influence of the dominant skepticism of the age, without finding much serious and anxious consideration of this question of immortality. This is particularly true of the autobiography and correspondence of John Addington Symonds, to which we have recently made reference, and to which, as regards this special subject, we may be permitted again to refer. In the same letter from which we quoted in our last communication, Symonds, while denying that the loss of the belief in the soul's immortality must of necessity make men immoral, admits that it is attended by injurious consequences by disabling and debasing effects.

"I feel sure," he writes, "that the habitual condition of skepticism enfeebles and debases the mind, so that a long continuance in it renders the spiritual sight more and more confused. It used to be urged against skepticism that it made men immoral; but that skepticism must have been of a very coarse and insincere kind; such skepticism resembles playing the truant from God, not an earnest search for truth in painful, God-forgotten wildernesses. But I feel that the most genuine and noble form of skepticism, by withdrawing the support of the paternal God, by obscuring the future after this life ends, by denuding the soul of moral ideas and fixed principles, renders a man more lax in his ethical conceptions, more socially indolent, less capable of energetic efforts, less angry against evil, less enthusiastic for good. . . . Such skepticism is like a blighting wind; nothing thrives beneath it. How can a man who has not made up his mind about the world and immortality, who seeks and cannot find God, care for politics, for instance? He is thrown back on merely personal and selfish tastes and interests. He is aimless in life. He has no point d'appui, no root, but sprawls, lying like an uprooted plant which belongs to nothing, can attach itself to nothing, and gapes for any chance drop of rain to moisten its fast withering suckers. The longer this skepticism continues the deeper becomes the unrest, the more worthless appear the common sources of interest, the more vacant seems the soul."

It is in this connection, it is immediately after this passage, that there occurs that passionate outcry after faith, after the power and peace of believing, which we quoted in our last communication. "It does not much matter," writes our author, "what a man believes; but for power and happiness he must believe something; he must have his foot 'tenoned and mortised' somewhere, not planted forever on a shifting sandheap."

Yet, though perceiving thus clearly and affirming thus strongly the importance of the belief in immortality, and the injurious consequences of the absence or loss of it, Symonds elsewhere repeatedly manifests a certain remarkable disinclination to the doctrine, or at least an acquiescence, if not a positive satisfaction, in the lack of any demonstration of the truth of it. He goes so far as to find a sort of solace in the prospect of extinction. Writing, March 5th, 1887, to his friend, Henry Sidgwick, with reference to

the latter's announcement of his "expectation of having to abandon in this life the hope of obtaining proof of the individual soul's existence as a consciousness beyond death, " he says: "I may add that it was for myself also a solemn moment when I read that paragraph, . . . through the measured sentences of which a subdued glow of passion seemed to burn. I do not pretend that I have ever fixed my views of human conduct clearly or hopefully upon the proof of immortality to our ordinary experience. I do not deny that I never had any confidence in the method you were taking to obtain the proof. I will further confess that, had you gained the proof, this result would have enormously aggravated the troubles of my life, by cutting off the possibility of resumption into the personal-unconscious which our present incertitude leaves open to my sanguine hope." Then, after a discussion of the relation of a belief in immortality to ethics, he concludes by saying: "I do not see, therefore, why we should be downcast if we cannot base morality upon a conscious immortality of the individual. But I do see that, until that immortality of the individual is irrefragably demonstrated, the sweet, the immeasurably precious hope of ending with this life the ache and languor of existence, remains open to burdened human personalities. A sublime system of ethics seems to me capable of being based, in its turn, upon that hope of extinction."

Such was the solace which this man of genius drew from the failure of all attempts at the "irrefragable demonstration" of immortality; such was his "sweet and immeasurably precious hope" of annihilation. Nor did he flinch from this attitude when the greatest trial of his life came upon him, in the death of his beloved daughter, Janet. Writing, on this occasion, to the same friend, he says:

"The pain of losing Janet was very great, and the desiderium will remain permanent. There seems to be something pitiful in this extinction of a nature formed for really noble life. You tell me that you have 'no consolation to offer.' But really I do not want any. I know that I cannot get any. The loss is there, and may not be made up to me. I have long since bent and schooled myself to expect no consolation of the ordinary sort. And I do not think I feel less brightly and less resignedly than those who are basing their hopes upon unimaginable reuniting with their loved ones, in heaven only knows what planet. I have ceased to wish for immortality, and therefore ceased to hope for it. . . . I have found that all life is a struggle, and neither for myself nor my fellow creatures do I desire the prolongation of the struggle. Being what we are, it is obvious that the continuation of consciousness in us must entail a toilsome Entwickellung."

To one who knows what the life of Symonds was, who is acquainted with its heroic and lifelong conflict with languor and disease, it will appear less strange than to one unacquainted with the circumstances, that he should have

had no desire for a "prolongation of the struggle." that he should have had an aversion to what he calls immortality. But, indeed, it needs no such acquaintance to account for his views and feelings on the subject. For it cannot be said that immortality, in the negative sense of a mere non-cessation of existence, in the sense simply of consciousness continuing after death, and this is the sense in which Symonds seems to regard it in all that he says on the question, and in which it is regarded generally by those who seek for a logical demonstration of it, is in itself a desirable thing. On the contrary, if this were all that is meant by immortality, it would not be difficult to show that it is a thing not to be desired, a thing the hope of which might reasonably and profitably be exchanged for the hope of extinc-There is all the difference that can be between immortality, in the sense in which science persists in using the term, as a mere non-cessation of existence, and immortality in the New Testament and Christian sense of the word. The one is negative, the other is positive. The one is in itself a poor, uninteresting, insignificant thing; the other is significant, interesting, opulent beyond conception. The one is not necessarily a desirable thing; it belongs to the idea of the other, naturally, constitutionally, necessarily, that is a thing to be desired and hoped for. Immortality, or "eternal life," in the sense in

which the term is used in the New Testament. what is it? It is Life, carried to its highest power as regards quality and as regards duration. Now. life in this form is our nature's greatest need and deepest desire. It is for want of life that we are weak, languid, miserable, perishing; if we had abundance of life, all would be well with us. is the belief of Christian people that there is One who has "life in Himself." nav. who is "the Life." and that He came into our world to impart this life to perishing men. Jesus Christ says, "I am come that they might have life." It is this life that is immortality, in the Christian sense. And this immortality so far from being the mere endless duration of the soul's conscious being, the infinite "prolongation of the struggle," the eternal continuance of "the ache and languor of existence," is the end of all ache and languor and struggle; it is the resolution of all discords into final harmony, the perfection of every faculty, the satisfaction of every desire, the fulfilment of every hope. It is purity instead of sinfulness, power instead of weakness, peace instead of struggle, permanence instead of evanescence

It is to be regretted that, because of the poverty of our language, we are unable to distinguish, except by circumlocution, between the two entirely different things of which we have been speaking. We have only one word, "life,"

to signify both life extensive, the life which we live (vita quam vivimus) and life intensive, the life by which we live (vita quâ vivimus). And vet the life by which we live, that subtle, mysterious, inexplicable, spiritual essence, whatever it may be, is a thing entirely different from the life which we live. In the Greek language, and in the New Testament it is different. There is one word for life extensive, and another for life intensive; and the two are never confounded. The first is not necessarily a high or noble word; but the second, as Trench, in his "Synonyms of the New Testament," shows, belongs "to the innermost circle of those terms whereby are expressed the highest gifts of God to His creatures." Than this, the Scriptures "know of no higher word to set forth either the blessedness of God, or the blessedness of the creature in communion with God," When Jesus Christ declares Himself to be "the Life" or "the bread of Life," or "the water of Life"; when the Book of Revelation speaks of "the crown of Life," or "the book of Life," or "the tree of Life"; when St. Peter speaks of "life and goddines," or St. Paul of "life and immortality," or the evangelists of "eternal life," this, and not the other, is invariably the word that is used. The other could not be used. for it is a common word, signifying life with reference merely to the period or duration of it. while this august and noble word has reference to its quality, and signifies the subtle, mysterious, vital and vitalizing principle which causes things to live. It is an important distinction; and it is analogous to, rather it is identical with, the distinction between immortality, in the sense in which the word is habitually used by those who are vainly seeking an irrefragable scientific demonstration of it, and the sense in which the word is habitually used in the New Testament.

In the one sense, immortality is a shadowy, insignificant, by no means necessarily desirable thing; in the other, it is a momentous and glorious spiritual reality, to the very nature of which it belongs that it is an object to be desired. In this sense it is as impossible for the soul not to desire immortality as for the lungs not to desire the air, or the eye not to desire the light.

XXI

THE IMPERISHABLE WORDS OF CHRIST.

How much importance is to be attached to our Savior's words is evident from His own language respecting them. He said, "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away." It may be instructive to inquire why it is that His words shall never pass away; what some of the characteristics are which impart to those words the peculiar quality of enduring forever.

In general, it may be said that our Savior's words will never pass away just because they are the words of Him who never changes, but is "the same yesterday and to-day and forever," or, because they are identified with the things that can never pass away. On a certain occasion our Savior said to the Jews, "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life." It was on the same occasion that Peter said to Him, "I.ord, to whom can we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life." This is the reason; the words of our Savior are "words of eternal life." Truth, spirit, life, these are the essence of His words; and these are the things upon which change and decay have no effect whatever.

To be more particular, however, it may be said, first, that the words of Christ can never pass away, can never become obsolete or antiquated, because of the themes with which they deal. These are wholly such as relate, not to temporary and transient, but to permanent and eternal things; our Lord's words have to do entirely with unseen and eternal realities; with God. with the soul, with eternity, with the things pertaining to the relation of our souls to God. with their eternal destiny. St. Paul says, "While we look, not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." This is the character of all the things that are seen; they are temporary; they last but for a time; they change; they disappear. And if our Savior's words related to them, they would pass away likewise. But it is the essential characteristic of His words thay they relate exclusively to unseen and eternal things; to righteousness, truth, justice, mercy, faith, hope, love,—such things as these.

The reference to that which is permanent, as distinguished from that which is transitory, is clearly discernible in all our Savior's words. It has been suggested by a recent writer "that the divinity of Jesus Christ chiefly appeared in His power to select the essential, and to avoid the

unessential, topics of human life and work." There is always this distinction between the unessential and the essential. There are things unessential, incidental, capable of changing, and doomed to pass away; and, underneath these, there is always something essential, real, abiding, of which they are the imperfect and transitory expressions. Forms change, but the spirit abides; ways, customs, fashions change, but human life continues; politics and institutions change, but government remains. Now, it is characteristic of our Savior's words that they have nothing whatever to do with the unessential and changeable things relating to human life, but everything with human life itself. They have no reference whatever to the changing fashions of the day, or the transitory politics of the time. They relate not to form, but to spirit; not to customs and fashions, but to human life; not to politics, but to the everlasting principles governing the relation of man to man. Had He spoken of forms or fashions, or politics, His words would have passed away; but, because He spoke of spirit, of life, of law, they cannot pass away.

How our Savior seized upon the essential, we perceive when we consider the language which He applies to Himself. He calls Himself the Way, the Door, the Vine, the Good Shepherd, Bread, Water,—such things as these. These are the great, stable, unchanging things incapable of

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ever becoming obsolete. Methods of traveling may be superseded; the past several generations have seen more than one method of travel and transportation become obsolete or antiquated: but the Way,—there is nothing about that that can become antiquated; the way by which a man goes, in passing from place to place, remains the same from generation to generation. kinds of banquet there may be, and the preparation of food may greatly vary according to time and place; but Bread and Water, food and drink, these must always be; these remain the same in the midst of all the variation, and form the foundation of every, even the most elaborate. It is the same with all the terms our Savior uses in regard to Himself: there is nothing in them that can be affected by change of place or lapse of time; they are as intelligible and applicable now as when they were first used by Him; they will be as intelligible and applicable a thousand years hence as they are now.

And this is true of all our Savior's words; they have all of them to do with the permanent, the continuing, the everlasting. Their theme is always that which is unseen and eternal. It is characteristic of our Savior that He turns away continually from that which is seen; He disparages it; He makes light of it, however great it may seem to be, in comparison with that which is unseen. Of this we have an instance in the way

in which the very discourse, to which the words we are considering belong, began. It is said: "And Jesus went out, and departed from the temple; and His disciples came to Him for to show Him the buildings of the temple. And Jesus said unto them, See ye not all these things? Verily I say unto you, There shall not be left here one stone upon another, that shall not be thrown down." In the presence of the mighty structure of the temple, what a disparagement that was of the material, visible and transitory, as compared with the spiritual, invisible, eternal!

Always our Savior's words relate to things unchangeable and eternal. They may have been suggested, indeed, in this or that case, by something visible and transient, a vine, a shepherd leading forth his flock, a fisherman casting his net into the sea; but they themselves always possess the characteristic of relating to things invisible and eternal. In every case they instantly pass from the outward and visible sign to the inward and invisible thing signified. Our Savior dealt not with rules which may need to be changed from time to time, but with principles, which are the same forever. Once a man came to Him and said. "Master, speak to my brother, that he divide the inheritance with me." That our Savior refused to do; it was not what he was for. He said: "Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you?" He said, also, looking through the request into the spirit from which it proceeded: "Beware of covetousness; for a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth." The division of the inheritance would have been a poor and insignificant thing, and a thing for the moment only; but those words are the expression of an eternal principle; and will be as true a thousand years from now as they are now.

This, then, is one reason why our Savior's words are imperishable: they have all of them to do with imperishable spiritual realities, with indestructible and eternal principles.

Another reason why our Savior's words shall endure forever is that they are addressed to that part of us by which we are related to the eternal world. Treating of eternal things, they make their appeal to that in us which is eternal. They are spoken, all of them, to that which is deepest in us; to the vital soul; to what the Scriptures call "the heart." They address themselves to the immortal part of us; to that in us which is the seat and source of all our life. For, one and indivisible as is our complex and mysterious nature. certain elements are nevertheless to be distinguished in it, and these are not all of them of equal significance and importance. There are parts of us that are more of the surface, and others that are more of the depths; there is a center, as distinguished from the circumference, of our

being: certain regions of our souls are more like the frontiers, others more like "the interior" of a great kingdom. Especially is our moral and spiritual being, that part of us which is constituted by the will and the affections, to be distinguished, as a superior thing, from that part of us which is purely and simply intellectual. Something in us there is which is central, vital, allrelated and all-including, the ultimate source of all our thoughts, desires, resolutions, actions. This is, not the mind, important as that part of our being is, but, lying back of that, and deeper than that, our moral and spiritual nature, that part of us by which, as distinguished from knowing, we love and will and act, that deep, immortal part of us whereby all the rest of our being is related to the spiritual and eternal world. Upon this all the rest of our mysterious being depends and turns. This is what the Scriptures comprehensively term "the heart." And it is to this that the words of Jesus are addressed; and their being so addressed is one of the reasons why they can never pass away.

A great philosopher and man of letters says: "Would you plant for a given time, for year and day? then plant in the intellectual nature of man. Would you plant for eternity? then plant in his moral nature." The same writer says: "One thing we see; the moral nature of man is deeper than his intellectual; things

planted into the former may grow as if forever; the latter, as a kind of drift-mold, produces only annuals. What is Jesus Christ's significance? Altogether moral. What is Jeremy Bentham's significance? Altogether intellectual, logical". In another place the same writer says: "The most wonderful words I ever heard of being uttered by man are those in the four Evangelists by Jesus of Nazareth. Their intellectual talent is hardly inferior to their moral."

This man, with his deep insight, saw clearly the difference between the intellectual and the moral, and what a difference it makes whether it is the one or the other that is dealt with; rather, we should say, whether it is simply the intellectual part of man that is addressed or the whole man, the moral part of him, the deepest thing in him, controlling and carrying along with it all the Our Savior "planted for eternity;" He was Himself like the Sower in His parable, who "went forth to sow his seed;" He spoke words to the very idea of which it belongs that they can never "pass away." And, just because of this, He sowed or planted in man's moral nature; He addressed His words to his moral and spiritual This does not mean that in His teaching the intellect was in anywise disregarded; He spoke to man's moral nature, not as opposed to, but as comprehending and including, his intellect. As is hinted in the last sentence quoted above. the rights of the intellect, though it was not primarily to it that they were spoken, will be found to be fully conserved in all our Savior's words. It is because, while the intellectual does not include the moral, the moral, on the other hand, does in a profound sense include the intellectual; and every genuine word spoken to the moral nature of man will be found to be addressed to his intellect also.

However, though thus of necessity indirectly addressing the intellect, it is characteristic of our Savior's teaching that He never spoke simply as a philosopher. For instance, as Dean Stanley somewhere points out, He gave us no philosophical definition of repentance; had He done so, it would have soon passed away, for philosophical terms and definitions soon lose their meaning. Instead, He gave us, what is better than any philosophical definition of repentance, the parable of the Prodigal Son; a thing taken from human life; addressed to the human heart; in which there is not a single circumstance which change of time or place has any power to render antiquated.

And this is true of all our Savior's words. They are addressed, not merely to the mind, but (the intellect not being excluded or disregarded) to the heart, the soul, the deepest thing in us, the immortal part of us.

Another characteristic of our Savior's words,

and another reason why they cannot pass away. is found in something inherent in the words themselves; in what may be called, for want of a better term, their tone. As they deal with eternal things, and as they are addressed to that in us which is eternal, so, it may be said they have the eternal tone. Far from being an insignificant matter, the tone of words may be said to be, in some respects, their most significant and characteristic quality. When the truth is spoken, on the highest subjects, and by one qualified to communicate it, it is known by a certain unmistakable ring which it has. When utterance is at its highest and best, when moral and spiritual truth is finding expression through one divinely appointed, so to speak, for that purpose, a certain unequivocal tone is characteristic of the uttered words. It is a subtle and mysterious thing; men speak of it as the "tone of sincerity," or the "accent of conviction." It is characterictic of all the highest human utterance; how much more of the words of Him who "spake as never man spake." This is what was felt in regard to our Savior's words when they were first spoken. It is written: "And it came to pass, when Jesus had ended these sayings, the people were astonished at His doctrine; for He taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes."

When we say that there is in our Savior's words,

corresponding to the eternal themes of which they speak, and the eternal part of man to which they are addressed, a certain eternal tone, we are only saving that these words manifest, carried to its highest power, a peculiar and mysterious quality which has always been felt to belong to every genuine uttered word of truth. Great is the mystery of the spoken word. It is not a lifeless, but a living thing. There is in it a living soul: which abides there; which, in cases of the highest utterance, does not depart from it even when the spoken becomes a written word. This is a truth which has often been felt and expressed in regard to the mysterious nature of words. Dr. J. W. Nevin, in the Mercersburg Review for January, 1871, says, upon this interesting and important subject: "There is, indeed, a difference here also among written productions themselves. some having in them the power of life far beyond others. There are books, we know, in which the living spirit of the author is perpetuated, we cannot tell how, age after age. Such is the mysterious relation of word to life, where the word is itself, as first uttered, living and not dead; it becomes, as it were, instinct with the spirit from which it proceeded in the beginning, so as to carry with it ever after the force of a felt personal presence. So it was most especially with the word of Him who was Himself the Incarnate Word of God, and of whom it is said 198

never man spake like Him. In Him speech became at once the embodiment of absolute truth itself, and what He spoke is felt to be of this character still as it has come down to us in the inspired pages of the New Testament." This is the secret of the tone of our Savior's words. He Himself is in His utterances; there is in them His "felt personal presence."

Such would appear to be some of the reasons why the words of Christ can never pass away: they are about eternal things; they are addressed to that in us which is eternal, and they have the eternal tone

XXI.

A GREAT HYMN.

One of the writer's recollections of his days in the Theological Seminary at Mercersburg is that of the somewhat rapid manner in which Dr. Schaff was accustomed to enter the lecture room in the morning, and, taking his place at the professor's desk, announce the hymn with the singing of which the duties of the day began. More frequently than any other, he would announce the fifty-second hymn in the collection of hymns appended to the old Provisional Liturgy then in use in the institution. "Hymn Number 52"; we can still hear him saying those familiar words. Evidently this was Dr. Schaff's favorite hymn. He himself, writing of it, in his "Christ in Song," says that it is "one of the most deeply evangelical and touching hymns in any language, the favorite of many Christians—e. g., of Prince Albert in his dying hour. Faith in Christ as the only and allsufficient Savior, has never found a more touching expression. It is one of those classic lyrics which sink at once into the heart, and can never be forgotten. . . . We mention, as a curiosity, that even the 'Lyra Catholica' contains, alongside of the hymns of the Romish Breviary and Missal, this hymn of Toplady, but gives it as a translation from the Latin, 'Jesus, pro me perforatus.'" The line just given is the first of a Latin translation of the hymn made in 1848, by Mr. Gladstone.

The hymn, "Rock of Ages," is, as every one knows, the production of Augustus Montague Toplady, a clergyman of the Church of England, and Vicar of Broadhambury in Devonshire, who was born in 1740 and died in 1778. He is the author of other well-known hymns, some of which are found in our hymn books, as, for example, "Your harps, ye trembling saints;" but he is best known by the one beautiful lyric of which we are writing. This he, dving young. left behind as "an everlasting possession." The hymn is based upon, at least the noble title applied in the first line to our Saviour is taken from, Is. 26: 4: 'Trust ye in the Lord forever; for in the Lord Jehovah is everlasting strength." The words 'zur olamim," here translated 'everlasting strength," signify, literally, 'rock of ages." In the Revised Version they are rendered 'an everlasting rock." In the phrase "cleft for me," there is an evident reference to "the clefts of the rock," mentioned in Cant. 2: 14. Thus the hymn is deeply rooted in Scripture, especially in the imagery by which the Lord is so frequently represented as a Rock, and by which St. Paul

says, "That Rock was Christ." It is indeed like a stream of living water flowing from a cleft in the rock.

How high this hymn stands in the honor and affection of Christian people is evident from the fact that when, a few years ago, a religious magazine, the "Sunday at Home," took a plebiscite of 3,500 of its readers on the question which were the best hymns in the language, the "Rock of Ages" was found to stand first in the list, having no fewer than 3,205 votes, only three other hymns having received more than 3.000 votes. The writer from whom we learn this fact (Mr. W. T. Stead, writing on "Hymns That Have Helped," in "McClure's Magazine." for December, 1897), proceeds to say: "Toplady put much of his time and energy into the composition of controversial pamphlets, on which the good man prided himself not a little. The dust lies thick upon these his works, nor is it likely to be disturbed now or in the future. But in a pause in the fray, just by the way of filling up an interval in the firing of polemical broadsides, Augustus Montague Toplady thought he saw a way of launching an airy dart at a joint in Weslev's armor, on the subject of sanctification. So, without much ado, and without any knowledge that it was by this alone he was to render permanent service to mankind, he sent off to the 'Gospel Magazine,' of 1776, the hymn, 'Rock of Ages.' To-day the world knows Toplady only as the writer of these four verses. All else that he labored over it has forgotten, and, indeed, does well to forget."

It is well known that Toplady, an ardent adherent of Calvinism, was extensively engaged in controversy with the Arminians, and particularly with Wesley; and the controversy was very acrimonious, after the fashion of that day. very much question, however, whether Mr. Stead is right in attributing to this hymn a controversial crigin, in making it to have been "an airy dart" launched "at a joint in Wesley's armor." It is hard to believe this sweet hymn to have been in any proper sense a part of that bitter theological controversy. Evidently it had its origin in an entirely different spirit. other hand, Mr. Stead is probably perfectly right in saying that its author, in writing it, was unconscious that it was by this alone that he was destined to be remembered, when all his laborious controversial pamphlets should be forgotten. It would seem to be characteristic of the greatest things that they are produced with a sort of divine spontaneousness and ease, without effort, unintentionally, and, as it were, unconsciously. This is no disparagement of the importance of human exertion. It is certain that no great thing is ever done except by one who knows what it is to "toil terribly." But the supreme hour in which he produces his greatest production is not likely to be one of terrible toiling; rather, it will be one of inspiration, vouchsafed to him from heaven as a reward for his previous honest, faithful, earthly toiling. It is Mr. Ruskin who says somewhere that no great thing is ever done with effort; for such a thing is done only by a great man, and he does it without effort. And the same writer says again: "Is not the evidence of Ease on the very front of all the greatest works in existence? Do they not say plainly to us, not 'there has been a great effort here,' but 'there has been a great power here?'" immortal thing is never produced as the result of a deliberate intention and effort to produce an immortal thing; it is more likely to come silently, secretly, stealthily, not by effort but by There is a "power not ourselves," which "visits" us, if we be worthy of such a visit, and, using us as instruments, speaks and acts through us. In some auspicious moment a swift-winged angel comes upon us unawares. and, when he has passed, we find that he has left a gift behind him. When men pray to God to use them as "instruments," their words sometimes mean more than they are conscious of. Sometimes there is a consciousness of being so used. The biographer of George Eliot writes: 'She told me that, in all that she considered her best writing, there was a 'not herself,' which took possession of her, and that she felt her own personality to be merely the instrument through which this spirit, as it were, was acting." It was evidently on this principle that the "Rock of Ages" was written. It was "given by inspiration;" it came spontaneously, without effort, without any consciousness of the immortal thing that was being produced; it had no direct relation to the laborious controversial pamphlets.

It may be, as Mr. Stead says, that Toplady "prided himself not a little" on these same controversial writings. It is natural that men should set the highest value upon that which has cost them the most labor. It was, perhaps, for this reason that Milton preferred "Paradise Regained" to "Paradise Lost," and that Goethe, making light of himself as a poet, considered his claim to distinction to rest upon the fact that he had discovered, and in his "Farbenlehre" had expounded, the true theory of color. The sure judgment of posterity has not justified these and similar judgments of authors upon the relative value of their own productions. The thing upon which the most labor has been expended is by no means always found to be the thing most precious to humanity. Rather, especially among the poets, the case is often exactly the reverse. More than one poet's long and ambitious poems are now entirely forgotten, while he continues to live in the grateful memory of mankind by

some simple lyric which, in some happy moment, came forth spontaneously from his heart. There are few now who have any knowledge of those extended poems of James Montgomery's, "Greenland," "The Pelican Island," and "The World Before the Flood," but this poet's simple and beautiful hymn, "Forever with the Lord." coming evidently from the heart, went straight to the hearts of thousands of people, and is in all the hymn-books, and will probably be sung as long as the English language shall last. Of this principle, of the superiority of that which comes by inspiration over that which comes by effort, the hymn, "Rock of Ages" is an illustration and instance. Toplady may have attached the greater importance to his controversial writings. We do not know that he did so, but, if he did, he was mistaken. There is no appeal from the judgment which has doomed these, with all their labor, to oblivion, and destined the hymn, with all its spontaneousness, to immortality. The relation between the two reveals also the superiority of the spirit of poetry to the spirit of controversy. It is of the nature of polemics to be transitory; it is of the nature of poetry to endure. Controversy, useful and necessary as it may be, is for a day; but a poem may be for all time.

And this is what this hymn is, and what its strength and enduring power largely consists in: it is (what cannot be said of all so-called hymns) true poetry. There is a wide difference between versified religion and religious poetry, between religious sentiments expressing themselves in the form of verse, and poetry giving utterance to religious sentiments. Religion is one thing. and poetry is another; but both of them are essentially of a lofty and ethereal character; and they are capable of being united together in wedlock; and, when they do so coalesce, the result is always something of a specially exalted quality. In a hymn these two ought to coalesce: a hymn ought to be poetry; there is nothing too good or too high for the expression of our feelings of admiration and reverence, of affection, confidence and love toward Him who "loved us and gave Himself for us." Now the hymn, "Rock of Ages," is one of the most perfect instances of this coalescence. In it piety and poetry are blended and fused together. In it we see the spirit of religion taking on the form of poetry, and the spirit of poetry taking on the form of religion, and dedicating itself to the expression of the highest religious sentiments. It is not always, as we have intimated, that a hymn is likewise poetry; but this particular hymn is also a genuine lyric poem. According to the famous maxim of Joubert, which has been pronounced "one of the truest of all dicta on poetry," "the lyre is a winged instrument and must transport."

Our hymn fulfills this definition of lyric poetry; it has wings, it soars, and it transports. And this, without a doubt, is one of the secret reasons of its excellence and its enduring power.

But perhaps the chief characteristic of the hvmn, and the principal reason of its greatness, may justly be considered to lie in another sort of coalescence of which it is a conspicuous illustration; we mean the coalescence of thought and feeling. We have said that the hymn is scriptural; it may be said, with equal truth, that it is doctrinal. Certain great, characteristic doctrines of the Christian religion are contained in it. It is intensely theological; it is hardly too much to say that there is theology in every line. But the characteristic and distinguishing thing is, not the doctrinal element as such, but the peculiar form or combination under which it here appears. The hymn is doctrine, but doctrine with a difference; it is doctrine transfigured and glorified, warmed and animated by feeling; it is doctrine that has taken wings to itself, and soars and sings. The hymn is theology, but theology with a difference: it is theology that has found what it means and what it is for; it is theology that glows and burns with the secret fire of a sacred passion. Something high and rare is sure to be the result whenever there is a concurrence of those two great forces of thought and feeling. Thought is one thing and feeling is another; but the two are capable of being fused together; and something of this fusion seems to be characteristic of all the greatest. highest, most enduring utterances. It is not good for either logic or passion to "be alone." Some one has said of the orations of the greatest of the Greek orators that they are "logic on fire." Had they been logic alone, or fire alone, they would not have been immortal. It was of the oratory of Burke, we believe, that it was said that it was as if its "thought were all feeling and its feeling all thought." So perfect was the fusion which had taken place between the two. It is in such perfect concurrence that both thought and feeling come to their best estate. Then thought is quickened and warmed by feeling, and feeling is sustained and exalted by thought. When such a coalescence takes place in the highest regions and in relation to the highest objects of thought and feeling, something high and extraordinary is sure to be produced. "Rock of Ages" is an instance of almost perfect coalescence of this kind. In the moment when it came from the head and heart of its author, thought and feeling, doctrine and devotion, theology and passion, were wedded together; and the result was a great and immortal hymn.

XXII.

THE PREACHER AND HIS CONGREGATION.

Perhaps it is not without a feeling of sadness, for the most part, that the average minister stands up to preach to the average congregation. The contrast is so pitifully discouraging between the actual congregation which confronts his eyes and the ideal congregation which rises before his imagination. He is not going to preach to "a crowded house;" indeed, he has never done so, nor does he expect ever to do so. The congregation may have sung "We'll Crowd Thy Gates with Thankful Songs," but there was no actual crowding. No, there is no great multitude of worshipers and hearers now present; the aisles are not "blocked;" it has not been found necessary to display placards announcing "standing room only;" it cannot be said that "hundreds" have been "turned away without finding entrance." No; on the contrary, there is a pathetic abundance of unoccupied space in the church as the average minister rises on Sunday morning, to speak to the average congregation.

It is not just this, however, that produces his feeling of sadness. He knows and feels that it

is an inestimable privilege and an honor of which he is not worthy, to be permitted to preach the everlasting Gospel of Jesus Christ in any place. however obscure, and to any congregation, however small. But he cannot help thinking of the vast multitudes for whom this Gospel was intended, but by whom the sound of it is never or almost never heard. This Gospel—is it not a thing for "all nations;" were not "all people" from the very beginning regarded as being included within its comprehensive scope? Where is the great and glorious Church of Jesus Christ, dealing with all nations; holding great populations in its strong and beneficent grip; wielding influence and power over "all classes and conditions of men;" gathering, not merely a handful of people here and there, but vast, multitudinous congregations of joyful worshipers? In the neighborhood of the church in which the average minister preaches, there are perhaps many hundreds of people who never cross the threshold of a church door. The thought of these is a burden to his heart and conscience: he feels himself personally responsible for their absence. More particularly, and with a still more poignant feeling, he thinks of those of his own members who are absent from the worshiping congregation. Not of the aged, the infirm, the sick; his thoughts of them are peaceful and comforting thoughts; he knows that for the most part they would be glad to be here if they could; but of those who, though weil and strong, are careless and negligent church-members and only irregular and occasional attendants upon the services of God's house. And with still more painful feelings he thinks of those of his congregation (for there are such) who never come to church at all; whose church-membership is a nominal and unreal thing; whose very names, as he sees them on the church register, make the minister sad. Truly, dearly beloved reader, the average minister has no cause for self-congratulation when he stands face to face with his Sunday congregation. And sometimes he seems to hear a scoffing voice which says: "Is this all? Is this handful all that thou hast gathered after so many years of toil and struggle? Verily, thou and thy preaching have nothing to boast of: thy life, indeed, seems to have been, in no considerable degree, productive of results."

Consolations are never wanting. Sometimes the minister casts aside his sorrowful thoughts; he turns upon the scoffing voice; he "strikes back." Why, he asks, should we be forever putting the hackneyed question, why the people do not go to church; why should we not rather inquire why there are so many who do? Is it not, after all, a remarkable fact that great multitudes of people do regularly frequent the services of God's house and the preaching of God's

Word, and, with invincible obstinacy, persist in doing so, Sunday after Sunday, year in and year out, from generation to generation? Is it not a significant circumstance that, in the one hundred and twenty-five years during which men have worshiped in this particular church, no appointment for service was ever made at which a congregation was not present? At least, the writer can bear personal testimony to the fact that this has been the case for more than one-fourth of this long period of time; and he is perfectly certain that the same is true of the remainder of it. Surely this is a circumstance worthy of consideration. It leads one to inquire what, after all, is the source of the attractive power of the Church of Christ and the worship of God, and to believe that, after all, this power shall never fail. Thus, saddened by the ever present and ever saddening discrepancy between the ideal and the actual, oppressed with a sense of nonattainment and the consciousness of failure, the preacher of God's Word seeks such consolation as it is possible for him to obtain. over the multitudes whom, though the Gospel was meant for them, he, nevertheless had no reason to expect to be present, and grieving still more over the absence of those whom he had a right to expect to be present, he takes refuge in the comforting thought of those faithful ones who, on this Sunday of somewhat unfavorable

weather, have not failed, as they never do fail, to be present in their places. Through the open vestibule door he caught gampses of them as they came in, and observed them shaking the light snow from their garments. Who are these, whose animated and glowing countenances show the good effect of the open air exercise they have taken in coming to God's house? These, dearreader, are the "regulars;" they are an unspeakable comfort to the minister; seeing them, he thanks God and takes courage. If there are those whose very names, as he sees them on the church register, make him sad, there are those whose faces, as he sees them in church, never fail to make him glad.

Sometimes a sort of pride comes to the preacher's help; a poor and lowly sort of pride, but an innocent and harmless one, and one which may well be considered permissible, seeing it serves a useful and beneficent purpose. There are times when he is sustained by the proud consciousness of duty performed under difficulties, of important services rendered, however they may be slightly regarded. Happy is he if, on some dreary February Sunday, he is able to say to himself: "The weather is unfavorable; the worshipers are few; I am preaching to a small congregation to-day. But, thank God, this sermon was not slighted. It is the fruit of conscientious and painstaking toil. It has been as industrious-

ly and faithfully prepared, and will be as freely and lovingly given, as if thousands were present to hear it." It is a great moment when the preacher can solace himself with this proud consciousness. Or, he has to deal, as sometimes happens. with an inattentive hearer The man is in church, but is there, as it were, unwillingly. has had no joy in the worship; he is not disposed to listen to the sermon. His countenance and his partly averted attitude betoken that he is bored and indifferent, that he "cares for none of these things." Such a hearer is a great trial to a preacher; happy is he at that monent if he is able to say: "O, my inattentive friend, would that you might be willing to listen to the interpretation which is being given of this passage of Scripture, into the meaning of which I have been digging as men dig for gold or precious stones. Believe me, the words which are now being spoken are, not for my sake, but for the sake of the truth, worthy of your respetful and interested attention. If any one, thirty years ago, had explained to me these words of Scripture as they are now being explained, he would have rendered me a great service; perhaps, if you were willing to listen, a great service might be rendered you." Sometimes,-not always, but sometimes -the preacher is able thus proudly to defend himself against the disparaging and offensive attitude of the inattentive hearer.

But why should we speak of inattentive hearers? Why should we not rather speak of those whose sympathetic and attentive attitude is a constant joy to the preacher's heart? As Dr. Broadus once said: "The soul of a man who can speak effectively to his fellowmen is a very sensitive thing. It is easily hindered; it is also easily helped." How the soul of the preacher sometimes rejoices to find one specially attentive and susceptible hearer. What communion and companionship are then established; what swift and mysterious communications then take place between soul and soul. Longfellow writes in his journal: "There is one law-student who comes in occasionally to my class, and I always lecture better when he is there. This shows how much depends upon the audience." Every preacher will understand this. Very probably he knows of some one regular and faithful hearer because of whom he always "preaches better." This person helps the preacher more than he knows. And the preacher is grateful to him for his attention, his sympathy, his help; in a measure leans and depends upon him; and misses him sadly when his place is made vacant by death.

Thanks for all attentive hearers; yea, blessings be upon all who come to God's house and participate in the worship of it, whether they be attentive listeners to the preacher or not. What ever may have brought them to church, and whatever may be their wandering thoughts while there, may they carry a blessing with them when they go away. To the preacher his congreation is an object of infinite interest and import-These are his people; they belong to him and he belongs to them. He knows them. He has been with them in times of joy and in times of sorrow. He knows something of their individual anxieties and perplexities, trials and struggles, sorrows and troubles. And this knowledge of them, and sense of identification with them, gives him at times flashes of insight into the deep and mysterious meaning of human life, and produce for him moments of a strange tenderness and exaltation of spirit. We remember once to have caught a glimpse, far back in the congregation, of the face of a young person, into whose life there had prematurely come the shadow of a great trouble. It was years ago, but we shall not forget that Sunday, that moment, that face, The infinite sadness and tenderness of it, in one so young! When we saw that face with its look of sadness and sorrow combined with the expression of a sweet and gentle patience, our thoughts were far away: and we remembered what is said of the face of Stephen: "And all that sat in the council, looking steadfastly on him, saw his face, as if it had been the face of an angel." There are moments when some swift vision is vouchsafed unto us into the deep, deep

meaning of human life, with its "eternal note of sadness," into the infinite significance and dazzling splendor of the Cross of Christ on which the Man of Sorrows died. Yes, even the preacher has "moments;" thanks for them; he would probably perish except for them.

"There are some moments in this lone
And desolate world of ours that well repay
The toil of struggling through it, and atone
For many a long, sad night and weary day.
They come upon the soul like some wild strain
Of distant music,—whence, we know not."

The service is over; the hymns have been sung, the lessons have been read; the prayers have been offered; the sermon has been preached. The people are departing; may they "go in peace." The parson turns away, repeating to himself Arthur Hugh Clough's "Say not the struggle naught availeth." And he says over to himself, also, these words of the same poet:

"Let us go hence, and think on these things In silence, which is best."

XXIII.

PASSION IN PREACHING.

Dr. Watson, enumerating in one of the chapters of "The Cure of Souls" the several canons of public speaking, gives the last and highest place to what he calls *Intensity*. The passage is as follows:

"The last and greatest canon of speaking is intensity, and it will be freely granted that the want of present day preaching is spiritual passion. Of intellectual and social passion there is enough in the pulpit, and one has even been amazed at the most strange of all enthusiasms, critical passion, when a preacher has become quite hot over the authorship of the Pentateuch. What is wanted, and what cannot be wanted, is the sense of the unseen and eternal—of the everlasting love of God, the atoning sacrifice of our Lord Jesus Christ, the unspeakable value of a single soul, the infinite pathos of human life, the tenderness of the Holy Ghost, and the graciousness of the Evangel."

The reader of the volume will be in no danger of supposing that this passage implies any disparagement of theology. For, in the next chapter but one, on "The Theory of Religion," the author gives to theology its proper and deservedly high place. He shows the necessity, the inevitableness of it, and affirms that "no one can

hope to teach religion, in even its simplest form, with permanent success, without a competent knowledge of theology, any more than a physician can practice medicine without a knowledge of physiology, or an engineer build a bridge who has not learned mathematics." He speaks in strong language, saving: "One can hardly imagine a greater sin against light within the Church than any indifference or enmity towards theology." He disputes "the impudent assertion that an average audience has no interest in theology," citing in evidence against it the fact that four of the books of fiction which within recent years have been most widely read, namely, John Inglesant, The Story of an African Farm, John Ward, Preacher, and Robert Elsmere, have dealt directly with theological questions; and the further fact that four books, not of fiction, which have recently appealed widely and powerfully to the intelligent reading public, namely, Mr. Balfour's Foundations of Belief, Mr. Pearson's Natural Life and Character, Mr. Kidd's Social Evolution, and Professor Drummond's Ascent of Man, have all of them had collateral connection with the problems of theology. There is something exhibitanting, strengthening reassuring in the manner in which Dr. Watson puts honor upon theology, as also in his sane and just discussion of the place which theology is likely to hold (in correction of certain mistakes of the past) in the Church of the future.

Unquestionably, theology, as it always has had, will always continue to have, much to do with the preaching of the gospel. The great doctrines of Christianity, built up with so much thought and care, will never cease to play a prominent part in it. What a goodly and wholesome thing is instruction in regard to the matters pertaining to God and the soul, and how welcome it is, always and everywhere, to the average man. What strength and steadiness, what substance and solidity, which otherwise it could not have, are imparted to the preaching of the man who practically recognizes the importance of theology. The successful preacher will have much to do with the indoctrination of his hearers; he will take pattern from the New Testament, which, as a rule, does not proceed to practical exhortation until it has first laid down a basis of doctrine. He will be a diligent student of theology, and his preaching will be leavened with it.

When all this has been said, however, we are far from having said or implied that a knowledge of theology is the principal thing which a preacher needs. The place of theology is indeed a high one, but it is not the highest; it is one of the principal instruments used in preaching,—it is not itself the force which uses the instruments. Preaching needs to be leavened with theology, as has been said, but theology itself needs to be leavened with something else before it becomes capable

of fulfilling the object and purpose for which it is intended. In itself, indeed, it may even be said to be a poor and ineffectual thing, singularly unfitted to be the means by which the preacher accomplishes his object. For that object, it needs to be remembered, is always an intensely practical one. It is not so much to instruct, as (using instruction and other instruments besides) to stir, to move, to vitalize and energize, to empower and enable. The preacher, or any public speaker (unless he be a scientific lecturer) stands before his fellow-men, not for the mere purpose of communicating knowledge, but for the purpose of convincing them of and persuading them to accept and adopt and act upon the truth which he proclaims, breathing into them, in what measure may be possible, the breath of life, to inspire and enable them so to do. It has been said that the public speaker ought to be "an animal galvanic battery upon two legs." But in the man who merely communicates knowledge, there is nothing of the galvanic battery. Theological knowledge, wedded to its proper mate, is capable of becoming one of the most beneficent of forces; unmated, it is destitute of motive power. It comes to its best estate, it enters into the kingdom, only when it enters into alliance with that element which Dr. Watson calls passion, using the word in its legitimate large and noble sense.

Head and heart, thought and feeling, logic and passion,—these are very different, but each needs the other, and each is at its best and highest only when wedded to the other. Thought is needed for light and guidance, passion for force and motive power. When the two coalesce, when the thought is all warmed by feeling and the feeling all illuminated by thought, it is in that hour that the highest activity of the human soul takes place, and its highest products are produced. Then, as was once said of a great public speaker, it is as if the thought were all feeling and the feeling all thought. This is that union which is indicated by Wordsworth, when he says, in The Prelude:

> "From Nature's overflowing soul I had received so much that all my thoughts Were steeped in feeling;"

and when he says, in the same poem:

"By reason built, or passion, which itself Is highest reason, in a soul sublime."

Especially where, as in the case of the public speaker or preacher, the object is, not simply to inform men, but to move them, passion is indispensably necessary. There, what Bacon calls "intellectus sibi permissus," the intellect left to itself alone, is a comparatively helpless thing. For purposes of motive power, there is a fatal inability in that which is exclusively intellectual. It is destitute of vitalizing energy,

the very thing which public speaking needs to possess. Edmund Burke, whose words we have just quoted, was a noble instance of that combination of thought and feeling, logic and passion, of which we have just spoken. Professor Woodrow Wilson, in a recent volume, in which he writes instructively and delightfully of Burke as the "Interpreter of English Liberty," says of that great statesman: "His powers are all of a piece; his heart is inextricably mixed up with his mind: his opinions are immediatly transmuted into convictions; he does not talk for distinction, because he does not use his mind for the intellectual pleasure of it, but because he also deeply feels what he thinks." The same writer savs of Burke's writings: "They are not purely intellectual productions; there is no page of abstract reasoning to be found in Burke. His mind works upon concrete objects, and he speaks always with a certain passion, as if his affections were involved." "As if his affections were involved,"—those words, it seems to us, indicate the true source of the power of every really great speaker or writer. Some one has described the oratory of the greatest of Greek orators by saying that it is "logic on fire." There is in those orations abundance of argument, but the characterizing and differentiating quality of the oratory lies, not in the logic, but in the circumstance that it is on fire. Wherever a man, speaking to his fellowmen, produces powerful and lasting effects upon them, passion, in some form, will be found always to be present. It may be latent, it may and probably will be suppressed or partially suppressed, but it will be there. Of the preaching of the man whom Dean Stanley pronounced to be "beyond question the greatest preacher of the nineteenth century," his biographer says, "There was a restrained passion in him which forced people to listen."

In no other calling is there so much room, and so much need, for the union of thought and feeling, as in that of the preacher of the Gospel. Here is boundless room for argument, and here is boundless room for passion. It would seem to belong to the very idea of preaching that it should be characterized by a certain intensity or passionateness; and Dr. Watson is probably right when he affirms that the greatest need of the preaching of the present day is that of spiritual passion. The things which the Christian preacher believes and proclaims are of such a nature that they can hardly be believed and proclaimed, in any true sense of the words. otherwise than passionately. Belief in these things is, as we have recently tried to show, in its very nature passionate. And the preacher who can say "I believed, therefore have I spoken," will of necessity speak intensely; he will speak "as if his affections were involved;" he will speak with the passionate accent of a passionate belief

XXIV

"LIBERTY" IN PREACHING.

It was a Sunday morning in April; and the parson was in his place in church; and the latest comers of the assembling congregation were coming in and taking their places for the morning service. Then, suddenly, from the sycamore tree down in the churchyard, the red-bird, that seems to have chosen that particular tree as his favorite place of resort, began his song. It was a song which a whole congreagtion might well pause and hush themselves to listen to. Like Shelley's skylark, this bird poured forth his

"full heart In profuse strains of unpremeditated art."

Next to the sweetness and variety of the strain, what struck one most was the perfect abandon of it; its spontaneous and unconscious freedom and joyousness. There was no clog or fetter to it; no faltering of note or failure of power. The bird sang "like an embodied joy whose race is just begun;" like some "blithe spirit," that had never known languor, and to whom "shadow of annoyance" had never come near. It was perfect, full-throated, passionate, exultant

utterance. It was a fit prelude and accompaniment (for it continued for a while after the service began) to the worship of God's house. Somehow, it reminded the parson of St. John's words, "I was in the Spirit on the Lord's day." And he could not help wishing that it might be given to him, preaching the gospel in the church that day, to know something of the freedom and joyousness of expression with which the bird delivered his message, down in the church-yard there, swinging on the sycamore tree.

Then the parson was led to think of freedom of utterance generally, and, in particular, of freedom of utterance in preaching. It is a thing greatly to be desired. St. Paul desired it for himself. Exhorting the Ephesians to always with all praver and supplication for all saints, he adds: "And for me, that utterance may be given unto me, that I may open my mouth boldly, to make known the mystery of the Gospel. for which I am an ambassador in bonds: that therein I may speak boldly, as I ought to speak." It is a thing which has been well-known to, and greatly valued by, all the great preachers of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. There is a significant expression which one occasionally meets with in the biographies, journals or letters of the preachers of fifty or a hundred years ago. The preacher of those times would sometimes write down in his journal. "Had great liberty in preaching to-

day." It is an expressive phrase. The language is perhaps antiquated and obsolete now; but the thing it stands for is a thing of to-day, and just as precious now as it was in any past generation. One does not always have "liberty" in preaching. For the most part, perhaps, the preacher is conscious of being more or less bound; he feels himself to be "an ambassador in bonds." He has a painful and mortifying sense of not attaining to adequate utterance; of a wall of separation between him and his hearers; of clogs impeding, of obstacles baffling, the expression of what he wishes to express. But it is not always thus; there are occasions, there are moments, when he finds liberty. Sometimes in the course of his preaching, something happens; "a bolt is shot back somewhere in the breast," clogs fall away, fetters are knocked off, obstacles disappear; suddenly it seems as if there had gone into effect some secret decree of absolution and emancipa-Then, for the moment, he attains to something like adequate, full and free expression. Then Paul's desire is fulfilled for him, and "utterance" is given him. Then, while the spell lasts, he feels what a glorious thing it is to preach to men the Gospel of Jesus Christ. And he can go home after the sermon is over, and write down in his journal (if he keeps one), "Had great liberty in preaching to-day."

Probably it would be found, upon considera-

tion, that the times when a preacher enjoys most liberty in preaching are those when he has most diligently and most faithfully studied the subject of his sermon. Liberty goes hand in hand with labor: the indolent man shall know nothing of the pleasures of emancipation and freedom. "At the root of all ease," writes George Macdonald, "lies slow and, for long, profitless-seeming labor, as at the root of all grace lies strength. Ease is the lovely result of forgotten toil." Toil and drudgery perform their task and are forgotten; but they reappear, transformed and glorified, in ease, and grace, and freedom. If any one wishes to experience liberty in preaching, he must needs be a hard-working student. Let him study with the utmost diligence the text which he has chosen; let him brood, with long-continued brooding, over the theme on which he is going to preach. In one sense, let him seek to become master of his subject, as men say; in another and a better sense, let him desire to be mastered by it (for the truth is greater than he), to be taken possession of by it, to become simply the mouthpiece or voice by which the truth of God shall find utterance. He is a preacher; let him magnify his office, and make large account of his sermon; giving it the right of way, so to speak, and deeming no pains too great to be taken in the preparation of it. While engaged in preparing it, let him not scorn to live in it and for it, having it

in his mind when he lies down at night and when he rises in the morning. Let him make friends with his Greek Testament; let him be an extensive reader, reading all he can find on the subject he is going to discuss; let him be even more diligent in meditation than in reading; and let him gather, from every legitimate quarter, illustrations of the truth he is intending to proclaim. The secret of many a bound, hampered, halting sermon, lies in imperfect preparation; and much of the secret of liberty in preaching lies in careful, painstaking, laborious study.

It is saving the same thing, in a different form. to say that a preacher is likely to experience liberty in preaching when he has in his possession abundance of material. Preaching is apt to be at its best when the preacher is giving to the people, not the whole but only a portion, of the result of his preparation. Often it is poverty that restricts and enslaves; it is abundance (so it be organized abundance) that enlarges and enfranchises. That preacher is little in danger of being hampered and hindered who, with copiousness of material, is speaking out of the fulness of his mind and heart. We heard a certain man speak of a sermon he had heard as a "rich". sermon; we understood him to mean a sermon characterized by abundance. The preacher was not hampered by scarcity; there was in his sermon no "thin-spreading," necessitated by

scantiness of material, no wearisome repetition. begotten by poverty of thought, but rather that rapid progress of ideas which is always desirable. but which is possible only where ideas are abundant. The preacher who has liberty in preaching is likely to be the one who is calmly conscious of possessing plentiful resources, of which he is bringing forth at the time only so much as seems to be necessary for the accomplishment of his object. Consider this man, who seems to be preaching with so much ease, freedom and power, what is the secret of it? It is not merely the thing which he is saying; it is also the great mass of unsaid things lying back of that. He draws his strength from a source unseen; he is fighting his battle with an Army of the Reserve behind him. All the time he has at his command other arguments and illustrations by which to impress the truth he is enforcing. There they are, ready to be called into action, if needed: only, they are not needed. It is this, in part, which explains his liberty in preaching.

But diligence of preparation and abundance of material are not of themselves sufficient to explain this phenomenon. Liberty in preaching is, in large measure, a thing of the heart, as well as of the mind; nay, this is one of its chief distinguishing characteristics, that it is a thing of the heart. It is "out of the abundance of the heart" that "the mouth speaketh." He

who preaches with liberty will do so, not merely because his mind is full, but because his heart is moved. There will be feeling as well as thought, in his preaching. These two belong together; and when, in some high moment, in the preaching of the Gospel, they come together in swift wedlock, liberty is one of the fruits of that union. He who has liberty in preaching is one whose own heart has been stirred and thrilled by the beatuy and the glory of the message he is going to deliver. He has himself first been helped by the sermon which he intends for the helping of others. When he himself has first felt the thrilling power of the truth he is going to proclaim; when, perhaps, tears have come to his eyes, as, sitting at his desk and studying his sermon, he has thought of those who, on the coming Lord's day, will be looking to him for some word of comfort, of hope, of help, amid the sadness, the sorrow, the struggles of their lives: when he has felt the infinite pathos of human life and the infinite splendor of the Gospel of Him who died on Calvary; when not only ideas have been coursing through his mind, but emotions have been coursing through his breastthat is a sign that he will probably preach with some degree of liberty when the hour of preaching comes.

After all, however, it must be admitted that there is something mysterious, inexplicable

unaccountable, in this matter of liberty in preaching. It is a thing which comes when, and whence, and how, we know not. Sometimes, when it seems as if it might be expected, it does not come: sometimes, unlooked for, it is suddenly present. Its coming seems to be, like that of all great things, "in such an hour as ye think not." There is a "power not ourselves" that visits and enfranchises us. It is the Spirit of God. makes us free; "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." Liberty in preaching is not of ourselves; it comes as a special, divine gift and reward, after we have done our best. We toilsomely climb to the mountain-top; there the Lord meets us and clothes us with power. There is a deep, deep meaning in our Savior's words to His disciples: "When they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak; for it shall be given you in that same hour what ve shall speak. For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you."

XXV.

THE ACCENT OF CONVICTION.

There is an Arabic proverb which says: "He who knows not, and knows not that he knows not, is a fool; shun him. He who knows not and knows that he knows not, is simple; teach him. He who knows, and knows not that he knows, is asleep; wake him. He who knows, and knows that he knows, is wise; follow him." Happy is the man who has arrived at certainty; who knows, and knows that he knows. He shall be like a house that is built upon a rock. He shall be stable, serene, secure. He shall be strong, and a source of strength to others. Men will listen to him and follow him; for he will speak with the tone of certainty, with the accent of conviction.

How we arrive at certainty is a question which we do not now care to discuss, except to say that, in regard to the highest and most concerning truths, it is evidently not by logic alone. Let all honor be done to logic, in its proper province; but that province is not without its characteristic and very extensive limitations. Great is the office of logic and argument; but let us not delude ourselves by imagining that it is their special office to give us certainty in regard

to those things of which, above all others, it behooves us to be certain. Indeed, their power to produce knowledge and certainty respecting the highest kinds of truths, must be admitted to be in a very extraordinary manner restricted. "Looking at the whole circle of things summoned before logic," writes one who was not ignorant of the place and the power of logic, and was himself a master of it, "I do not find more than one single object taken in by logic entirely, and that is Euclid's Elements." The same writer says in the same connection: "If a truth must not be believed except demonstratable by logic, we had better go away without it altogether." little dependent are we for our beliefs, and the certainty with which we hold them, in regard to the highest, that is, moral and spiritual truths, upon logic and its processes. However it may be in mathematics, in morals there is a surer and swifter method of arriving at certainty than that of logical demonstration. There is another certainty besides that which is mathematical. The soul has an eye of its own. Our moral and spiritual nature has a power of perceiving and recognizing truth, not less real than that of the intellect, within its sphere, of finding it out by logical reasoning. The highest truths are seen; the certainty with which we hold them is a certainty produced by vision. It is a certainty which no logical demonstration could give. nor any lack of logical demonstration take away; which it is certain no logic could ever overthrowto do so would be as irrational, absurd, impossible. as that the moon should overthrow the sun. regard to the great, essential truths of religion, the man who knows and knows that he knows, does so because he sees. He is a seer; he perceives and recognizes the truth; he is a man of insight and vision. And the certainty of his knowledge imparts to his utterances a certain characteristic tone, in which there is something subtle and indefinable, but which is unmistakable whenever it occurs. And it is this tone, whatever it may be, that imparts power to the utterances of the teacher or preacher: that stirs and moves men; that causes them to listen; that disposes them to follow.

There was something peculiar in the manner and tone of our Savior's preaching. He had an accent all His own. Men were irresistibly drawn to Him; they listened to Him; they "heard Him gladly." It was not merely what He said; it was also, it was in a certain sense especially, the manner of his saying it. This is clearly indicated by St. Matthew, who says, at the close of the Sermon on the Mount: "And it came to pass, when Jesus had ended these sayings, the people were astonished at His doctrine; for He taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes."

"What was it ye went out to see,
Ye silly folk of Galilee?
The reed that in the wind doth shake?
The weed that washes in the lake?
The reeds that waver, the weeds that float?—
A young man preaching in a boat.

"What was it ye went out to hear
By sea and land, from far and near?
A teacher? Rather seek the feet
Of those who sit in Moses' seat.
Go humbly seek and bow to them
Far off in great Jerusalem.
From them that in her courts ye saw,
Her perfect doctors of the law,
What is it ye came here to note?—
A young man preaching in a boat.

"A prophet! Boys and women weak!
Declare, or cease to rave;
Whence is it He hath learned to speak?
Say, who His doctrine gave?
A prophet? Prophet wherefore He
Of all in Israel's tribes?—
He teacheth with authority,
And not as do the scribes."

Our Savior's preaching was unique, and is not to be compared to any other, and may not be given as an instance of the accent of conviction, being too much beyond that; yet it is interesting to observe the effect produced by the tone with which He taught. In the preaching of the Apostles we have, properly speaking, an illustration of what we mean by the accent of conviction. When they went forth to preach the Gospel of

Jesus Christ, they went forth perfectly persuaded and convinced of the truth of the message they were to deliver. They were as men who knew, and knew that they knew. In regard to certain things, especially the thing on which all the rest depended and which carried all the rest along with it, they were certain with a certainty which no power could possibly take away from them. They were convinced, they had been convinced by "many infallible proofs," that Jesus Christ was risen from the dead. They had seen Him; they had talked with him; they had eaten and drunk with Him. The Resurrection was the one thing of which, above all others, it behooved them to be certain; certain in regard to this, they were certain in regard to all the rest. everything else had been staked upon this; this one thing was itself, in a certain sense, the Gospel of Christ. At first, indeed, it seems as if the office of the Apostles had been simply to proclaim the fact of the Resurrection. It is said: "With great power gave the Apostles witness of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus." It is said of St. Paul at Athens that "he preached Jesus and the resurrection." Not that their preaching consisted of nothing but the constant reiteration of this fact; for it abounded in exhortations, appeals, arguments, interpretations of prophecy. But the resurrection was the sum and substance of it; that which imparted reality

and vitality to all the rest; that which, being taken away, all the rest became hollow, unreal, spectral, vain. And when they preached it, they did so as men who were absolutely certain of what they preached. Their words had a certain ringing tone in them; they spoke with the unmistakable accent of conviction.

St. Peter, on the day of Pentecost, said to his hearers: "Ye men of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you by miracles and wonders and signs which God did by Him in the midst of you, as ye yourselves also know, Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken and by wicked hands have crucified and slain. Whom God hath raised up, having loosed the pains of death, because it was not possible that He should be holden of it." Again, after the healing of the lame man at the Beautiful Gate of the Temple: "Ye rulers of the people and elders of Israel, if we this day be examined of the good deed done to the impotent man, by what means he is made whole, be it known unto you all, and to all the people of Israel, that by the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, whom ye crucified, whom God hath raised from the dead, even by Him doth this man stand here before you whole." Again, in instructing Cornelius: "Whom they slew and hanged on a tree, Him God raised up in the third day and showed Him openly; not to

all the people, but unto witnesses chosen before of God, even to us who did eat and drink with Him after He rose from the dead." We cite these passages from the preaching of the Apostles, as instances and illustrations of the accent of conviction. These men knew; they were certain; they spoke with the tone of a passionate belief; and it was this that made their preaching the characteristic thing it was, that gained them a hearing, that gave them power over the minds and hearts and lives of men.

In some measure, this peculiar tone will be characteristic of all true preaching. The characteristic and influential thing in a man's preaching is found, not merely in what he says, but also in the manner in which he says it. The two belong together: the manner is essential as well as the matter; there are certain things which cannot even be said except with a certain accent. The great things of the Gospel of Jesus Christ cannot be spoken except as the Apostles spoke them, with the accent of conviction. When it is attempted to speak them otherwise, the very purpose of the speaking is defeated; nay, there is no proper speaking at all. And there is no hearing; for men will not listen except to the man who speaks with the tone of conviction and certainty. It is largely the presence or absence of this that makes a preacher's preaching effective or ineffective. It is the accent that matters. The preacher is not one whose office is merely to instruct, though he has much to do with instruction. He does not preach merely for the purpose of conveying information, but, by means of information, instruction, argument, appeal, exhortation, and whatever other influences and forces may be available, to stir men and to wake them into action, to breathe into them the breath of life, as it were, that they may be able to believe and do the things they ought to believe and do. He is one who "lays his mind on other men," and "makes them think as he thinks and believe as he believes." No one can do this unless he speaks with the accent of conviction. This is the characteristic mark of the man who is capable of convincing and persuading his follow-The accent of conviction invests with power; the accent of doubt, of hesitation, of ininvestigation and speculation merely, disables, Belief is health, sanity, power. withers, blights. As weakness longs for strength, and sickness yearns for health, so men everywhere turn their ears and give their attention to the man who speaks with the accent of belief, of certainty, of conviction. To him they will listen; him they will follow. "Give me of your beliefs," said Gethe: "I have doubts enough of my own,"

If it should be said that we are attributing too much importance to so secondary and insignificant a thing as manner, accent, tone, we would reply that these things are by no means so unimportant as to a superficial consideration they might appear. In a certain sense, a man's accent is the characteristic and significant thing about him. It is the expression and manifestation of the man himself, of his own character and life, of the deepest things that are in him. Manner, according to Sir James Mackintosh's definition, "is the transpiration of character." It is by his accent that a man is known. The very life and character of the man get into his tone and manner. It is by this means that they communicate themselves to others. It is a great mystery which takes place when a man speaks with the accent of conviction. For this accent, instead of being an insignificant and trivial thing, is nothing else than the expression of the life of the man himself, and his act is nothing else than the pouring forth of the vitality and power of his own beliefs and convictions (incapable of being communicated otherwise) for the service and help of his fellowmen.

XXVI.

"MINE OWN PEOPLE."

In Mr. Justin McCarthy's "History of Our Own Times" there is an interesting paragraph concerning the acceptance of office by Mr. John Bright in the new administration which Mr. Gladstone was called upon to form upon the retirement of Mr. Disraeli. After speaking of the remarkable strength of the government which Mr. Gladstone formed, and of the circumstance that the one name upon its list, after that of the prime minister himself, which engaged the interest of the public, was that of Mr. Bright, Mr. McCarthy proceeds to say:

"Speaking to his Birmingham constituents, on his reelection after accepting the office of the President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Bright referred to his new position in a few sentences of impressive and dignified eloquence. He had not sought office, he said; it had come to him. 'I should have preferred to remain in the common rank of the simple citizenship in which heretofore I have lived. There is a charming story contained in a single verse of the Old Testament, which has often struck me as one of great beauty. Many of you will recollect that the prophet, in journeying to and fro, was very hospitably entertained by what is termed in the Bible a Shunammite woman. In return for the hospitality of his entertainment he wished to make her some amends, and he called her and asked her what there was that he should do for her. "Shall I speak for thee to the king, or to the captain of the host?" And it has always appeared to me a great answer that the Shunammite woman returned. She said, 'I dwell among mine own people.' When the question was put to me whether I would step into the position in which now I find myself, the answer from my heart was the same,—I wish to dwell among my own people.' It was impossible, however, that a ministry could now be formed without Mr. Bright's name appearing in it."

Nothing could be more characteristic of Mr. Bright than his quotation, on such an occasion. of this beautiful passage of Scripture; and nothing could better indicate the secret source of the simplicity and dignity, the strength and power. of his personality and character, than the spirit in which the quotation is made. In large measure, this great statesman was what he was, and accomplished what he accomplished, because it was characteristic of him to abide among his own people, which he continued to do even when compelled, for the time being, to leave the rank of simple citizenship and accept political office. The same is true of every man who has been on a large scale a friend and helper of his fellowmen. He has been of his people; has identified himself with them; has loved them, and has had a passion for serving them. Every such man "dwells among his own people," as the Shunammite woman expressed it: he "rides on the same anchorage" with them, as it was expressed by a great Greek orator. To abide among one's own people, and to be unwilling to be separated from them; to consider their lot one's own lot and their cause one's own cause; to be loyal to them, and faithfully to serve them—this is always one of the marks of the able and worthy man; and if influence and power, distinction and greatness are ever to come to a man, it is in this way and by this means that they will come.

Every man has his place and his people. is the part of wisdom for us to believe that the lot which God has given us is a good lot, and that the people to whom He has caused us to belong are a good people. Let us not vainly imagine that we are worthy of a better place; the probability is, that the place, whatever it may be, is better than we deserve. At all events, the sign of our being prepared for a higher and better place will be our having fully and faithfully developed the capabilities and used the opportunities of the place in which we now are. Let us not deceive ourselves by believing that we, being different and better, ought to belong to a better people. We are not better than our people. We are flesh of their flesh, and blood of their blood. The probability is that they are as good a people as can anywhere be found; and it is certain that they are the best people for us. So, laying aside all self-conceit, and scorning as

infallible signs of weakness the impatience and petulance that are born of self-conceit, let us thankfully accept our place and our people. There is simplicity and dignity and modesty in abiding among one's own people. It is also the safe course for anyone to pursue. Snares beset the path of the man who leaves his place and cuts himself off from his people, but he is secure who abides among those with whom God in His providence has cast his lot. There is a proverb which says: "Sit down in your own place, and no man can make you stand up."

To abide among one's own people is not only an expression of modesty and a ground of security; it is a source of strength. In a certain sense, every man is what his people make him; the strong man is strong with the strength of his people. That is to say, no man can be great by himself alone, but only as he is identified with others and representative of them; only as he dwells among his own people. There is a German proverb which says: "Ein Mann ist kein Mann." Separation and singularity are fatal to greatness and power. If a man's thoughts are exclusively his own, if they are peculiar, exceptional, odd, by that token they are of slight significance and consequence. The great thought is not some novel conceit which has occurred only to a single individual; it is a thought which many may have been in some sense thinking, which

has been dimly hovering before their minds, until at last some chosen one of their number has been able, in their name and in their behalf, to conceive it clearly and to grasp it powerfully. The great utterance is not the expression of any unusual experience, but the unusual expression of the common experience; and it bears this characteristic mark, that, when it is spoken. thousands of souls stand up, welcoming it and rejoicing because it is the thing which they were trying to say, but could not. The great action is not the action of any single or separate individual, but the action of a people, performed through some one of their number, divinely chosen and commissioned and qualified to act in their name and as their representative. The great thoughts are people-thoughts; the great words are people-words; the great actions are peopleactions. Consider this law. O thou who art dreaming of distinction and greatness, whilst thou art perhaps thinking lightly or scornfully of the plain and simple people among whom thy lot is cast. "Seekest thou great things for thy-Seek them not." Greatness never comes to him who seeks it. But know this, at least, that there is not the remotest possibility of distinction and power and greatness crowning the life of any man who separates himself from the people he belongs to and refuses to dwell among them

But the chief reason why it behooves a man to abide among his own people, lies not in what they may do for him, but in what he may do for them. To do it means not merely the possibility of greatness; it means the opportunity of service; indeed, what greatness is there apart from service? No people is ever really served except by one of their own number. No stranger can be their guide, their helper, their saviour. stranger will they not follow, but will flee from him; for they know not the voice of strangers." It has been said that God has given to every people a prophet in that people's own language. What if it should fall to thy lot, O man, to be such a prophet to thy people? What if, in some high hour, on some mountain-top, amid blackness and darkness and tempest, all thought of ease and pleasure and self-indulgence being forgotten. God should speak to thee and sav: "Go. speak to this people, and be to them My prophet and interpreter?" Could any greater honor befall thee than that, to be sent forth as the servant of God and the servant of thy people? Such an experience may never come to thee; but be sure of this, that the man to whom it does come will be one who reverences and loves and abides among his own people.

Quarrel not with thy people, however plain and homely, however raw and uncultivated they may be. Go not in quest of a people more agreeable to thy taste, more educated and intelligent, more cultivated and refined, more wealthy, influential and powerful. Such there are, and they are most worthy of respect; but for thee there is one fatal defect in them all—they are not thine own. What thou wantest is not a people who may serve thee, but a people whom thou mayest serve; and this is the people whom God has given thee. Be content and thankful; abide among them and forsake them not.

There is no people like one's own people, whatever their imperfections and faults may be, Happy is he who, underneath all these faults, can clearly discern the noble capabilities which they may obscure indeed, but cannot annul. Woe to the man who forsakes his people because of their imperfections and faults; these are the very reasons why he should remain among them. There was once a man who had a people; and it was, when he came to it, a very unlovely people. It was crude, raw, undeveloped; was, in fact, a race of slaves, with all the faults of slaves. During all the forty years he lived and labored among them, this people is declared to have been a "stiff-necked" and "rebellious" people. But he, beholding the noble possibilities in this people, passionately clung to them, and cast in his lot with them, and lived and died among them, refusing to belong to any other people, choosing rather to suffer the affliction with them

than to possess the treasures of Egypt and to be called the son of Pharaoh's daughter. How ages of history have vindicated the wisdom of this man's choice! Beneficent consequences of world-wide significance followed, and are still following, his decision to dwell among his own people.

XXVII.

THE CHURCH'S REAL ATTRACTION.

It is hardly possible to have a high opinion of the enterprise recently undertaken and excuted by the editor of "The Ladies' Home Journal," in sending a young woman to a large number of churches in New York, Brooklyn and Boston with the avowed purpose of finding out what sort of reception she would meet with. We have not seen the full report of Miss Laura A. Smith, by whom this commission was carried out, but receive our information through a summary of it, given by "The Literary Digest." Miss Smith reports that she dressed herself "in very plain clothes, and endeavored both by my dress and behavior to typify the average young woman, without means, who goes to a city to find a church home." She declares her purpose to have been, "first, to test the welcome given to the stranger in the average church, to see what is meant by the invitation, 'strangers cordially welcome;' and, second, to see how many of the clergymen or the members of the congregation would, after the services, speak a word of encouragement or greeting to the stranger within their gates." As regards thirty-seven churches visited in New York and Brooklyn, Miss Smith reports as follows: "In five churches thirteen members had spoken to me. In thirty-two churches I had been absolutely ignored by their members." Of twenty-four churches visited in Boston, she reports that the pastor of one had sought her out and spoken to her. "In four churches four members, two being ushers, had passed a friendly word. As for the other nineteen churches, not a word from any one."

It is hardly possible, as we have said, to entertain a high opinion of, or to place much confidence in, this experiment. The practice of putting on appearances, however innocent the object aimed at, the act of spying upon others in order to ascertain whether they are sincere in the professions they make, is hardly one in itself to be commended. Moreover, it may justly be contended, that the experiment involved no true test. The circumstance that, out of thirtyseven ministers of Christ in New York and Brooklyn, only three spoke to the stranger, and out of nineteen in Boston only one, is by no means convincing proof that the stranger was not "cordially welcome." It may well be that the ministers criticized were at that very time busily engaged in speaking to strangers elsewhere. It may well be that the person sitting next to Miss Smith was a stranger, looking, like herself, for attention, possibly expecting Miss

Smith to speak to her. Even if neither ministers nor members had in a single instance spoken to or shaken hands with the visitor, the circumstance could not be conclusive evidence of her not having been welcome. There is nothing to show that any one of those congregations in which Miss Smith received no attention may not. nevertheless, possess the true spirit of Christ. So little may any such test be depended upon for determining whether a congregation is of a Christian spirit or not. All that the experiment would seem to prove is that one who goes to church for the purpose of receiving attention is likely to be disappointed. The test would be a valid one only if the Church existed for the exercise of sociability. It is not surprising to find representatives of some of the churches mentioned by name in Miss Smith's report earnestly protesting against having their congregations judged by her standard. It is not surprising to find a secular newspaper remarking, in a paragraph on the subject, that Miss Smith seems to have mistaken a religious service for an afternoon tea.

Nevertheless, the experiment might be productive of good if it should call attention to a false view of the nature of the Church of Christ, which is widely prevalent, and of which the incident of which we are speaking is itself a conspicuous illustration. That sociability ought to be

one of the characteristics of a Christian congregation: that the members of it ought to love one another; that strangers ought to be welcome to its services, and that special attention ought to be given to the matter of receiving them and making them feel at home-no one will deny. But that the Church is a mere social institution. existing for the exercise and practice of sociability: that it is of the nature of a club, the members and proprietors of which receive, and dispense hospitality to, invited guests; that it is natural and proper to go to church with the dominant expectation of receiving some sort of social attention or other pleasant entertainment; that it is legitimate and necessary for the church to seek to attract persons to its communion chiefly by holding out the inducements and attractions of such attention or entertainmentthese things are as contrary as can well be to the true idea of the Church of Christ. The Church is an institution of divine origin, of spiritual character, existing, first of all, for spiritual purposes. In the New Testament it is known as the Body of Christ. It is equipped with powerful spiritual forces, the Word, the ministry, the sacraments, intended for, adapted to and capable of accomplishing the satisfaction of the deepest needs of men's souls. Its symbol is the cross. Its call is, not to enjoyment, but to sacrifice and service. It has attractions of its

own, which, if boldly confided in, will prove, in the long run, to be as superior to those of the club as it is, in its origin and nature, exalted above that institution. It cannot give what the world gives, but, it can give something which the world cannot give. It cannot go the world's way, but, going its own way, it can say to it, using the words of its Master, "Whither I go ye cannot come." It aims, not at pleasure, but at that righteousness, the hungering and thirsting after which is one of the deepest characteristics of man's soul. It offers "that peace which the world can neither give nor take away."

It is an evil day when the Church forgets or makes light of the difference, the peculiarity, the uniqueness of her constitution and character. In particular, it is an evil day when the Church. disregarding her own characteristic and powerful attractions, enters into competition, as it were, with the world, and adopts and relies upon attractions not different in kind from those of earthly organizations and associations. It is a dangerous competition; it is one in which the world will always have the advantage. The attempt is a futile one, to make religion "jolly." There is nothing "jolly" in the Ten Commandments; there is nothing amusing in the Sermon on the Mount; there is nothing of an earthly attractiveness in the "Man of sorrows and acquainted with grief," in whom "there is no beauty that

we should desire him." The attractions of religion lie deep; it offers, not entertainment and enjoyment to the surface of us, but satisfaction, peace and joy to the depths of us. It is a fatal mistake to lose confidence in these deep and mighty attractions, and, turning away from them, to rely upon and to use other and different attractions, which, however seeming to be more immediately effective, are sure in the end to prove misleading and injurious. Some years ago an earnest preacher, preaching upon this subject, said "The moment the Church ceases to depend upon the power of the Holy Ghost, acting through the reverent administration of the sacraments, a spiritual and chastened worship, and sane, evangelical, sober, earnest preaching, there is absolutely nothing which she may not logically call to her aid in drawing men into her fold. And there is enough in the character of many of our methods of administering the church to cause a thoughtful man to ask whether, if the present pace is maintained, the dawn of the coming century may not see our churches transformed into houses of amusement or clubs for physical comfort."

To forget the reality and the peculiar and unique character of the Church of Jesus Christ, as an institution, and, so forgetting, to forsake its proper and characteristic attractions and substitute others in their stead, seems to be one

of the special dangers of Protestantism. In the "Outlook" of September 21st, in a very sensible editorial on the incident which has occasioned this communication, it is said: "It is the weakness of American Protestantism that this club conception prevails among the Protestant churches of this country. No one would think of attempting to take the social temperature of Roman Catholic churches by applying to them a journalistic thermometer. In a Roman Catholic church no woman would expect personal attention unless she made her wants known to the priest, or to some one who would take her case to the priest. To the credit of the Roman Catholics be it said that they attend church services for the purpose of worshiping God. They do not expect to receive a welcome in church, any more than the user of a public library expects a welcome when he sits down to read." Once, in a large city, the writer had occasion to pass by a Roman Catholic church, in which, at the time, divine services were being held. Through the open door, at the farther end of the church, the lights burning at the altar, the symbols of the Christian religion were to be seen. The congregation was a vast one; it not only filled, but overflowed, the great church: many of the worshipers were kneeling (for at the moment the congregation was kneeling) on the bare steps and pavement outside the

building. To the writer it was an impressive and affecting sight. Here was a vast multitude of people, of all classes and conditions, engaged in the act of common worship. It is nothing to the present purpose to criticise that worship: the unquestionable fact remains that the intention was that of worshiping. How many in that multitude had been lured to church with the promise, or had come with the expectation, of receiving attention? It is safe to say, not a single one. Here (even a Protestant may say this) was, not the club conception, but the Church conception, of the Church of Jesus Christ, as an institution different, unique, "not of this world." The Church of Christ, in its proper character, is altogether unlike any earthly institution, organization or association. It is not a place in which some are hosts to entertain, and others guests to be entertained. It is a place in which all together and all alike, rich and poor, wise and ignorant, strong and weak, are guests of Him who is its only Master and Owner, to be ministered unto by Him, in the great need of their poor souls. To him who sees the Church as it really is, and stands in proper relation to it, the house of God will be his Father's house, in which he is at home, "an house of prayer for all people." through the worship and service of which he may enter into communion with his Maker and Redeemer.

While it is at all times proper to preach the gospel of gentleness, kindness, courtesy, to remind Christian people of the doctrine and duty of not being "forgetful to entertain strangers," and to bring in, from the streets and lanes, from the highways and hedges, the wandering and lost, to sit down as welcome guests at the feast of the gospel, certainly the present is not a time to emphasize a conception of the Church of Christ which has the effect of representing it as if it were an earthly institution with earthly inducements and attractions. That conception is already too prevalent in Protestantism, has already wrought much harm, and is capable of working more. Rather is it a time to revive, to emphasize, and to put honor upon that conception of the one holy, catholic and apostolic Church of Christ, which prevailed from the beginning, and which Protestantism had originally no thought of abandoning. It is time to speak of, to put honor upon, to confide in, the proper and characteristic attractions of the Christian Church. He who holds this conception and feels the power of these attractions, is not likely to "go to church" with the expectation of obtaining some personal recognition or attention for himself

In the days when it was not unusual for Anglo-Saxons to be exposed for sale in the slavemarket, an intending purchaser asked a slave, "Will you be honest if I buy you?" To whom the slave replied, "Yes, whether you buy me or not." When one who knows the real nature, object and attraction of the Church of Jesus Christ is asked, "Will you come to church if we show you attention?" he will probably answer, "Yes, whether you show me attention or not."

XXVIII.

DIAMOND AND SEED.

The emphatic word in the above title is the conjunction "and;" for it corresponds to, was suggested by, and differs only in this single word from, the title of a very striking editorial which appeared some time ago in "The Outlook." The editorial in question, under the caption "Diamond or Seed?" maintained that Christianity is not a diamond, but a seed; that is, not a "finished product," but an "ever-growing life;" not a completed thing, to be handed down from generation to generation, to which nothing can be added and from which nothing can be taken away, which is, "in the twentieth century exactly what it was in the first century." but "a life which is to be developed in successive generations, growing with the growth of the world." The two conceptions are represented as opposite and contrary to each other, and the difference between them is declared to be "radical." Upon reading the title of this editorial, and perceiving the import of it, there instantly came into the writer's mind the words which stand at the head of this communication. True, he has been anticipated in the use of them;

not long after the editorial appeared, this same expression was used as the heading of a brief criticism of it by one of "The Outlook's" subscribers. The writer had occasion to make use of the ancient saying, "Pereant qui ante nos nostra dixere!" However, in view of the prior, original and independent occurrence of the expression to himself, the writer deems himself justly entitled to the use of it; and, considering that the subject was discussed only in the briefest manner by the critic referred to, judges that he is not precluded from the expression of his views upon it.

When the writer had finished reading "The Outlook's" editorial, there occurred to his mind a certain striking saying which he remembered to have seen quoted by the same periodical a good many years ago, before it had exchanged the name of "The Christian Union" for its present title. As nearly as we can remember, the saying was expressed in the following words: "Exigent minds say, 'This or that is true;' tolerant minds say, 'This and that is true.'" In the realm of the truth, which is very comprehensive and vast, it is better to use, at least we are far more frequently called upon to use, the conjunction "and" than the conjunction "or." Hence, he who says "this and that" is far less likely to fall into error than he who says "this or that," One of the chief characteristics of the truth is

its inclusiveness. Indeed, it is solely because it seems to overlook this characteristic, because it says "or" instead of "and", that we have any fault to find with the editorial to which we are referring. With what that editorial says, positively, namely, that Christianity is a seed, a living and growing thing, capable of and destined to continual and progressive development, it is impossible to disagree; Christianity would be nothing if it were not that. If the only difference between the seed theory and the diamond theory were that the one is that of a living and developing, and the other that of a non-living and non-developing Christianity, there would be no room whatever for any difference of opinion. It is what the editorial says negatively, what it denies, that gives rise to objection. Affirming that Christianity is a seed. it denies that it is a diamond; it does not perceive that it may be at the same time both one and the other. In opposition to this view it may, we think, be justly affirmed that Christianity, essentially a living, growing and changing thing, is, under another aspect, a stable and unchanging thing; that, in a certain sense, it was given to the world as a diamond is given, that is, as "a finished product;" that, in a certain sense, it is incapable of having anything added to it or subtracted from it; that, in a certain sense, it is exactly the same in the twentieth century that it was in the first.

That a thing should be at the same time both a diamond and a seed might well seem to be a contradiction; it is no contradiction, however, in the realm of truth, which is the native land of paradoxes. It is because of the vastness, the comprehensiveness, the many-sidedness of the truth itself. The kingdom of God is very large; it is capable of being represented and regarded under many different aspects. How manifold these aspects are may be seen in the multiplicity of images which our Saviour uses in His parables setting forth the nature of His kingdom. In one parable He compares that kingdom to a mustard seed, thereby giving His sanction to the seed theory; but in another He compares it to a pearl, thereby seeming to give His sanction to the diamond theory. The kingdom of God is both; it is a seed that lives, and grows, and passes through manifold changes; it is also a precious stone, a pearl, or a diamond, that is received, possessed and transmitted. This combination is one by no means unfamiliar to the Scriptures. The New Testament has much to sav about precious stones, but always, in connection with Christ and His kingdom, they are living stones. St. Peter says of Christ: "To whom coming, as unto a living stone, disallowed indeed of men, but chosen of God, and precious, ye, also, as lively stones, are built up a spiritual house." Christ is a stone, a precious stone, a living stone, precious, indeed, because living; and those who believe in Him are likewise stones, but "lively," that is, living, stones. Such is the paradox. By the same paradox, it may analogously be said that His kingdom is a stone, a precious stone, a living stone. It would seem to be by no means contrary to the Scriptures that the kingdom of Christ should be at once a living organism and a precious stone, at once a diamond and a seed. This one pregnant scriptural expression, "living stone," seems to carry in itself the whole argument in favor of the comprehensive view for which we are contending. "Living" stands for seed; "stone" stands for diamond. They belong together; neither may exclude the other.

There is another scriptural expression which seems to us to involve the rejected diamond theory. It is the phrase "once for all," as contained in the following passage: "By the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all." It may be that our interpretation is incorrect; we are aware of the dispute as to the clause of the sentence to which this phrase is to be referred. However, the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, by his frequent use of the word "once," seems to lay stress upon the idea expressed by this phrase, upon the finished character, upon the finality and conclusiveness of what was done by Christ. It is said, "this He did once;" it is said that "He

entered in once into the holy place;" that "once in the end of the world hath He appeared to put away sin:" that He was "once offered to bear the sins of many." We are quoting these passages, to which others might be added, in order to show the emphasis which the New Testament lays upon the truth that what was accomplished by Jesus Christ was accomplished "once for all," that what he gave to the world was so given that nothing may, in any true sense of the word, be either added to it or subtracted from it. is the question, whether the Christianity which Christ gave to the world, confessedly and undeniably a living, growing, changing thing, is not. at the same time, a thing perfect from the beginning, and unchanging in the midst of all change. Being a seed, is it not also a diamond? That is, is it not a thing finished and complete at the time of its being given; is it not "the faith which was once delivered unto the saints:" is it not a precious inheritance, to be received, held and transmitted intact? The seed theory and the diamond theory belong together; they are not inconsistent with each other; the one we ought to hold and not to leave the other unheld.

That these two are not inconsistent, that a thing may be at once a diamond and a seed, that a being destined to pass through various stages of development and change, may, nevertheless, be perfect and entire at the beginning of its ex266

istence, is sufficiently evident. There is nothing that lives and grows that does not come all at once; it is characteristic of all life that the end is already present in the beginning. The seed is given just as the diamond is given; it is perfect; it lacks nothing. There is nothing in the developed tree that was not present in the seed from which it grew. When a human being comes into the world, it is on this same principle of coming all at once, of being perfect from the beginning. When a child is born, "a man is born into the world"; the child is the man. All the members of his body, and all the faculties and powers of his mind and soul are present at the beginning of his existence. However long he may live, and whatever changes he may undergo, nothing will ever be added to him or subtracted from him. There will only be development or evolution of powers present from the start. When a Christian comes, it is on the same principle; he comes all at once; he comes by being "born again;" all that belongs to Christian life and character is in him from the first; the mysterious thing which was given to him, and by virtue of which he became a Christian, was given to him "once for all." All the possibilities of repentance, faith, hope and love are in him; indefinite growth and development there may be, but there is never, properly speaking, any addition. All things that live and grow

we say, come after this manner; they are given perfect, to begin with; if there were no other difference between the two than this, the seed may be said to be given not otherwise than the diamond. There is a sense, indeed, in which Christianity is a seed, and not a diamond. The diamond is an inorganic thing, and Christianity cannot be adequately represented by anything inorganic. This is the reason why, in one sense, Christianity is not a diamond; it is not, however, because it is a finished thing, to begin with: not because it remains always the same: not because it is incapable of having anything added to it or subtracted from it. In these last mentioned respects Christianity, which all of us admit to be a seed, is, at the same time, undeniably a diamond.

A diamond and a seed; a thing finished, and yet unfinished; perfect, yet ever advancing toward perfection; changeless, yet constantly undergoing change; an inheritance, "once delivered" and yet perpetually being delivered—this is the paradox. We are here concerned simply with the statement of it, not with any attempted explanation of it or argument concerning it. It is the paradox of Him who is a "living stone," and whose people are "living stones," and whose religion is at once a diamond and a seed.

XXIX.

"THE CAPTAIN OF MY SOUL."

The recent death of William Ernest Henley has been the occasion of considerable comment upon the personality and literary activity of that wellknown English poet and essayist. He is thought by many to have been "a significant force in modern English literature." The New York Evening Post speaks of him as "perhaps the most typical man of letters of the generation now passing out of middle age." The same paper says that he "was always an apostle of the unconventional and the excessive." The Springfield Republican says that "he always commanded attention by his positiveness, which sometimes attained the point of truculence; but his judgments were erratic, and his prejudices were bitter and ineradicable." We observe that all the notices which we have seen make mention of one particular poem of his, the poem by which he has hitherto been chiefly or almost exclusively known to the more general public, and which, in the opinion of some of the critics, is the only one of his poetical productions which posterity will probably care to preserve. It is the poem beginning, "Out of the Night that Covers Me.'' As it is with this alone that this

communication is concerned, and as the poem is in itself a significant, characteristic and striking production, we take the liberty of reproducing it here entire:

> "Out of the night that covers me, Black as the Pit from pole to pole, I thank whatever gods there be For my unconquerable soul.

"In the fell clutch of circumstance
I have not winced nor cried aloud;
Under the bludgeonings of chance
My head is bloody, but unbowed.

"Beyond this place of wrath and tears
Looms but the Horror of the shade,
And yet the menace of the years
Finds, and shall find, me unafraid.

"It matters not how strait the gate,

How charged with punishments the scroll,
I am the master of my fate;
I am the captain of my soul."

This poem may be regarded as in a measure illustrating and verifying the already quoted judgments upon its author and his productions. It "commands attention"; it is characterized by positiveness, unconventionality, excess. No one can read it without feeling the power of the thrilling note which it contains. It is an instance of "sincere personal expression." It is a genuine utterance of its author's soul, and has in it something of that vivid and vibrating quality which

is found in all such utterances, whatever form they may assume. It is a militant Declaration of Independence. It is a passionate, pagan protest against the domination and despotism of Circumstance. It is an indignant repudiation of the belittling and disabling belief that we are, simply and exclusively, what our environment makes us. The poet passionately affirms that he is the master, and not the victim, of his fate. Pagan-like, he gives thanks to "whatever gods there be" for his "unconquerable soul." "Man's unconquerable mind" is a phrase we remember to have seen somewhere in Wordsworth. Perhaps it was this phrase of Wordsworth's that became the germ of the poem of which we are writing.

Whatever of significance this poem may possess, and whatever impression it may have made upon the minds of its readers, must evidently be attributed to its being a particularly vivid and striking expression of a great truth. It takes the ancient maxim, "Quisque suae fortunae faber," "Every one is the artificer of his own fortune," and fulfils in respect to it the office of poetry by breathing into it the breath of life, by filling it with human interest and human passion. It is the office of poetry to take that which is common and show that it is not common; to give wings to that which has no wings, fire to that which has no fire, life to that which has no life. The poem of which we are writing is a fine instance of the

poetical, as distinguished from the philosophical, expression of truth; it puts into the maxim we have quoted a fire and a force which no one has has ever found in it in its philosophical form. This maxim, we have said, expresses a great truth; it would be more correct to say, one side of a great truth. For truth, for the most part, is made up of two opposites, and is found in the concurrence of these. A great truth generally has its "sides." and these have each its time and place to be remembered and emphasized. Under one set of circumstances, and with reference to a certain class of persons, it is one side of the truth, under certain conditions it is another, that needs to be brought forward and insisted upon. It is hardly too much to say that what is true at one time, and with reference to certain persons and circumstances, ceases to be true when the time, circumstances and persons are changed. This is not because the truth varies, but because it has sides

There are truths which need now to be remembered, and now to be forgotten; to be insisted upon at one time, and held in abeyance at another. Charles James Fox, with respect to the doctrine of resistance to governments, expressed the wish that it "might never be forgotten by kings nor remembered by subjects." And John Stuart Mill, quoting this saying of Fox's, with reference to his own wish to disbelieve the doctrine of

the formation of character by circumstances. remarks that "it would be a blessing if the doctrine of necessity could be believed by all quoad the character of others, and disbelieved in regard to their own," We remember that Carlyle expresses exactly the same sentiment in words which seem to us so luminous, just and discriminating, that we may be permitted to quote them here: "It is a great truth, one side of a great truth, that the Man makes the Circumstances, and, spiritually as well as economically, is the artificer of his own fortune. But there is another side of the same truth: that the man's circumstances are the element he is appointed to live in and work in: that he by necessity takes his complexion, vesture, embodiment, from these, and is, in all practical manifestations, modified by them almost without limit: so that, in another no less genuine sense, it can be said that the Circumstances make the Man. Now, if it continually behooves us to insist on the former truth toward ourselves, it equally behooves us to bear in mind the latter when we judge of other men."

So, then, the truth that a man is the master and not the victim of his circumstances, is one the wisdom and salutariness of insisting upon which depend upon whether he is speaking of himself or of others. In the poem we are considering, the poet is speaking of and judging himself. Let him, therefore, affirm and insist upon this

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particular side of the great, twofold truth. To do so will probably do him no harm; may do him much good. Let him boast of his "unconquerable soul;" of his head, "bloody, but unbowed;" of being "unafraid;" of being "master of his fate." It is the vivid and passionate utterance of this defiant and triumphant spirit, in the face of adverse circumstances, that imparts to the poem its characteristic, thrilling note.

It is one thing, however, to say that one is the master of his fate, and another thing to say that he is the captain of his soul. A man's lot is one thing, his soul, another. Indeed, it can hardly be considered possible, in any proper sense, for a man to speak, as the poet here does, of his soul as something separable from himself, as something which he possesses and of which he may be the master. True, it is common to speak of man as having a soul, but this must be regarded as an inadequate and improper form of speech. It would be more correct to say, "Man has a body; he is a soul." Properly speaking, the soul is not something which a man has; it is that which he is. The relation of a man to his soul is of such a nature as to preclude the possibility of his being the captain of it; if it is to have a captain it must of necessity be some other than himself. We would not be captious in our criticism; on the contrary, we would gladly acknowledge—we have already acknowledged—what there is of truth in this vehement declaration of the soul's mastery over circumstance. We would simply point out another and still greater truth, which it does not express; nay, which it seems to overlook or deny; and yet at the same time to suggest by the expressive and suggestive phrase which it uses, "the captain of my soul."

For every soul must have its captain, must belong to, and follow, and serve, some master. "No man can serve two masters;" but every man must, and practically does, serve one. It is not service that degrades, but service unlawfully exacted and rendered, bondage to an illegitimate master, who has no sovereign claim to our allegiance. The service of the true and legitimate master enlarges, enfranchises, ennobles. To belong, to serve, is the constitutional and inevitable destiny of every human To belong to and serve its proper Lord and Master is its characteristic strength and glory. This is weakness, to be the captain of one's own soul; this is strength, to have found, and to follow, the soul's true Captain. When we are strong, it is with a strength not our own; when we conquer, it is because our Captain conquers for us, and in us, and throughus. There is a sufficiency, indeed, but "our sufficiency is not of ourselves." It may perhaps be well, under certain circumstances, to boast of one's "unconquerable soul;" of not having "winced nor cried aloud," "in the fell clutch of circumstance," of being "unafraid" in the presence of the horror of the shade;" of being "master of one's fate;" nay (for we may concede a certain degree of allowance to the phrase), even of being "the captain of one's soul." But there is something higher, because more human than this. It is, to boast of the unconquerable Captain of our souls: of having winced and cried aloud in the clutch of circumstances too much for us, but not too much for Him; of having been afraid when passing through the Horror of the Shade, and vet not afraid, because of His being with us there. How strangely the language of this portion of the poem reminds us of the language of a certain portion of the twenty-third Psalm: "Though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death. I will fear no evil, for Thou art with me." The author of those words would not have ventured to call himself the captain of his own soul.

One cannot but feel that the boasting of this poem is based upon an insufficient experience and a superficial estimate of the evils, the miseries, the horrors, to which man's earthly life is liable. Its author has been in the clutch of circumstance, but not of the worst circumstance. He has never been where the disciples were when they cried, "Master, save us, we perish!" "They that go down to the sea in ships, that do business in

great waters; these see the works of the Lord, and His wonders in the deep. For He commandeth. and raiseth the stormy wind, which lifteth up the waves thereof. They mount up to the heavens, they go down again to the depths: their soul is melted because of trouble. They reel to and fro and stagger like a drunken man, and are at at their wit's end. Then they cry unto the Lord in their trouble, and He bringeth them out of their distresses." It is not merely the picture of a storm at sea; it is a representation of the vicissitudes and storms of human life. They who live this life deeply, who "go down to the sea in ships and do business in great waters," have such experiences as shatter all their confidence in their own sufficiency. "Circumstances" are too much for them. Disappointment and sorrow and trouble prove to be evils too great for a spirit of stoical indifference to cope with. Above all, the accusations of a guilty conscience, the horror and misery of sin, the awful power of death—these are the things which cause them to reel to and fro and to stagger like drunken men, and, repudiating the doctrine that they are the captains of their own souls, to call on the name of the great Captain of their salvation, who alone is able to deliver and save them.

Who is the Captain of our souls? None other than He who made the heavens and the earth and all that in them is; who is the maker of our bodies and the father of our spirits, and "knoweth our frame;" who holds us and our circumstances in the hollow of His hand; who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made man. He who wrestled with sin and death, and overcame them forever; He who died on the cross and rose the third day from the dead—He is "the Captain of my soul."

XXX.

"THE GREAT COMPANION."

It is somewhat curious that this beautiful title should have been given to God by one who had come to doubt or deny His existence. Whether original with him we know not, but the first time we remember to have seen it was in Professor Clifford's often-quoted saying, "We have seen the sun shine out of an empty heaven to light a soulless earth; we have felt with utter loneliness that the Great Companion is dead." It is a sentence which mournfully expresses an agnostic's sense of that impoverishment and desolation of spirit which is the natural and legitimate result of his agnostic belief. He has been robbed by the very process which was intended to be, and seemed to be, one of enrichment. He has gained knowledge, but lost faith—a poor exchange. He has been left alone with emptiness, soullessness, death. Men seek to find out God solely by intellectual means and scientific methods, and discover that God is not thus to be found; they attempt (to use Bacon's phrase) to "soar into the secrets of the Deity on the waxen wings of the understanding," and meet with the disaster in which every such

attempt must end; and then they announce that they have not found God; nav, that God is not to be found; nav, that God does not exist. We need not at all be disquieted by these agnostic announcements. We are not at all disturbed when the blind man informs us that the sun has ceased to shine; we simply look at the sun in the heavens, shining there in his glory, and quietly go about our affairs. We may well, however, admire the beautiful manner, beautiful in its sadness and mournfulness, in which this particular agnostic announces the final departure from himself and his companions of the heavenly vision. "Blessings brighten as they take their flight." When he proclaims the fact that God is no more, his words have in them a great tenderness and sadness, expressive of the sense of an infinite loss; he calls God by a beautiful name; he speaks of Him as "the Great Companion."

God is indeed the Great Companion of all those who believe in Him, and love and obey Him. In a certain sense, the title expresses what God is for in His relation to men; He is for companionship, and all that companionship implies and stands for. "Fear not, for I am wth thee," is a great, characteristic saying of God's, constantly recurring throughout the entire Old Testament history. This is what He was accustomed to say to Abraham, to Isaac, to Jacob. When Jacob went forth from his father's house, and,

in a desert place, far from any human dwelling, lay down for the night with a stone for his pillow, God was with him there, and spoke to him, and said, "I am with thee, and will keep thee in all places whither thou goest." The scene is typical of all human loneliness, and of that divine companionship which no extremity of loneliness can ever take away. "Certainly I will be with thee," the Lord said to Moses when He sent him forth to perform the great task to which He had appointed him. He said the same to Joshua when his turn came: "Be strong and of a good courage, for thou shalt bring the children of Israel into the land which I sware unto them; and I will be with thee." The preposition "with" is a great and mighty word in the Bible. "Thou art with me" is a characteristic and constantly recurring utterance of the Psalmist. "Though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death I will fear no evil; for Thou art with me." God's promise to be with His people, especially in every time of need and trial, is in one sense the principal and all-comprehending promise of the Old Testament. As it is written in Isaiah: "Fear not, for I have redeemed thee, I have called thee by thy name; thou art mine. When thou passest through the the waters I will be with thee; and through the rivers, they shall not overflow thee."

Thus it is in the Old Testament. When we come to the New Testament we find no change but

that of progress, intensification, completion. Our Lord Jesus Christ came "to fulfil;" He has brought to pass the fulfilment and realization of the idea of God as the Great Companion. He is Immanuel-God with us. What is the significance of His incarnation and life on earth; of His sufferings, death, resurrection and ascension, and of the coming of the Holy Ghost, except that thereby God in Him, removing all obstacles out of the way, was establishing and bringing to perfection that communication, companionship, union, between God and man, which belongs to the very idea of His relation to His creatures? The thought of this companionship and oneness finds constant expression in our Savior's discourses to His disciples. He is at once their great Master and their Great Companion: He is to be with them and they with Him. Especially is this the case as regards His last utterances, "I will not leave you comfortless; I will come to you. Yet a little while, and the world seeth me no more: but ye see Me." "If a man love me, he will keep My words, and My Father will love him, and We will come to him, and make our abode with him." "And ye now therefore have sorrow; but I will see you again, and your heart shall rejoice, and your joy no man taketh from you." "Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given Me, be with Me where I am." It is significant that this expression, of "being with," occurs

in the very last words spoken by our Saviour to to His disciples before His ascension; these last words were: "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." Thus does the end coincide with the beginning; it is simply the expansion and fulfilment, the perfection and glorification of the promise originally made to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. It is significant, also, that St. Paul having spoken of the end and consummation of all things, the coming of Christ and the resurrection of the last day, suddenly stops short and includes all that he might have been expected to say of heaven in the simple words, "And so shall we ever be with the Lord." That is heaven, to "be with Christ;" there is nothing more to be said than that. In a certain sense, our whole relation to Christ, here and hereafter, and the whole substance of our religion is summed up in this, that He is our great, almighty, ever-present. immortal Companion.

How great and deep a need of our nature is thus satisfied, we may be assisted in understanding by reflecting upon the essential and inevitable loneliness of all human lives. Very precious is human companionship, but it is in its very nature superficial, imperfect, inadequate. Dear to the heart beyond all other earthly things is human sympathy, but confessedly it is only "in part," and can never be more. Human sympathy and human companionship reach but a

little way: in the depths of every heart there is a great sense of loneliness and a great longing for that perfect companionship, of which, in its actual surroundings and associations, it finds approximations and suggestions indeed, but which itself it can never find in them. However it may be as regards the smaller and less significant occasions and experiences of human life, in all its solemn and momentous crises, we are alone. Critical times and seasons, days of fate and doom, there are in every life; and, when we go forth to meet them, we go unattended: no one can be with us there. There is something awful in the thought of the loneliness of the soul in all its supreme hours. This is true, especially, of the great and final hour of death. "I shall die alone," said Pascal. But it is true also in a measure, of all those hours, which, because of the momentousness and finality with which they are charged, bear a resemblance to that of death. Nav. in a certain sense, it is true of one's entire life. No one can at any time find in his fellow-man that perfect and absolute companionship which is born of perfect and absolute sympathy. "The heart knoweth his own bitterness." We not only die alone; we also live alone. It is this sense of human loneliness, and the consequent need of the divine companionship, that Keble expresses in his beautiful poem for the twentyfourth Sunday after Trinity, having reference,

in the beginning of it, to the saying of Pascal's which we have just quoted:

"Why should we faint and fear to live alone, Since all alone, so Heaven has willed, we die, Nor even the tenderest heart, and next our own, Knows half the reasons why we smile or sigh?"

Perhaps none of the poets has given more perfect expression to the human sense of isolation and loneliness, and the human longing for communication and companionship than Matthew Arnold. Sometimes, being in the mood to do so, in a brief interval of leisure, after the performance of some duty, we take up and read from the volume containing the strange, sad poetry of this wellknown critic and man of letters. If we quote from his prose or poetry, as we have occasionally done, it is not (as one of our correspondents once seemed to infer) because we accept his theological and religious views—we are far from doing so; it is rather because he occasionally makes vivid and striking affirmation of certain great and everlasting truths; because he now and then gives almost perfect expression to certain deep and universal human experiences. It is thus that Matthew Arnold sings of the human isolation:

"Yes! in the sea of life enisled,
With echoing straits between us thrown,
Dotting the shoreless watery wild,
We mortal millions live alone.

The islands feel the enclasping flow, And then their endless bounds they know.

"But when the moon their hollows lights,
And they are swept by balms of spring,
And in their glens, on starry nights,
The nightingales divinely sing;
And lovely notes from shore to shore,
Across the sounds and channels pour:—

"Oh! then a longing like despair
Is to their farthest caverns sent;
For surely once, they feel, we were
Parts of a single continent!
Now round us spreads the watery plain;
Oh, might our marges meet again!

"Who ordered that their longing's fire
Should be, as soon as kindled, cooled?
Who renders vain their deep desire?—
A God, a God their severance ruled!
And bade betwixt their shores to be
The unplumbed, salt, estranging sea."

There are few, perhaps, who have not, on some occasion in their lives, mourned over "the unplumbed, salt, estranging sea," which separates soul from soul, and dooms every human life to be lived by itself alone. Thanks for all human companionship as far as it goes. But there are boundaries which it cannot pass; there are regions which it does not reach; there are experiences with reference to which many a soul may say, with the Ancient Mariner:

"O Wedding-Guest! this soul hath been Alone, on a wide, wide sea: So lonely 'twas, that God Himself Scarce seemed there to be."

It is this deep sense of human isolation and loneliness, this profound and unutterable longing for perfect sympathy and companionship, that God, in the person of His Son Jesus Christ, satisfies when He comes to us as the Great Companion. In satisfying this one need He satisfies all the needs of our nature; for these are all summed up and comprehended in the one great need of union and communion with Him. This, His power of companionship, was purchased by Him at "a great price." He could not be the Great Companion without first having had experience of the Great Loneliness. He was alone that we might not be alone. How much of the long-continued passion of His life on earth was made up of the loneliness of it! And how much of the narrower and intenser passion which marked the close of His earthly life consisted of His being "left alone." How awful are those words, spoken to His disciples just before His betrayal: "Behold, the hour cometh, yea, is now come, that ye shall be scattered every man to his own and shall leave Me alone." Then, indeed, was He left alone when one of His disciples betrayed Him, and another denied Him, and all forsook Him. But later He experienced a still more awful sense of desertion

and desolation; in the hour when, on the cross, He exclaimed, "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" This was the deepest depth of His unutterable passion; it was then that He passed through the region where God Himself scarce seemed to be; it was then that He tasted the last drop in the cup of human loneliness and desolation of spirit. He was not alone, indeed; He never was deserted of the Father; it was always as He Himself said more than once, "And vet I am not alone, because the Father is with Me." Yet this undoubted fact does not make any less real or perfect His human consciousness of being utterly forsaken and alone. And it is this, His perfect experience of utter and absolute loneliness, that has made Him the Great Companion.

Whatever the agnostic may say, the Great Companion is not dead. The crucified and risen Christ lives forever. There is no boundary that He cannot cross; there is no region of our lives that He does not reach; there is no promontory of human experience so lonely and so far beyond the confines of human companionship and help that He does not stand there with us. And, when we shall pass through the valley of the shadow of death, we shall fear no evil, for He, the Great Companion, will be with us there.

XXXI.

THE DIVIDING OF THE SPOILS.

"To the victor belong the spoils." This is a maxim which, because of the use which has been made of it in the partisan politics of our country, has become odious, and is seldom uttered except to be rejected. And yet, in itself considered, it is the expression of a great and glorious truth.

This is not saying that there is anything great or glorious in "spoils," or in the conspicuous part which they have borne in connection with wars of conquest. On the contrary, one of the most painful and distressing sights consequent upon such a war must have been the spoils which the conqueror brought home with him. When a Roman general came back from a successful campaign of conquest, and a triumphal procession was granted in his honor, the spoils taken from the enemy always formed a prominent feature of the spectacle which ensued. In that procession were sometimes led captive kings and queens, princes and princesses; there were seen, following the conqueror's chariot, troops of beautiful boys and girls, from Gaul, from Germany, from Britain, from Syria; these were among the spoils. There were especially exhibited the arms taken on the field of battle by the victorious general from the general whom he had vanquished; these were the *spolia opima*, of which one reads so much in the history of Roman triumphal processions. There were carried the choicest treasures of the kingdom which had been conquered; treasures of gold, silver, precious stones, costly vessels and rich apparel. The ancient kingdom of Antiochus, or of Attalus, or of Mithridates, or some other powerful and wealthy kingdom of the East, had been plundered, and these were the spoils taken from it.

These spoils were, to call them by their proper name, nothing but plunder; and there must have been something very sad and distressing in the sight of these precious things taken by force from their lawful owners. From the beginning there have not been wanting, among the conquerors themselves, those who perceived their true character, and revolted from them, and would have nothing to do with them. Abraham returned with his confederates from the war against the four kings, and there was much spoil, and the king of Sodom said to him, "Give me the persons, and take the goods to thyself," Abraham said, "I have lifted up my hand unto the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth, that I will not take from a thread even to a shoe-latchet." When England was conquered by William the

Norman, in 1066, there was universal spoliation: all England became "spoils" to his invading and conquering army. Vast domains, castles, villages, whole cities, were distributed among the knights and barons who had followed him, while the simple vassals had smaller portions. All, even those who had been ignoble grooms in Normandy, found themselves enriched. Men whom the old annalists call the "base scum of armies," "went mad with pride and astonishment at beholding themselves so powerful, at having servants richer than their own fathers had ever been." In the long run, the Norman Conquest proved to be a blessing to England, but her spoliation by the Normans must have been a pitiable sight. There was only one among William's knights who laid no claim to lands, or treasure, or other reward for his services; who, like Abraham, refused to have anything to do with the spoils of the conquest. "He said that he had accompanied his lord to England because such was his duty, but that stolen goods had no attraction for him, and that he would return to Normandy and enjoy his own heritage, a moderate but legitimate heritage, and, contented with his own lot, would rob no one." This man's name was Guilbert Fitz Richard, a name which, because of his high-minded scorn of spoils, it does one good to remember, more than eight hundred years afterwards.

Such, for the most part, has been the character of those spoils which from the earliest times have been a characteristic feature of all wars of conquest; they have been, simply, "stolen goods." There are, however, spoils which are legitimate; which are capable of being regarded with joy and pride; which consist not of stolen, but of recovered, goods; which are composed, not of men enslaved, but of men set free. There is no spoiler like our Lord Jesus Christ. It had been predicted of Him that he should be such. It had been said by Isaiah, "Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong." The same prophet had said: "Thus saith the Lord, even the captives of the mighty shall be taken away, and the prev of the terrible shall be delivered. for I will contend with him that contendeth with thee; and I will save thy children." Our Lord "contended;" He took away the "captives of the mighty;" He delivered the "prey of the terrible;" He "divided the spoil." Never was there such a war of conquest as that which was waged by Him; never were there such spoils as those which were won by Him.

How remarkable are those words in which our Saviour Himself described Himself as a spoiler of the enemy: "When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace; but when a stronger than he shall come upon him,

and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armor wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils." The "strong man armed" is Satan. "the prince of this world," as our Savior calls him. His "palace," or stronghold, which he keeps and holds as an army holds a fortress, is this present world; and his goods or armor, wherein he trusts, are the sons of men, taken captive and held by him; these are the arms and tools without which he would be powerless. Or, according to another view, not inconsistent with this, the stronghold is the soul of man, and the armor is that soul's capabilities and powers, intellectual, emotional, volitional, capable of being used by Satan for his own purposes; capable also of being used for purposes the highest and most heavenly. The stronger than the strong is our Lord Jesus Christ. When we consider His incarnation, when we contemplate His coming down from heaven to earth, we behold Him going forth to make war upon the "strong man armed." When we contemplate His passion and death, we behold Him struggling with and overcoming the strong man in his stronghold. And, when we contemplate His resurrection, we are the witnesses of His victory; we behold Him taking the strong man's armor from him and dividing his spoils. The greatest act of spoliation the world has ever seen took place when Jesus Christ rose from the dead. Then the strong man armed was stripped of his armor; then the captives of the mighty were taken away; then the prey of the terrible was delivered; then the spoils were divided. He is the victor and to Him belong the spoils.

How glorious are the spoils of Christ; spoils which no one ever regarded, or could regard, with scorn; spoils which never caused a tear. except of joy. In His triumphal procession. how many captives have marched rejoicing; what brilliant gifts, capabilities and powers have come to their highest and best estate by being taken as spoils by Christ, and used and spent in His service. From the beginning, from the time when He, by His resurrection, took from the enemy his armor and divided his spoils, the religion of Jesus Christ has been a despoiling religion. It has been characteristic of it to spoil the enemy. One of the first spoils it took was Paul. What an hour that was in which this man, with all his culture, with all his brilliant qualities, intellectual and moral, was wrenched by Christ from the hands of the enemy, to be to Him "a chosen vessel," to bear His name "far hence to the Gentiles!" What an hour that was in which the raging persecutor was taken as spoils by Him whom he was ignorantly persecuting; when Paul became at once the freeman, and (as he delighted to call himself) "the slave of Christ." St. Augustine, with all his

intellectual acumen and philosophical culture—he, too, was "spoils;" he was taken from a dissolute and profligate life to be the great servant of Christ, the great teacher, the great light of the Church in the century in which he lived. And so it has ever been. Christ has been the greatest of all despoilers. The history of Christianity has been the history of Christ, coming upon the enemy, and overcoming him, and taking from him his armor and dividing the spoils.

Nay, from the very first, from the time when the children of Israel, departing out of Egypt, "spoiled the Egyptians," it has been characteristic of God, and God's people, and God's service. to take spoils. All that is great and good in the world; all precious things, whether in nature or art: all that is noble and beautiful in philosophy or poetry; all brilliant capabilities or useful powers, whether of intellect or heart or will-all these belong to Christ, and, when found elsewhere than in His service, are capable of being, and liable to be, seized by Him as spoil. In St. Mary's Church, Oxford, the writer was shown several sets of ancient altar plate, among which was a chalice richly adorned with precious stones. This had been given by Dean Burgon, whose father, having extensive trading connections with the East, had made a collection of Oriental gems. Some of the gems set in the chalice were

engraved with mystic hieroglyphics; some of them were two thousand years old; some of them had probably once served in the worship of idols. Now it is probable that another set of altar plate, presented by Dr. J. H. Newman, when he was vicar of St. Marv's, more suitably expressed, by its rich simplicity and austerity, the writer's idea of what these sacred vessels ought to be. Nevertheless, there was something specially interesting and suggestive in this particular chalice, so richly set with precious stones and engraved gems. It seemed fit that these precious stones should burn and glow upon the altar of a Christian Church; for that altar and its service there is nothing too beautiful or precious. But the chalice was especially interesting because the gems with which it was adorned were spoils, taken from the heathen. It caused the writer to think of many things, especially of the manner in which, from the beginning, Christ and His religion have taken and divided "spoils." Christianity has taken heathen temples and changed them into Christian churches; heathen words, and invested them with a new and higher meaning; heathen customs, and given them a Christian character. All things are Christ's; all precious stones, and all the beautiful and precious things in nature and art, which these appropriately represent. They are His, and, to recover them, He despoils the enemy in whose possession they are found.

Especially did this chalice, with its precious stones, seen by him there, in St. Mary's church at Oxford, remind the writer of some other and nobler spoils taken from the heathen: of the Latin and Greek languages and literatures, which for centuries have played so great a part in the history of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and which have had so much to do with the education of generation after generation of England's greatest sons. The writer thought of these, the noblest and most precious spoils ever taken from the heathen. And then he remembered one of his favorite poems in "The Christian Year." It is the one for the third Sunday in Lent, and is based on the sentence of the Gospel for that Sunday, in which our Savior speaks of Himself as overcoming the strong man. and dividing his spoils. Having sung of the spoiling of the Egyptians and the spoiling of the Canaanites, Keble, in this lyric, goes on to celebrate the greatest spoiling of all—the spoiling of "Immortal Greece:"

"And now another Caanan yields
To Thine all-conquering ark;—
Fly from the "old poetic" fields,
Ye Paynim shadows dark!

Immortal Greece, dear land of glorious lays,
Lo! here the "unknown God" of thy unconscious
praise

"The olive-wreath, the ivied wand, 'The sword in myrtles drest.' Each legend of the shadowy strand,
Now wakes a vision blest;
As little children lisp, and tell of Heaven,
So thoughts beyond their thought to those high
Bards were given.

"And these are ours: Thy partial grace
The tempting treasure lends:
These relics of a guilty race
Are forfeit to Thy friends;
What seemed an idol hymn, now breathes of Thee,
Tun'd by Faith's ear to some celestial melody.

"There's not a strain to Memory dear
Nor flower in classic grove,
There's not a sweet note warbled here,
But minds us of Thy Love.
O Lord, our Lord, and spoiler of our foes,
There is no light but Thine; with Thee all beauty
glows."

XXXII.

HAIL TO THE DEFEATED!

When Brennus and his Gauls overran Italy. defeated the Roman army and plundered Rome, and when the ransom of a thousand pounds of gold, with which they were finally bought off, was being weighed out, it is a well-known story that, in reply to the remonstrance of a Roman tribune against the use of false weights by the Gauls, the Gallic chieftain flung his sword into the scale, with the exclamation, "Vae victis!" "Woe to the conquered!" It is an old, significant, barbaric cry, which the advancement of civilization has not wholly deprived of its characteristic import. The lot of the conquered is by no means now what it was in ages when the doctrine that might makes right was more believed in than it is at present; nevertheless the condition of the vanquished is always characterized in some degree by that "woe" which Brennus pronounced upon it. To be defeated is at least, for the most part, to be disparaged; it may not mean oppression, but it does mean oblivion; it may not bring destruction, but it does entail disregard and neglect. It is success that is praised; failure is not praised. Men reserve their shouts for the victor. The world has never lacked, and never will lack, for such songs as "Lo, the conquering hero comes!" But the conquered, hero though he may be—as a rule, there are no shouts for him; no songs are sung in his honor; he comes and goes in silence.

Yet those have never been wanting who, looking beneath the surface of things, have perceived that not only the conqueror, but also oftentimes the conquered, is deserving of praise. Nay, they sometimes perceive that, as regards all the essential elements of victory, the vanquished are the victors. They are not always willing to acknowledge the finality of a defeat sustained on any particular occasion. In regard to some causes they are of the mind of Cato, as expressed in Lucan's famous line—"Victrix causa Deis placuit, sed victa Catoni,"-"The victorious cause was pleasing to the gods, but to Cato the cause that was conquered." They look beyond; they have prophetic vision to see that the cause that is vanguished to-day may be victorious to-morrow. Nay, more: they perceive that sometimes the vanguished are victorious. even in being vanquished, or, at least, contribute their full share to the real victory, that is, the final settlement by which the question in dispute is settled. At all events, they recognize the fact that, wherever a victory is gained and a defeat sustained, the chief thing to be considered is. not whether one gained the victory or not, but what aims and purposes he cherished, and what qualities he brought into exercise, in the effort to accomplish his object, whether he actually accomplished it or not. Whether one particular "cause," whatever it may be, triumphs to-day, or to-morrow, or not until after many years. is of little consequence. Indeed, it may not be destined to triumph at all; that belongs to God. and not to us. A man's cause may be mistaken: he may, without knowing it, be fighting against destiny. But the fidelity and loyalty, the magnanimity and courage which he manifests in contending for it—these are never mistaken. These, after all, are the chief ingredients of every victory worth contending for; and these a man may have whether he succeeds or fails, whether he conquers or is conquered.

As a rule, there are no shouts in honor of the defeated, no songs to hail the coming of the vanquished. Yet occasionally a voice is lifted up, pleading their cause, protesting against the neglect of them, proclaiming their praise. The most distinct and powerful utterance of this kind, which we can at present recall, is that of one of our own American poets, Walt Whitman, whose language, because it expresses so strikingly what we have been trying to say, we beg leave to quote: "I play not marches for accepted victors only—I play great marches for conquered and slain persons.

Have you heard that it is good to gain the day?

I also say that it is good to fall—battles are lost in the same spirit in which they are won.

I beat and pound for the dead;

I blow through my embouchures my loudest and gayest for them.

Vivas to those who have failed!

And to those whose war-vessels sank in the sea!

And to those themselves who sank in the sea!

And to all generals that lost engagements, and all overcome heroes!

And the numberless unknown heroes, equal to the greatest heroes known!"

There is something very beautiful in the wideness and inclusiveness of this strain. It is beautiful with the beauty of justice. It will sing for accepted victors, but not only for these; it will sing for unaccepted and unrecognized victors, too. It throbs with the passionate admiration of heroism, reckless of whether it succeeded or failed. It is a song for the defeated; a pæan for all "overcome heroes" and all "unknown heroes;" and we may well be pleased that it comes to us from an American poet.

It is a long way from modern American poetry to ancient Greek oratory, but, somehow, this strain of Whitman's has reminded us of a certain passage in a great Greek oration. The oration is none other than the *De Coronâ* of Demosthenes; and the particular passage is that of the famous

Oath. The De Coroná is generally considered to be the summit of human eloquence; and of this supreme oration the Oath is universally admitted to be the most eloquent passage. Apart from the course of the argument to which it belongs. it would be difficult to give an idea of the nature and power of this passage; separated from its connections, it would not seem to be the supreme thing which it actually is. It has its roots away back in the argument: it is of the nature of a culmination; and it is an instance of the perfect fusion of logic and passion, which does not often take place, but which is always witnessed when human utterance reaches its highest. It has been said of the oratory of Demosthenes in general, that it is "logic on fire." And this description is especially true of the Oath, which is what it is, largely because in it the two great forces of argument and passion are perfectly welded into one. But, we venture to say that the passage owes its power in a certain degree, also, to the circumstance, that it is an affirmation of the principle we have been trying to state. It is a distinct declaration that the honor to which men are entitled from their fellow-men does not depend upon the successful issue of their exertions, but upon the principles for which, and the spirit in which, they contended.

Demosthenes is defending, against the attacks of Æschines, the policy pursued by him in the

past. His argument in regard to this matter is of a cumulative character. He shows that, in most trying circumstances and with exertions beyond his strength, he had honestly and diligently done all that a statesman could be expected to do. He affirms, and undertakes to prove, that, had any other policy been pursued, the results would have been worse. Nav. he goes still further, and declares that, even if all the results had been foreseen, there was nothing else the commonwealth could have done that would have been worthy of herself and her ancestral principles. "But since he insists so strongly on the event, I will even assert something of a paradox; and I beg and pray of you not to marvel at its boldness, but kindly to consider what I say. If then the results had been foreknown to all, if all had foreseen them. and you, Æschines, had foretold them and protested with clamor and outcry-you that never opened your mouth-not even then should the commonwealth have abandoned her design, if she had any regard for glory, or ancestry, or futurity." He shows them that, under his guidance, they had acted in accordance with their own principles, and with what had been the spirit of the commonwealth long before his time; for it had always been the custom of their country to contend for precedency and honor and renown, and to "accept no foreign law." How, he asks, could

they have beheld strangers visiting their city and finding that the foreigner had been made leader and lord of all, but other people without them had made the struggle to prevent it; especially when, in former times, their country had never preferred an ignominious security to the battle for honor.

It is in the midst of affirmations, appeals and arguments like these that he comes finally, in the most natural manner, to the particular passage we have in mind, in which, as it were, reiterating and summing up all that he has been saying, he exclaims:

"But never, never, can you have done wrong, O Athenians, in undertaking the battle for the freedom and safety of all! I swear it by your forefathers—those that met at the peril at Marathon, those that took the field at Plataea, those in the sea-fight at Salamis, and those at Artemisium, and many other brave men who repose in the public monuments, all of whom alike, as being worthy of the same honor, the country buried, Æschines, not only the successful or victorious! Justly! For the duty of brave men has been done by all: their fortune has been such as the Deity assigned to each."

This, reader, is what is known as the Demosthenic Oath. It has been judged by many competent critics to be the most eloquent passage in the greatest oration ever delivered. It is cirtainly a significant circumstance that this supreme passage of human eloquence should be of the nature of a passionate affirmation of the truth

that the event of any course of conduct pursued is not the chief thing to be considered; that it is not the successful or unsuccessful issue of actions that ought to determine the honor or dishonor belonging to those by whom they were performed. "All of whom alike, as being worthy of the same honor, the country buried, not only the successful or victorious!" There is something beautiful and glorious in these words, so different from the barbaric cry "Vae Victis!" This passage is, as it were, a noble strain in honor of all brave men who did their duty, whether they succeeded It does no injustice to, it puts no disparagement upon, those who fought bravely and won; it simply includes in the same honorable list with these those who fought bravely and lost. It is a song that might be entitled, "Hail to the Defeated!" or, "Lo, the Vanquished Hero Comes!"

Principles are eternal; the perfect expression of a genuine principle can never grow old. The passage we have quoted is as applicable to the affairs of to-day as to those of two thousand years ago. The truth which it utters has its illustration in events taking place under our own eyes. It perhaps does not require much of the spirit of prophecy to foretell which side will conquer and which be defeated in the war now being waged in South Africa. It may be that the Boers are contending vainly against destiny; that Provi-

XXXIII.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SORROW.

The Bible has not inappropriately been called the Book of Sorrow. It is a grave, serious, sombre book; its predominant tone is not that of brightness and gayety; from beginning to end it has much to say of affliction, of sorrow, of suffering. It is impossible to hide this austere character of the Scriptures; it is not possible, and if it were possible it would not be desirable, to transform the Bible into an interesting, entertaining, amusing volume. Its austerity is its excellence, its sombreness is its strength and glory. For it is the book, not only of God, but also of human life; and human life, whatever it may be upon its surface, is in its depths grave and serious, sad and sorrowful.

There are, however, certain peculiarities in the manner in which sorrow is mentioned in the Bible. It is not mentioned alone, but always in connection with joy. If afflictions are spoken of, it is more than probable that the word "glory" will be found to occur in the same sentence. "For I reckon," says St. Paul, in a characteristic and typical passage, "that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared

with the glory which shall be revealed in us." And he says, again, "For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." Moreover, these two things are so mentioned together that the sorrow is for the sake of the joy, the affliction for the sake of the glory. The sorrow is a preliminary, a preface, a parenthesis. a precedent condition, an incident, a passing state. That upon which the emphasis falls and rests, that which is final and abiding, is the jov and not the sorrow. It is said, "Weeping may endure for a night, but joy cometh in the morning." It is said, "And the ransomed of the Lord shall return, and come to Zion with songs and everlasting joy upon their heads; they shall obtain joy and gladness and sorrow and sighing shall flee away." Always, for those who love and trust God, it is the weeping that passes, the joy that comes and stays; always it is the. joy and gladness that abide forever. More than once our Savior predicted His sufferings and death, but always in the same manner and with the same conclusion. "Behold, we go up to Jerusalem, and the Son of Man shall be betrayed unto the chief priests, and unto the scribes, and they shall condemn him to death, and shall deliver Him to the Gentiles to mock and to scourge, and to crucify Him; and the third day He shall rise again"—that is always the significant and solemn conclusion.

Not only thus, but the Bible places these two things together in such a way as plainly to imply a vital connection between the humiliation and the glorification, the sorrow and the joy, the sorrow being, in some mysterious way, the origin and the cause of the joy. The relation is not one of mere succession in point of time, but one of cause and effect. It is not that the sorrow passes away, and is then succeeded by joy, but the sorrow itself causes the joy, which would otherwise have no existence. It is our "light affliction" that works for us "a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." It is because the corn of wheat falls into the ground and dies that it "bringeth forth much fruit," It is because Christ Jesus "humbled Himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross," that God "hath highly exalted Him." Our Savior said to His disciples, "Ye shall be sorrowful, but your sorrow shall be turned into joy;" that is, the very ground and cause of their sorrowing shall become the ground and cause of their rejoicing. What a profound utterance of this great truth is contained in our Savior's words to the two disciples on the way to Emmaus, on the day of His resurrection: "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things and to enter into His glory?"

Such is the mysterious relation, the more mysterious the more we think about it, between

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these two so entirely different things. Why is it that affliction, sorrow, suffering, should be associated, and thus vitally associated, with joy and glory? Why, since God is love, is suffering the indispensable condition of attaining to that which is highest? Why is it that "all the best and most beautiful flowers of thought and character seem to spring up in the track of suffering?" Why is it that love and sorrow are always wedded the one to the other; that the highest love and the highest sorrow inevitably belong together; and so, that the Christ had to be "a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief?"

Perhaps the best answer is, that we do not know. Yet, as regards sorrow, its relation to joy, and its exalted and beneficent character and ministration, there are not wanting considerations which may at least serve to throw a dim light upon the problem which from the beginning has agitated the minds and hearts of men.

In the first place, there is something which sorrow indicates. While not in itself an excellent or desirable thing, it is the token of things, of capabilities, of traits of disposition and character, that are excellent and to be desired. A man who is capable of great sorrow is capable of much besides. The sorrow he feels is the sign and the measure of the susceptibility and sympathy and tenderness and goodness that are in him. The man who is capable of the acutest

pain is capable also of the intensest pleasure. The highest has to be susceptible, and this susceptibility has to be two-fold—a susceptibility of sorrow, as well as joy. A stone has no susceptibility one way or the other; but it is a stone. The higher up we go in the scale of life, the more possibility of pain we find; the susceptibility of suffering is the price we pay for what we are. Thus it comes to pass that, as has been said, "the mark of rank in nature is capacity for pain:" that "our sorrow is the inverted image of our nobleness." Thus we see how, in this world of sin and imperfection, sorrow must needs be inseparable from joy. The higher we ascend the greater power of sorrow we find. And the highest must of necessity be "a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief." Thus, we say, sorrow is what it is, and sustains the high relationships it does, partly because of what it indicates.

But partly, also, because of what it takes away. The question of attaining to glory is, in a certain sense, and to a certain extent, a question of something to be removed; of certain things to be eliminated; of our being set free from certain limitations, hindrances, obstructions, clogging adhesions. The glory is there, but it is an obscured, oppressed, imprisoned glory. The precious gold is there, but combined with much earthly alloy. What shall release this glory; what shall separate the gold from the dross?

Affliction, sorrow, suffering—these forces alone, it would seem, are capable of acomplishing this result.

It is an old and worn image, the image of gold mixed with alloy, but it is the image which Scripture uses when speaking of affliction and tribulation. "I will bring them through the fire, and refine them as silver is refined, and try them as gold is tried." How much there is to be removed from it; what a process of beating and pounding, of pulverizing and burning, there must be before the gold can appear in its purity. It is so wherever there is anything precious. The principal diamond mines of the world are in South Africa; and the chief of these, no more than four or five in number, are contained within a circle three and one-half miles in diameter. One of these, the Kimberley mine, yielded from 1871 to 1885, 17,500,000 carats of diamonds. valued at \$130,000,000, and weighing, as precious stones, about three and one-half tons. To obtain these stones, 20,000,000 tons of earth and rock were excavated. That is to say, for every ton of diamonds about six million tons of earth and rock had to be removed. How great a part the work of removal has to perform in bringing to light things that are precious!

Michael Angelo used to consider, not so much that he was fashioning and producing an angel, but that the angel was imprisoned in the block

of marble on which he was working, and that it was his office to release it. The angel was sleeping in the stone; it belonged to him to remove the superfluous, adhering, encumbering, encrusting matter in which it was concealed, and bring its beauty and glory to light. He used to say, "the more the marble wastes, the more the statue grows." We are like that. We are like angels imprisoned in rough stones; and the hand of the Master is removing the clogging adhesions of extraneous matter by which our glory is concealed; and the strokes of His chisel are our sufferings. There is no one in whose personality there does not lie something exceedingly precious. more precious than gold or diamonds, or any beautiful work of man's art. But it is imprisoned and oppressed, hidden and obscured by multitudinous limitations, faults, sins, which need to be removed. It is like gold which cannot appear in its purity until the ore which contains it has been pounded and pulverized so that all foreign substances may be taken away. It is like a diamond which can be brought to light only after the separation and removal of the tons of earth and rock by which it is concealed. It is as if that which is highest were locked up in a dungeon, and pain were the only key to unlock the dungeon's door. It is as if our noblest capabilities and powers were sleeping an enchanted sleep, and the touch of sorrow alone could awaken them.

More, however, than in what it indicates, and more than in what it takes away, the significance of sorrow consists in what it communicates and imparts. Sorrow, when it is permitted to perform its appointed and appropriate work, imparts certain most precious gifts. It imparts knowledge; we learn by suffering. It is sorrow, chiefly, that brings us to the feet of the Great Teacher, to learn of Him. The best, greatest, highest lessons are to be learned only by entering into the fellowship of His sufferings, only at the foot of His cross. There we learn patience, gentleness, tenderness, sympathy. Patience—is there anything in this world more to be desired than that? St. Chrysostom called it "the queen of the virtues." It is the discipline of sorrow that chastens us. that takes away our petulance and impatience, and makes us of a patient spirit. is sorrow, above all, that invests us with the power of being a comfort and a help to others. It is by its means that "the power of Christ" is made to rest upon us; the power of Him who is "touched with a feeling of our infirmities," because He was "in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin;" the power of Him who is "able to succor them that are tempted," because "He Himself hath suffered being tempted." Significant because of what it takes away, sorrow is more significant still because of what it imparts. It takes away crudeness and rawness, and imparts refinement; takes away hardness and harshness, and imparts gentleness and tenderness; takes away bitterness and imparts sweetness; takes away petulance and imparts meekness and patience; takes away helplessnesss, and imparts the power to help.

Greatest of all schools is the school of sorrow. O reader, hast thou ever been in that school? Dost thou know its sombre halls? Hast thou, still trusting in God, walked its lonely corridors? Hast thou sat down there, in the ashes of disappointment, and eaten thy bread with tears, and watched and waited, through the dark and lonely night, for the breaking of the day? Then thou knowest, then thou needest not to be told, what lessons are there to be learned.

Be sure of this, O child of God, that when, in His providence, sorrow enters into thy life, it is with no other intention than that of leading thee onward and upward. When sorrow comes, open wide the door and bid her welcome. Entertaining her, thou wilt find that thou hast been entertaining an angel unawares. Some day she will be transfigured before thine eyes. Some day thou shalt find thy sorrow "turned into joy."

"A dewdrop, falling on the wild sea wave, Exclaimed in fear, "I perish in this grave!" But, in a shell received, that drop of dew Unto a pearl of marvelous beauty grew; And, happy now, the grace did magnify, Which thrust it forth, as it had feared, to die; Until, again, "I perish quite!" it said, Torn by rude diver from its ocean bed. Oh, unbelieving! So it came to gleam Chief jewel in a monarch's diadem.

"The seed must die, before the corn appears,
Out of the ground, in blade and fruitful ears,
Low have those ears before the sickle lain,
Ere thou canst treasure up the golden grain.
The grain is crushed before the bread is made;
And the bread broke, ere life to man conveyed.
Oh! be content to die, to be laid low,
And to be crushed, and to be broken so,
If thou upon God's table may'st be bread,
Life-giving food for souls an-hungerèd."

XXXIV.

THE ELECT HOUR.

Not all hours are alike; some are "elect, precious." Now and then there comes to us an hour of emancipation and exaltation. There are times when we are left to ourselves, and there are times when we are "visited." "Left to ourselves, we sink and perish; visited, we lift up our heads and live." The elect hour is an hour of "visitation;" of insight; of freedom; of life. Then shackles are stricken from our limbs: then the scales fall from our eyes; then we see, and feel, and know; then we are invested, as it were, with new capabilities and powers. It is then that we perceive the meaning of things concealed from us before; it is then that we climb the mountains of certainty and look down upon the clouds and mists beneath. Such an hour is described in the concluding lines of Matthew Arnold's "Buried Life." In that hour, it is said:

"A bolt is shot back somewhere in our breast,
And a lost pulse of feeling stirs again.
The eye sinks inward, and the heart lies plain,
And what we mean, we say, and what we would, we know.
A man becomes aware of his life's flow,
And hears its winding murmur, and he sees

The meadows where it glides, the sun, the breeze. And there arrives a lull in the hot race Wherein he doth forever chase The flying and elusive shadow, rest. An air of coolness plays upon his face, And an unwonted calm pervades his breast; And then he thinks he knows The hills where his life rose, And the sea where it goes."

It is impossible to predict when or how the elect hour will come; it is like the wind, which "bloweth where it listeth;" its ways are not our ways. We are deceived by appearances. Many an hour has all the outward seeming, but nothing of the reality, of the hour that is elect; many an hour has all of the reality, but nothing of the outward seeming. Here is an hour which, seemingly, ought to belong to the elect; it was specially appointed; it was looked forward to and prepared for; it bears all the outward trappings a "great occasion." It comes; it goes; was an ordinary, earthly hour, after all; it was none of the elect. Here, on the other hand, is an hour for which no appointment was made, and which bears no visible mark of distinction; it gave no sign; it came upon us suddenly and stealthily; and, lo, it is not from earth, but from heaven; it is elect. For the elect hour no earthly appointment can be made. All things that are elect, whether they be times or events or personalities, come

otherwise than by human appointment or arrangement. Like the kingdom of God itself, all the things pertaining to that kingdom come "not with observation." Their feet, as a Greek proverb says of the feet of the avenging deities. are "shod with wool." The elect thing, whatever it may be, comes silently, secretly, stealthily, suddenly; its coming is always "in such an hour as ye think not." It has always been, in some sense, "while men slept," that the great event has taken place, or the great act has been performed. Afterwards they wake up and recognize the greatness of it; but at the time they "knew it not." This is the law of the elect hour. It is beyond the reach of calculation; it is independent of human appointment or arrangement; it belongs to the idea of it that it comes mysteriously and suddenly. It is a strange thing. "Thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth."

Nevertheless, there are certain things, as regards the elect hour, which may be discerned with some degree of clearness; one of these is, its relation to the common and non-elect hours going before it. We have said that it comes suddenly and unexpectedly; as indeed it does, so far as our perception of its coming and its presence is concerned. Yet, in itself, that coming is not sudden; is not sudden, that is, in the

sense of not having been prepared for. Nothing that is significant is absolutely sudden or solitary; if it stands alone, isolated, unrelated, it is insignificant. The significant thing "belongs;" it has its relations; it has had its origin, development, history; it "cometh from afar." The elect thing is such, not because of its independence of, but because of its vital relation to, that which is not elect. The uncommon has its roots in the common. The extraordinary is the legitimate offspring of the ordinary. The Alps, to use the well-known words of Professor Huxley, are "of one substance with the dullest clay, but raised by inward forces to that place of proud and seemingly inaccessible glory." He makes a fatal mistake who fails to perceive this intimate and vital relationship between these two things. apparently so different; who has a passion for the unusual and the extraordinary, but despises the usual and the ordinary. Hast thou a feverish longing for the uncommon, and dost thou despise the common? Art thou forever craving that which is distinguished, choice, precious, elect: and art thou at the same time discontented with, art thou forever neglecting and rejecting that which is common and every-day? Thou knowest not what thou art doing. The thing thou seekest thus thou shalt never find. The thing that is elect never comes to him who seeks it; least of all, to him who seeks it in a spirit of

discontent with, or contempt of, the things that are not elect. The elect hour comes only to him who has learned to respect and love the hours that are common and undistinguished.

It is interesting to reflect upon the mysterious relationship of the uncommon to the common: to remember, for example, that the precious diamond is of one and the same substance with so common a thing as charcoal. The elect hour is like the diamond, produced by the subjection of carbon to volcanic heat and volcanic pressure. It is like some precious essence or exract; like the costly volatile oil extracted from the petals of the rose, and known as attar of roses. It is estimated that 200,000 well-grown roses are required to produce half an ounce of the oil. It takes many common hours to make one that is elect. We go our way; we do our work; we bear our burdens. We try to be diligent, painstaking and faithful. We remember the words, "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much." Knowing that no one will do anything well unless he likes what he is doing, we try to put our hearts into our work; we would fain reverence and love the task that has been set us. But, all the same, it is tasks that we are performing; it is drudgery that we are undergoing; we are bearing "the burden and heat of the day." Our work is homely, uninteresting, unattractive. The hours are common, earthly hours; they come, and go, and give no sign. There is in the drudgery itself no hint of the glory which drudgery is capable of producing; in the labor, no prophecy of the ease which is its lovely result; in the pressure, no suggestion of the precious things which pressure alone can bring forth. Then, suddenly, all is changed. The burden and heat of the day are past; the task has been performed; the drudgery is at an end; the pressure ceases, and we hear a voice which says, "Well done, thou good and faithful servant! Thou hast toiled well; thou hast endured bravely. And thou art weary now. Come unto Me and rest." And then, somehow -who can tell how?-we are transported, as it were, to some lofty and lonely mountain top, to be there alone with Him who spake these gracious words. And there such things are said and done as cause us to know and feel that all the previous drudgery and pain were "but for a moment," and are "not to be compared with the glory" of that hour. It is the Elect Hour. It is an hour of rest and refreshment, of exaltation and inspiration, of vision and insight. And it is the direct and proper result of the multitudinous hours of toil or suffering that went before it. Without them it could have no existence whatever.

Not less evident than its relation to the common hours which preceded it is the relation of

the elect hour to the common hours by which it is followed. If, on the one hand, it is the reward of past, on the other, it is the preparation for future, accomplishments and endurances. and precious as this hour is, it is "not too bright or good for human nature's daily food." If ever we are carried to a mountain top, it is not that we may remain and reside there, but that we may presently go down again to the lowlands. If rest is given us, it is that we may be prepared for toil or suffering; if vision is vouchsafed us, it is that we may translate it into action by the performance of duty. The elect hour is, by its very nature, of brief duration; it cannot tarry; it passes rapidly by; sometimes it has the swiftness of a swallow's wing. This is the significance and glory of it, that, with all its brightness, it is most closely akin to hours of darkness, that, with all its ease and grace, it is but a preparation for hours of toil and drudgery. It is in that hour, and on the mountain top, that we have vision of our lives as they ought to be; it is afterwards, and in remembrance of that hour, that, amid daily toil and struggle, we endeavor to fashion our lives and characters according to the pattern which was shown us in the mount. Remote, mysterious, heavenly as it is, nothing is more closely related to things earthly and practical than the elect hour. To quote once more from Matthew Arnold, this time from the poem entitled "Morality":

"We cannot kindle when we will
The fire which in the heart resides.
The spirit bloweth and is still,
In mystery our soul abides.
But tasks in hours of insight willed
Can be through hours of gloom fulfilled."

Aye, this is one of the distinctive characteristics of the elect hour, that it is an "hour of insight," and that tasks which are willed in that hour may be fulfilled in "hours of gloom."

Bright and glorious as is the elect hour, very close is its relationship to the hour of darkness. Once there was One to whom, in the midst of His life of toil, and suffering, and sorrow, there came an elect hour. It was, most fittingly, on a mountain top. It is written: "And after six days Jesus taketh Peter, James and John his brother, and bringeth them up into an high mountain apart, and was transfigured before them; and His face did shine as the sun, and His raiment was white as the light. And, behold, there appeared unto them Moses and Elias talking with Him." What was it that was spoken of in that hour? It is said that they "spake of His decease, which He should accomplish at Jerusalem." There was presently coming into that strange life an hour of unutterable darkness. We read, further on, in the history of the cruciflxion, of the deep, dark midnight which overwhelmed the soul of this innocent

sufferer; a darkness that was the very essence of all possible or conceivable loneliness and desolation of spirit. There was external darkness, too; the outward and visible sign of that "Now from the sixth hour which was within there was darkness over all the land unto the ninth hour." It was this that was coming: the hour of Gethsemane and Calvary was not far off; and it was evidently because of them, and in preparation for them, that the hour on the Mount of Transfiguration was vouchsafed. It was in the hour of gloom that He endured, and accomplished, and fulfilled what had been foreseen, and accepted and willed, in the hour of brightness and glory.

Such is the elect hour. Bright and glorious in itself, it is at once the result of, and the preparation for, many hours that have no brightness or glory in them, hours of gloom and darkness, of toil and drudgery, of sorrow and suffering.





DR. KIEFFER AND GRANDSON

XXXV.

THE BLACK ROCK.

The parson, somewhat weary of writing, leaned back in his chair and gazed through the window opposite his study table. From this window (for the parsonage is situated on high ground), there is presented to the parson's eyes, whenever he lifts them from his writing, a somewhat extended view: first, a low-lying section of the town; then fields, gradually sloping upwards; then a belt of woods, hiding from the eye the wide interval between itself and the mountain; and, finally, the mountain, seven miles distant. It is a point from which one may make, on a limited scale, meteorological observations. Here, in summer, the summer storms may be seen skirmishing across this quarter of the valley, as bodies of Union and Confederate cavalry used to do thirty-five years ago. Here we have seen two separate columns of thunder-storm effect a junction of their forces, and go rejoicing on their thunderous way together. The other day day we lifted up our eyes and saw a curious phenomenon; a mile or two of the mountain's length was entirely hidden from view as by a white veil. The limits of the white eclipse were somewhat distinctly defined; to the north and to the south of the obscuration, the mountain apeared in its usual beautiful blue, but all was white between. Then we knew that it was the first snow-squall of the season, marching like a white squadron across the mountain.

On this particular occasion, the parson fell to thinking of the mysterious manner in which we are affected by our surroundings, of the imperceptible and stealthy way in which the things to which we have been long accustomed, enter into our lives and become, as it were, a part of us. He was thinking especially, of the Black Rock: there, on the mountain yonder; directly opposite his study-table and study-window; on which his eye of necessity rests whenever he looks up from his work; and which, from years of looking in upon him at his studies, has become a sort of "silent partner" in his affairs as a student. The Black Rock, reader, is a projecting crag, or combination of crags, on the front, and almost at the very summit, of the mountain which bounds the valley on its eastern side. At this distance, it and its surroundings (for, for ages the rock has been showering down fragments of itself on the space below) show as a great, bare, dark spot upon the surface of the mountain. Often it is dimly discerned, but sometimes, when flooded with light from the level rays of the setting sun on the opposite side of the valley, it is revealed

with remarkable distinctness. The Rock itself is black and rugged, but it looks out upon, it is associated with, it is itself a part of, a scene of surpassing loveliness. From its summit one may gaze, not only across a section of the narrow strip of western Marvland, but far into Pennsylvania on the north, and far into Virginia on the south, catching glimpses of the Potomac in more places than one, particularly where it emerges from the mountains far to the west. The Black Rock, though difficult of access, was once a favorite place of resort for pleasure-parties; it has within recent years been relegated into obscurity and neglect through the making public of a popular place of multitudinous resort several miles farther to the north, where the mountain is crossed by a railroad. The writer remembers when, with a solitary companion, he made his first visit to the Black Rock. We had lost our way, and not knowing that the object of our quest was so near, were pushing through the underbrush of the shaggy mountain top, when a single step, as it were, brought us on to the summit of the rock, and in the twinkling of an eve flashed the whole beauty and glory of the scene upon our eyes. It was a moment not to be forgotten; a moment for silence and for reverent contemplation.

We were there once more, with three dear friends, in the last days of last October. Something in

the very loneliness and desolation of the spot, emphasized by the autumnal surroundings, seemed to make it more impressive and attractive. We noted the action of wind and weather upon the rock; how, in the great, broad, topmost stone of one of the turret-like structures, grooves had been worn, and little hollows eaten out, forming miniature lakes, filled at the time with rain-water. The Black Rock has endured much. There it stands, silent, lonely, majestic; patient with a grim patience; though rugged and hard-visaged itself, yet looking out on such a scene of beauty as one might gladly travel far to see. It gives no sign; it remains calm and unmoved; it heard, unmoved, the guns of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam but a short distance away.

To the parson, however, the Black Rock is more than an object to be visited; it is a "presence;" it has become, through long use, the daily companion and co-partner of his labors and his thoughts. It gazes in at his window; it associates itself with him in his tasks; all the work that has been done in this study has been done under its supervision and inspection. We have called it a "silent partner"; it is not silent, however, in the sense of not speaking. For often it speaks, and indeed sometimes has much to say, in its own peculiar and somewhat severe manner. The Rock cannot be called a gay companion. Its aspect is sombre; its words are stern;

its criticism is relentless. We do not remember, for example, that it ever uttered a compliment. It likes not compliments; it knows no t the language thereof. Once or twice, indeed, on a Sunday night, after a hard week's work, we thought we heard it faintly say, "Well done!" But it is a far cry from the Black Rock to the parson's study, and we may have been mistaken.

It is commandments, rather than compliments, to the utterance of which the Rock is addicted. These seem to suit it better: mountains and commandments go well together. It has a way of flinging them at us, straight from the mountain, as occasion may seem to require. They come suddenly, and for the most part very opportunely, and are spoken in no faint voice. but are shouted out with the loud and unequivocal voice of genuine command. We remember one critical occasion on which, after long hesitation and debate, the whole question was instantly and irrevocably settled by a commandment hurled in at the window as from a catapult. And the commandment was-"Thou shalt not flinch!"

The favorite doctrines of the Blaack Rock are such as a rock would naturally be expected to hold. Though itself shouting sometimes with so loud a voice, it is a great believer in silence. What sermons it has preached to us upon this theme, proclaiming the dignity, the modesty,

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the security, the triumphant power of silence! It holds that it is a good and necessary thing to wait, and that the strong and able man will be characterized by an immense power of waiting. Let a man plant himself (so it says) on the firm foundations of reality and truth; let him do strenuously the thing which God has appointed to be done by him; and then let him wait, calmly, without any anxiety or nervous fear; all will come right; every such man shall in the long run come to his own. The Black Rock is a great believer in the Long Run. And sometimes, when it speaks thus, its words remind us of one of our own poets, who says, in his large, calm, confident way: "And whether I come to my own today, or in ten thousand or ten million years, I can cheerfully take it now, or with equal cheerfulness I can wait." They remind us also words of Goethe's: "Ohne Hast, aber ohne Rast." Sometimes, also, looking out upon this great, calm Rock, abiding there quietly in its place, and preaching this doctrine of waiting, we have been caused to remember that saying of Emerson's: "If the single man plant himself indomitably upon his instincts, and there abide, the huge world will come round to him." What a splendid thing it is to plant oneself on what is really fundamental, and then to wait and see the huge world come swinging round to where he stands.

The Black Rock has much to say of patient endurance. There are many things in life which are simply to be endured; there is no other way. There are victories won by passivity, quite as great as those which are won by activity. "Victor quia victima;" in order to be victor, one must often be the victim. Let the storm break upon thee, and waste its force upon thee; let many storms wear grooves in thee, and leave manifold marks on thee, to be worn afterwards. But see thou to it that thou be not moved from thy place, and that, after the storm has passed by, thy feet be found fixed, as before, on the everlasting and immovable foundations

Of Reality, also, our friend makes large account, and often enters into discourse. Great is reality, however rugged it may be. The actually existing thing, whatever it may be, however plain and bare and homely, is a thing to be regarded and respected, to be seen and dealt with as it is, and not otherwise. First of all, let us look about and see things as they actually are; let us love reality and fact; let us have nothing to do with appearances, affectations, unrealities. Let us know, also, that the very ruggedest reality is capable of being associated in the most intimate manner, with heavenly beauty and glory. Thus, at times, speaks the Black Rock, having indeed good authority to speak thus; and branching off then, very probably, into discussion

of the relation between the Real and the Ideal. a theme on which it is never weary of discoursing. The words of the Black Rock are, as we have said mostly stern. Yet let us not be unjust to this faithful monitor. It is a rock, and it is black, but it is not incapable of being gentle. We remember once perhaps we should say more than once, when it spoke with a great tenderness; one would not have thought that a rock could speak in tones so gentle and soothing. O reader, hast thou ever been weary with a great Weariness, or lonely with a great Loneliness? Hast thou passed through "that great and terrible wilderness?" Hast thou been a sojourner in the land of Sadness and Sorrow? Hast thou been in the Valley of the Shadow? Art thou acquainted with the Dark Hour? It was in such an hour that the Rock,—but we will not speak of that.

O Black Rock, companion, critic, counselor, consoler! We thank thee for thy companionship, thy criticism, thy counsel, thy consolation. A sign and symbol thou art to us of that other Rock, "the Rock that is higher than I," the "Rock of Ages," the invisible, spiritual Rock of which it is written, "That Rock was Christ."

XXXVI.

THE PLANTING OF THE OAK.

To the church of which the writer is pastor there is attached an ancient and interesting gravevard, which, though it has long since ceased to be used for purposes of general burial, bears witness, by its carefully-kept condition, to the congregation's reverent regard for the restingplace of the dead. It is a lovely spot, which is apt to recall to the mind of him who enters it. the poet Gray's "Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard." It is a place in which to meditate and moralize, in which to muse on the past and the departed. There are graves here which are not without historical associations. Here is the grave of Jonathan Hager, the founder of the town, who was a member of this congregation. He was a friend of General Washington, and is said to have been the first foreigner ever naturalized in the United States, having been maturalized by the Legislature of Maryland to make him eligible as a member of that body. We have seen the statement that he was a volunteer captain under General Braddock, in the ill-fated expedition of 1755. Here, also, is the grave of his son, the younger Jonathan, who as a boy ran away to the Revolutionary War, and was captured by the British and held prisoner by them for some time at Halifax. These, with the members of their families, lie buried in this graveyard. Here, likewise, is the grave of General Daniel Hiester, a membr of the well-known Hiester family of Pennsylvania. who married Rosina, only daughter of Jonathan Hager; who was active in the Revolutionary War, and afterwards was a member of the first National Congress after the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. Another interesting grave is that of John Gruber, founder of the Hagerstown Almanac, which, established more than a hundred years ago, not only exists, but exists in a highly-flourishing condition to-day. There are in the United States many thousands of people who would refuse to give their entire confidence to any other almanac than a genuine "Gruber." such as their fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers had in their households before them.

The first two pastors of the congregation lie buried in this graveyard. The Rev. Jacob Weymer, who served the congreation from 1770 to 1790, lies buried here in a unknown grave; of him it may be said, as is said of Moses, "No man knoweth of his sepulchre unto this day." This does not indicate any neglect of his memory, for his name is held in great honor, and his personality and services in grateful remembrance, to

this day; it is the result of his own expressed wish and direction that no tombstone should be placed at his grave. The writer knows, having learned so much many years ago from an aged member of the congregation, that he was buried in the southern portion of the graveyard, but the particular spot is not known. Down under the weeping willow is the grave of Mr. Weymer's successor, the Rev. Jonathan Rahauser, pastor of the congregation for nearly twenty-five years, from 1792 to 1817. These two alone among the pastors of this church died while engaged in its service.

Perhaps it was the weeping willow which has just been mentioned that suggested to the pastor's mind the idea of planting a tree in the churchyard. It is old now; it has also been somewhat injured by storms; it seemed proper that another tree should be coming on to take its place. Perhaps, also, the idea or intention may have been in part the result of the parson's love of continuity: his fondness for maintaing unbroken the connection between the present and the past, between the present and the future; his sense of the interest and value of the outward and visible sign of such union and continuity. As such a sign, as a bond of connection between generation and generation, nothing could be more effective or more interesting than a living and growing tree. How valuable a possession it would be for this congregation

to have upon its grounds a tree planted by Father Weymer; and how memorable such an object would be, as connecting it with the times of its origin. Or, the parson's intention may have grown out of his love of trees. He is a great admirer of trees, and loves to plant them and see them grow. Or, he may have been thinking of the time when his ministry should be past, and when the places which once knew him should know him no more. And he may have taken a half mournful pleasure in the thought that, after he should be gone there should be, in the neighborhood of the church, a tree planted by him, and known as his tree, which should serve as a gentle, modest and unoffending remembrancer of him, and as an outward and visible sign of his affection for the church in whose service so many years of his ministry were spent.

Whatever the motive of the act may have been, the pastor decided to plant a tree in the church-yard, as, when a boy, he had planted a tree on the campus of the college in which he was a student. At first, as has been said, he thought of planting a weeping willow. He considered, however, that the weeping willow, beautiful as it is, is a tree of a somewhat soft nature, is liable to be injured by storms, and is not of as long life as he desired his tree to be. He wanted a tree of hardy nature, of slow growth, of long duration. Upon reflection he chose the oak. His tree should

be an oak; and, in particular, it should be a pinoak, because of the specially graceful form and the specially beautiful foliage of that variety. The required oak was procured for him by his friend, Mr. Harry E. Strite, a great lover of trees. and one having extensive knowledge of them: who went down to Weverton, on the Potomac. specially for this purpose. The tree, brought from this locality (though there was no thought of this when it was obtained) seemed to the parson to possess a special interest and significance. as having grown along the Potomac, not far from the place where his father in his boyhood used to go fishing and swimming. The tree having thus been procured, the particular spot in which it should be planted was determined upon by consultation with Mr. W. H. McCardell, chairman of the Committee on Church Grounds.

At the planting of a tree of this kind, or in the performance of any other significant action, of which it is desired that the memory should be preserved, it is important that there should be present some child or young person, as the representative of future time. For this reason, the parson waited until the youngest son of the house should have come home from school, that he might witness the transaction. He, the youngest, alone of seven children, is left at home with his parents. He, too, like his brothers before him, will go away to college in the fall—"and then

there will be none." Let him stand by, as an eye-witness to the planting of the oak. Years ago, an old man, so old that one of the recollections of his childhood was to have seen General Washington, then on a visit to Hagerstown (his father lifting him up in the crowd that he might have a view of the great man speaking to the citizens), told us that, in his boyhood, he was once playing in the neighborhood of his father's house, two miles to the west of the town, while the younger Jonathan Hager, above referred to, and some surveyors were engaged in determining certain boundary lines. They had fixed upon a certain pine tree as a corner. Mr. Hager called the boy to him and said: "My boy, do you see this tree?" The boy said he did. "Look sharp," said the man; "do you think you will remember it?" The boy looked sharp, and thought he would remember. "Look sharp again," said the man; "I want you never to forget this tree." Then he explained the meaning of the tree; and then, leading him to the foot of it, he boxed the boy's ears, and then gave him a shilling. "Now," said he, "I want you to remember this tree as long as you live." And the boy did remember it as long as he lived; he had reasons, both of pain and pleasure, for doing so. It is a curious illustration of the law that attention is the mother of memory; we remember what we attend to. This boy had had his attention called to the tree in a two-fold, practical and very impressive manner The method used in this instance by Mr. Hager was, we believe, an old method, well-known in England centuries ago, for preserving and transmitting to posterity the memory of landmarks and other memorable objects.

So the oak was planted in the presence of the youngest son of the house. And the older trees looked on; and the church, with its ancient walls, now in their one hundred and thirtieth year, and its modern tower, likewise beheld the scene. It was a curious intermingling of the past, the present and the future. A little boy of the neighborhood, a member of the Sunday School, came straying in to see what was being done. To him also the meaning of the tree was explained, and he was asked to remember it. The parson does not mean to claim that he himself did all this work of planting. There was one who assisted him-perhaps it would be more correct to say, who was assisted by him. He does claim, however, to have done a considerable portion of the shoveling of the earth, and to have assisted otherwise in the important transaction; to have done enough to make the claim a real and not a fictitious one, that the tree was planted by him.

Such was the planting of the oak. May the tree thus planted live, and grow, and prosper,

and continue long. May the older trees of this ancient churchyard, the sycamore, the elm, the weeping willow, graciously receive it into their companionship. May it become a strong tree, capable of wrestling with the wild winds, that blow across this hill, and receive no injury from them. May it be "like a tree planted by the rivers of water;" whose leaf shall not wither. May the birds of the future, the descendants of the robin, and the red-bird, and the Baltimore oriole, that frequent these grounds. build their nests unmolested in its branches. In the far distant future may some one, resting beneath the shadow of it, think kindly of him by whom it was planted. Here may it stand, as a silent memorial of one who said his word. and did his work, and went his way; as the outward sign and symbol, also, of other, of invisible, things planted by him, which he trusts may be living and growing when he is gone.

It was between 4 and 5 o'clock p.m., on Monday, the 25th day of April, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and four, that this thing was done.

XXXVII.

THE DESERTED HOUSE.

It was Tennyson's poem of "The Deserted House" that was in the parson's thoughts to-night as he unlocked the door of the parsonage and let himself into the dark and silent house, of which, for the time being, he is the solitary occupant. He said over to himself the lines:

"All within is dark as night; In the windows is no light; And no murmur at the door, So frequent on its hinge before."

Reader, do you know what it is to be the sole inhabitant of a house, once filled with brightness and activity, but now deserted and dark; to come into it at night, and hear no sounds save that of your own footfalls as you ascend the stairs; to sit down alone at the table; to listen, at the midnight hour, to the sound of the autumnal wind, now swelling high and loud, now dying softly away with an infinitely mournful cadence?

This house, once the scene of so much life and gaiety, is silent and lonely now. The seven children who once enlivened and gladdened it, who romped within its walls or shouted upon

its grounds: who gathered around the table. morning, noon and evening; who came and went, bringing into the family life the atmosphere and interests of the school-room or the breeziness of the playground.—where are they? They are gone, they are scattered; the youngest went to college in September, and the next to the youngest is on the sea to-night,-God be with him and watch over him there. And the mistress of the house,—she, too, has gone, for the time being, for a visit and a greatly-needed change and rest. And the colored servant,—she, likewise, took her departure with the close of day. To this servant, standing respectfully by, waiter in hand, as he sat down to his luncheon to-day, the parson. perhaps somewhat weary of silence, ventured to remark, "Well, Mary, the family is becoming very small." "Yes, sah," she replied; "it's a gettin' mighty small, shore." These were the only words that were spoken. Invitations to dinner are not wanting; and the parson is much away from the house by day; but at night, when he returns to it, it is a lonely and deserted house.

There are few parents who would not admit that, with all the cares and anxieties of them, those were their happiest days when their children were small, and were all gathered together with them under the same roof. How very near they then seemed; how dependent they were;

how many things it was then possible and necessary to do for them; and out of this nearness, and dependence, and these loving services, how much there came of comfort and joy and happiness to the parents' hearts. It is a condition which cannot and ought not to be permanent. We take pleasure in our children's growth; we would not have it otherwise. They must grow into self-dependence and selfhelp; and, as birds leave the nest, so the time comes when they must leave the shelter of the paternal roof and go forth into the world. Yet this early time of an unbroken family circle is a blessed thing while it lasts; and, through all the years that follow, is likely to be looked back upon as a sort of golden age in the family life. Lately we read of an aged woman who lay dying. She was nearly one hundred years of age, and the husband who had taken the journey with her. sat by her side. She was just breathing faintly, but suddenly she revived, opened her eyes, and said, "Why! it is dark." "Yes, Janet, it is dark." "Is it night?" "Oh, yes! it is midnight." "Are all the children in?" Her youngest child had been in the grave for twenty years; but she was living her life over again; she had gone back to the days when, every day, as the night came on, the anxious question was whether the children were all in. "Are all the children in?" What a significant question it is! They may none of

them be in; they may all of them be out in the wide, wide world. Yet all of them may indeed be 'in." If they are within the fold; in the "Father's house"; in the covenant and kingdon of our Redeemer, Jesus Christ; then, wherever they may be, all is well.

Once, years ago, on a Christmas afternoon, we dropped in to see a man and his wife who, we feared, might be feeling lonely at that time of festivity and family reunions. There had been a recent death in the house. We found them sitting alone by their fireside. "Well," said the woman. (and there was a peculiar tenderness and pathos in her voice), "vou find us two here alone together; we have gone back to where we began." It is an experience which comes to many parents: and it is partly for the sake of these that we are writing these words. They have reared their chilren and they have gone; distance, and in some cases perhaps death, has separated them from those they love; they have gone back to where they began; they are left alone. In a certain sense their house is left unto them desolate. For such it is well to remember One who was often "left alone," and to reflect that, for those who love and trust Him, there can be no entire and absolute loneliness, and no house can be altogether deserted. Into the loneliness of every lonely life, into the desolateness of every deserted house, comes silently, if we are willing to let Him enter, the Great Companion. When the writer was young, he had a dear old friend, whom he would often drop in to see, and with whom (for he was then just learning that beautiful language) he was accustomed to practise the speaking of German. Sometimes he would find him sitting entirely alone, in meditative mood, with his hands folded before him. Then he would say, "Sie sind allein?" And the old man, with a beautiful smile, would reply, in the words of a well-known German hymn: "Allein, und doch nicht ganz allein." "Alone, and yet not all alone,"—this may well be the language of every child to God, to whose lot it may at any time fall to be left alone.

Let us look backward; but let us also look forward; forward to the time when changes and partings shall no more take place. Many years ago, not long after the writer had entered the ministry, he remembers once to have passed a Sunday in a strange town, and to have attended divine service in the Presbyterian Church. He will never forget the sermon preached on that occasion. It was from the text, "And He led them forth by the right way, that they might go to a city of habitation." We remember, especially, the stress which the preacher laid upon the expression, "a city of habitation," as an expression implying continuance, permanence, unchangeableness. We remember, also, the

use which he made, in this connection, of the promise that from the heavenly city the redeemed "shall go no more out." It is a promise the deep and tender meaning of which comes home to every one who feels the changeableness and evanescence of our earthly life: how man "fleeth. as it were, a shadow, and never continueth in one stay;" how our family circles are breaking up, and our homes dissolving: how from our earthly homes those whom we love are continually "going out." The father, looking for the last time upon the face of his boy, as he goes forth into the world to seek his fortune; the mother, kissing her daughter goodbye, as she crosses the threshold of her home, to go as a missionary to far-off India or Africa,these know what the promise means that from the city of God there shall be no more going out. We cannot reproduce the preacher's beautiful words, but something like this he said. It is worth while to think much of the time when, and the place from which, they shall"go no more out." There shall be no parting there; and no farewell word shall ever be spoken. "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain."

Past midnight in the deserted house; it is a time and a place for many thoughts and many memories. In what a weird way, at this mystic hour, the past seems to come back and mingle with the present. That sound we seemed to hear just now upon the stairway,—was it the footsteps of a little girl coming with her book to the study to say her lesson? That voice which seemed just now to fall upon the ear,—was it the voice of a little boy, a little boy with golden hair and deep blue eyes? Nay; it was but the wind. They are gone; those days are gone; and those are gone whose presence once filled with brightness and merriment the walls of this now deserted nouse. The wind is growing wilder and louder; may there be no storm on the sea to-night. It is late; let us lay aside our writing and go to our rest, thinking of the time when we shall come to "a city of habitation," and when those who dwell therein "shall go no more out."









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